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1. INTRODUCTION 
As part of this study, a survey of localized failures due to fatigue 
and brittle fracture of domestic and foreign bridge structures was carried 
out. Detailed information was not readily available from most foreign 
sources. Some information was made available but for the most part the in-
formation was not extensive. 
A mail solicitation was made of several states in order to obtain 
supplemental information on cases of cracking that were known to exist and 
where further i~formation was needed in order to summarize the cracking. 
In addition, visits were made to several states in order to obtain 
additional information on known cases of cracking and to acquire new infor-
mation. The states visited included: California, Illinois, Iowa, 
Louisiana, Minnesota, Oregon, Texas, Washington and Wisconsin. 
Altogether information was a~quired on 142 bridge sites. An effort 
to group cracking problems into categories required use of more than 30 
terms to represent the various types of cracking problems. Often a bridge 
site contained more than one kind of bridge structure and several types of 
cracking problems were observed. Table 1 summarizes the design details 
where cracks developed and for which information was acquired. It also 
shows the number of bridge sites where the various kinds of cracks were de-
tected. 
A representative sample of these bridges was selected for a detailed 
review and summaries were prepared which describe the bridge structure, the 
cracking and its causes, the repair or retrofit and the cost. These 
-1-
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summaries form the basis for this report. 
Table 2 provides a list of most bridge sites, the state they are 
located in, and a brief description of the detail or condition that led 
to cracking. 
Each summary has its own reference list and sequence of figures. 
References cited in the individual introductory sections are listed at 
the end of report. 
-2-
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TABLE 1: SUMMARY OF TYPES OF DETAILS EXPERIENCING CRACKING 
Detail. 
1. Eyebars 
2. Pin Plates 
3. Coverplated 
-Beams 
4. Flange Gussets 
5. Flange or Web Groove 
6. Coverplate Groove 
7. Electroslag Welds 
8. Longitudinal Stiff-
eners 
9. Web Gusset 
10. Flanges & Brackets 
through Web 
11. Welded Holes 
12. Cantilever Brackets 
13. Lamellar Tearing 
14. Transverse Stiffeners 
15. Floorbeam Connection 
Plates 
16. Diaphragm Connection 
Plates 
17. Diaphragm & Floorbeam 
Connection Plates at 
Piers 
18. Tied Arch Floor Beams 
19. Tied Arch Floor Beam 
Connections 
20. Coped Members 
21. Welded Web Inserts 
22. Plug Welds 
Initial Defect 
Number 
of 
or Condition Bridges 
Stress corrosion 1 
Forge laps, un-
known defects 12 
Frozen pins 1 
Other 1 
Normal weld toe 3 
Fabrication cracks 1 
Weld toe 5 
Lack of fusion 6 
Lack of fusion 4 
Various flaws 6 
Lack of fusion, 
poor weld 4 
Intersecting welds 5 
Gap between stiff-
ener & gusset 2 
Flange tip crack 3 
Lack of fusion 3 
Tack welds 1 
Riveted Connection 2 
Restraint 1 
Shipping & handling 4 
Web gaps 26 
Web gaps 9 
Web gaps 
Web gaps 
Weld root 
Notch 
Lack of fusion 
Crack 
-3-
4 
8 
2 
13 
1 
1 
Fatigue Catagory 
Initial crack 
Out-of-plane 
D 
E' 
<E' 
E or E' 
Large initial crack 
Large initial crack 
Large initial crack 
<E' 
Out-of-plane 
<E' 
Large initial cracks 
Out-of-plane 
Out-of-plane 
Out-of-plane 
Out-of-plane 
Out-of-plane 
Restraint 
Out-of-plane 
Restraint 
Restraint 
Large initial crack 
Proj. 448-2 
TABLE 1: ·SUMMARY OF TYPES OF DETAILS EXPERIENCING CRACKING (CONT'D) 
Detail 
23. Gusset Plates 
24. Box Girder Corner 
Welds 
25. Stringer-Floorbeam 
Brackets 
26. Stringer End Con-
nections 
27. Hangers (Truss & 
Arches) 
28. Welded Repair 
Initial Defect 
Number 
of 
or Condition Bridges 
Lateral bracing vi-
bration 3 
Transverse weld 
cold cracks 3 
Web gap 4 
Restraint 
3 
Vibration-Wind 4 
Lack of fusion, 2 
weld termination 
-4-
Fatigue Catagory 
Out-of-Plane 
Large initial crack 
Out-of-plane 
Weld termination 
Aeroelastic Instability 
<E 
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TABLE 2: SUMMARY OF BRIDGES 
Bridge 
I.D. No. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
Name 
Kings Bridge 
Silver Bridge 
Yellow Mill Pond 
Quinnipiac River 
Aquasabon River 
Lafayette Street 
Dan Ryan Elevated 
I79 Back Channel 
I79 Tied Arch 
Brady Street 
Meadville 
I78 
Poplar Street 
Lehigh Canal 
Chester-Bridgeport 
Allegheny River 
South Bridge 
Ohiopyle Truss 
Point Marion 
Country Club 
Ft. Duquesne Bent 
St. Anne, Ottawa River 
I24 Bridge at Paducah 
Des Plaines River 
13.9 Mile Grimsby 
5.09 Mile Edmonton 
Walt Whitman 
Mackinac 
Milford-Montague 
C.P.R. Subway 
Founders Bridge 
Location 
Melbourne 
West Va. 
Conn. 
Conn. 
Ontario 
Minn. 
Illinois 
Pa. 
Pa. 
Pa. 
Pa. 
N.J. 
Illinois 
Pa. 
Pa. 
Pa. 
Pa. 
Pa. 
Pa. 
Pa. 
Pa. 
Ontario 
Ill. - Ky. 
Ill. 
Alberta 
Alberta 
Pa. 
Mich. 
Pa. 
Ontario 
Conn. 
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'rype Cracking 
End coverplates 
Eyebar head 
End coverplates 
Longit. stiffener groove weld 
Web insert groove weld 
Lateral gusset-web 
Flange piercing web 
Electroslag welds 
Electroslag welds 
Electroslag welds 
Electroslag welds 
Longit. stiffener groove welds 
Floorbeam web gaps 
Cantilever bracket plates 
Verticals-wind vibration 
Cantilever bracket plates 
Cantilever bracket plates & 
rivets 
Corrosion 
Impact damaged .hanger 
Corrosion & fatigue 
Lamellar tearing 
Welded patch plates 
Thrust brackets, groove welds 
and box corner welds 
Web gaps 
Diaphragm web gaps 
Diaphragm web gaps 
Floorbeam truss-stringer 
brackets 
Floorbeam truss-stringer 
brackets 
Welded gusset 
Longit. stiffener groove 
Lateral connection plates 
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TABLE 2: SUMMARY OF BRIDGES (CONT'D) 
Bridge 
I.D. No. 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
3Z 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
Name 
Se)~our at Mill Pond 
Cromwell 
Wainwright 
Location 
Conn. 
Conn. 
Virginia 
Alberta 
Ill. 157- St. Clair Ave. Illinois 
C. P. Bridge, Dutch Creek Canada 
Belle Vernon Pa. 
Dekorra Bridge Wise. 
Girard P-oint Pier Caps Pa. 
I90 over Conrail Tracks Ohio 
I90 over Cuyahoga 
River Valley Ohio 
Bartow County (L&N) Ga. 
Route 21 Ramp N.J. 
Chamberlain South Dakota 
Belle Fourche South Dakota 
Tilford 
L&N Bridgeport 
Silver Memorial 
Southwest Miramichi 
35.2 Dublin Santa Fe 
412.1 Santa Fe 
Route 17 
I57 Farina Overpass 
Burned River Bridge 
Praire du Chien 
Lehigh-Webster County 
Des Moines (1061 ) 
Iowa City (7659) 
South Dakota 
Alabama 
West Va. 
Canada 
Texas 
Oklahoma 
Va. 
Ill. 
Ontario 
Wise. 
Iowa 
Iowa 
Iowa 
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Type Cracking 
Welded stringer connections 
Lateral connection plate 
web gaps 
Pin plates 
Cross frame connections 
Cracked hangers 
Stringer copes 
Stringer angle connection 
rivets 
Web crack; gusset cracks; 
flange crack 
Flange penetrations 
Transverse stiffener web gaps 
Transverse stiffener web gaps 
Electroslag welds 
Coverplate end 
Cross-frame diaphragm web 
gaps 
Cross-frame diaphragm web 
gaps 
Coverplate groove weld splice 
Eye bar 
Groove welds 
Diaphragm web gap 
Eyebar head 
Web gaps 
Welded bolt holes 
Plug welds 
Web gaps, restraint, corner 
weld 
Welded pelt holes 
Floorbeam-girder web gap 
Floorbeam-girdet web gap 
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TABLE 2: SUM}~Y OF BRIDGES (CONT'D) 
Bridge 
I.D. No, 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
66 
67 
68 
69 
70 
71 
72 
73 
74 
75 
76 
77 
78 
79 
80 
81 
82 
83 
84 
85 
86 
87 
88 
89 
Name Location 
B37-30, Big Eau Pleine Hisconsin 
Dresbach Wisconsin 
I229 Big Sioux River South Dakota 
Napier Ave. - St. Joseph Michigan 
River 
Lenhardtsville I78 Pa. 
Fremont Oregon 
Vermilion River Ill. 
Gulf Outlet La, 
Eel River Calif, 
Mascoutah Ill. 
US 51 @ Peru Ill. 
Old Cairo Ill, 
Meredosia Ill. 
I70 Fayette County Ill. 
Little Vermilion River Ill. 
Crooked River Canyon Oregon 
Milwaukee Harbor Wise. 
Cornell B-9-87 Wise. 
Toutle River Wash. 
Satsop River Wash. 
Stillaquamish River Wash. 
Hwy 27 over !94 Minn. 
Quinebaug Conn. 
New England Mills Calif. 
Merced River Calif. 
Bryte Bend Calif. 
US 61 (657) Iowa 
Decatur (3567) Iowa 
Bear Creek (3958) Iowa 
I80 (3758) Iowa 
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Type Cracking 
Lateral connection plate 
Floorbeam-girder web gap 
Lateral_ connection web gap 
Riveted diaphragms 
Welded insert; 
Gusset welded to flange angle 
Box corner welds 
Crack at cope 
Coverplate groove welds 
Coverplate groove welds 
Corrosion; fatigue @ 
stringer supports 
Corrosion and copes 
Diaphragm web gaps 
Gusset plate cracks 
Stringer end conn. & floor-
beam bracket 
Electroslag welds 
Tied arch floorbeam conn. 
Tied arch floorbeam conn, 
Tied arch floorbeam conn. 
Tied arch floorbeam conn. 
Weld repair of web 
Groove weld 
Coped girder web 
Stringer brackets-web 
Flange gussets 
Diaphragm web gap 
Lateral (gusset) connection 
plate-web 
Diaphragm web gap 
Helded bolt holes 
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TABLE 2: SUMMARY OF BRIDGES (CONT'D) 
Bridge 
I.D. No. 
90 
91 
92 
93 
94 
95 
96 
97 
98 
99 
100 
101 
102 
103 
104 
105 
106 
107 
108 
109 
110 
111 
112 
113 
114 
115 
Name 
Marshaltown (2640) 
Yaquina Bay Bridge 
Siuslaw River Bridge 
Coos Bay 
Santiam River Bridge 
Thruway-Buffalo 
Clarion River Bridge 
Canoe Creek Bridge 
Fayette County (359) 
Red Rock Reservoir 
(613A) 
Cedar River I80 (8859) 
Moshannon Creek 
Ramp C Viaduct I83-
I695 
I470 Ohio River 
BN Sandpoint 
Metro Pier Caps 
Shitoku-Ohashi Tied 
Arch 
Mukaijima-Ohashi 
Location 
Iowa 
Oregon 
Oregon 
Oregon 
Oregon 
N.Y. 
Pa. 
Pa. 
Iowa 
Iowa 
Iowa 
Pa. 
Md. 
W~Rt Va. 
Idaho 
Wash., D.C. 
Japan 
Tied Arch . Japan 
Maoroshi Tied Arch Japan 
Dallas Elevated Texas 
Green Bayou Bridge Texas 
Red River Bridge Texas 
Port Allen Intracoastal La. 
Sunshine Bridge La. 
I90 over Train Ave. Ohio 
Third St. Via., Columbus Ohio 
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Type Cracking 
Groove welded blast plates 
Floorbeam end restraint 
Cracked Stringer webs-
Basqule 
Floorbeam web above end conn. 
Coped stringers 
Longit. stiffener groove 
Floorbeam web gap 
Floorbeam web gap 
Bearing stiffener web gap 
Bearing stiffener web gap 
Bearing stiffener web gap 
Coped stringers 
Box girder web gaps 
Hanger cable fatigue 
Weld repair-flange plate 
Web penetration 
Steel pipe diagonals-wind 
·vibration 
Hv·shaped hangers-wind vib. 
H shaped hangers-wind vib. 
Intersecting welds, end 
restraint 
Lateral brace welded to 
flange 
Coped flange at joint 
Coped finger joint seat 
· Coped sidewalk bracket 
Transverse stiffener web gap 
Lateral connection plate 
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2. EYEBARS AND PIN PLATES 
The failure of the Point Pleasant or Silver Bridge (I.D. 2) in 
1967 as a result of the fracture of an eyebar is well known and a summary 
of this failure is provided hereafter. 
Several other eyebars have cracked in bridge structures although 
none resulted in a collapse. At least two railroad bridges in the U. s. 
developed fatigue cracks in eyebar heads that resulted in fracture 
(I.D. 52, I.D. 48). One such failure that occurred in a Santa Fe Bridge 
in Oklahoma (I.D. 52) was found to be caused by forge laps in the eyebar 
head that happened to be oriented normal to the axis of the pin. This 
served as an initial crack that resulted in fatigue crack growth and even-
tual fracture. 
Five Japanese railway bridges built between 1900 and 1913 have de-
veloped fatigue cracks at the eyebar head normal to the axis of the pin. 
A description of the Fujigawa Bridge is given in Ref. 1. About 820,000 
train crossings have occurred over most of these structures. 
Two bridge structures have experienced cracking in pin plates which 
supported suspended spans. One such crack formed on the net section at 
' 
the pin hole, much like an eyebar failure (I.D. 34). However, in the 
second structure (I.D. 36) several pin plates failed in the gross section 
as a result of corrosion product that "welded" the pin plate heads to the 
girders. This caused bending stresses to be developed in the pin plates 
and the fixity at the ends resulted in cracking at the corroded area. 
Bending stresses were observed in the pin plates of two bridges that were 
-10-
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instrumented during the summer of 1981. Friction and corrosion product 
provided fixity at the pins and caused rigid link behavior and bending. 
A summary of the structure with cracked pin plates is provided in 
this section on the Illinois 157 bridge,(I.D. 36). 
-11-
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2.1 FATIGUE/FRACTURE ANALYSIS 
of 
POINT PLEASANT (SILVER) BRIDGE OVER OHIO RIVER 
-- A Brief Summary --
I.D. No. 
Town/City/etc. 
Railway/Highway/Avenue 
State 
Owner 
2 
Pcir.t Pleasant, W.V. and Kanauga, Ohio 
us. 35 
West Virginia 
West Virginia-DOT 
-12-
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1. DESCRIPTION AND HISTORY OF THE BRIDGE 
Brief Description of Structure 
The Point Pleasant Bridge which carried U.S. 35 highway over the Ohio 
River was located between Point Pleasant, West Virginia and Kanauga, Ohio. 
The bridge was also known as the "Silver Bridge" because it was one of the 
major structures to be painted with aluminum paint (Ref. 1). It was one of 
two nearly identical and unique eyebar chain suspension bridges in the U.S. 
The other bridge, also spanning the Ohio River was at St. Mary's, West 
Virginia until it was dismantled. 
This bridge was an important link between major cities on both sides of 
the Ohio River. It was also an important local artery for industrial plants 
in Point Pleasant and the Gallipolis areas of Ohio. 
The Point Pleasant Bridge was an eyebar chain suspension bridge with its 
axis in an east-west direction over the Ohio River. It had a 700 ft. center 
or main span and two 380 ft. side spans as shown in Fig. 1 (Ref. 1). In addi-
tion,. there were two approach spans on each side of the bridge. They were plate 
girder spans 75.25 ft. and 71.50 ft. in length supported on concrete piers~ 
The two suspension bridge towers extended 130 ft-10.25 in. above the tops 
of the two main piers. The total length of the bridge was 1, 753 ft. (Ref. 1). 
The roadway of the suspended span as originally built in 1928, consisted 
of a timber deck and sidewalks. In 1941, the timber deck was replaced with a 
3-inch deep steel grid floor filled with concrete. The new roadway was 21 
feet wide for two lanes of traffic with a 5 ft-8 inch sidewalk. The new deck 
caused no significant change in the dead load of the structure. 
-13-
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The bridge superstructure was unique in that the stiffening trusses of 
both the center span and the two side spans were framed into the eyebar chain 
to make up the top chord of about half of the length of the stiffening trusses 
{Ref. 1) . Most of the eyebars were between 45 and 55 feet in length of 
varying thickness (1.5 to 2.2 in) depending on the truss panel_inwhich they were 
located. The shank width of eyebars was 12.0 in. They were made of heat treated 
rolled carbon steel bars with forged heads designed to break at ultimate 
loading in the shank. Each joint was composed of 4 eyebar heads and a con-
necting pin or pin rod, and was secured by double nuts on each end of the pin 
rod as shown in Figs. 3, 4 and 5. A view of the stiffening truss and joint de-
tails are given in Figs. 4 and 6, 7, 8. 
Brief History of Structure and Cracking 
Construction began on the Point Pleasant Bridge on May 1, 1926 and the 
Bridge was opened to traffic on May 19, 1928. The brdige originally was 
built and owned by the W. Virginia-Ohio River Bridge Corporation. On 
December 24, 1941, the State of W. Virginia purchased the Point Pleasant 
Bridge and continued to operate the bridge under the authority of the State 
Highway Commission as a toll bridge until January 1952, when it became toll 
free (Ref. 1) 
For almost 40 years, it carried an increasing number of vehicles across 
the Ohio River (Ref. 1). On December 15, 196 7 the Point Pleasant Bridge col-
lapsed suddenly without any warning about 5:00 PM with the loss of 46 lives and 
37 vehicles of all types (.Kef. 1). The three suspended .. sections fell within 60 
seconds. The collapse was immediately preceded by several loud "cracking" 
sounds on the Ohio side span superstructure. According to eyewitness 
accounts, the bridge started to fall, hesitated, and then collapsed 
-14-
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completely with a "roaring" sound that lasted during the collapse (Ref. 1). 
0 The temperature at the time of collapse was recorded as 30 F (Ref. 1). 
It has been clearly established by the investigation (Ref. 1) following 
the failure that the nominal static stresses in all eyebar elements at the 
time of collapse did not exceed those provided for in the original design. 
The main cause of collapse (Refs. 2,3,4) was traced back to the unstable 
extension or brittle fracture of two corrosion cracks located at the pinhole 
of one of the four eyebars (Eyebar 330) of joint Cl3 north (see also Figs. 1, 
2 and 6). The design of the chain was unique in that only two eyebars were 
used in each chain segment and the chain also formed a portion of the top 
chord of the stiffening trusses. Thus, failure of any one eyebar in the 
bridge would cause the complete collapse of the structure (see Fig~ 9). 
-15-
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2. FAILURE MODES AND FAILURE ANALYSIS 
Location of Fracture, Failure Modes and Stages 
Model test results (Ref. 3) on an eyebar and joint assembly made up 
from the structural elements recovered from the wreckage similar to those 
of joint Cl3N indicate that the separation of joint Cl3N was the key event 
in the sequence of collapse of the Point Pleasant Bridge. Several possi-
bilities for separation of Cl3N were considered and tested which imitated 
the cyclic and static load conditions at the time of failure. Physical 
evidence on the .components of the joint by the induced brittle fracture 
through the lower limb of eyebar 330, as shown in Fig. 8, was essentially 
identical to that of the model prototype. Also the opening of the eye of 
the eyebar due to plastic strain as well as the appearance of this second 
fracture in the upper limb of this same eye are essentially similar. 
Branching of the model test opposite limb of the eyebar introduced a 
slightly different appearance after the midwidth of the section (Ref. 3). 
Also, it was observed during the model test that there was an unexpectedly 
long time interval between the instant of brittle fracture in the lower 
limb of eyebar 330 and the subsequent complete separation of the joint. 
This indicated that some time interval would likely be present during col-
lapse of the bridge structure. 
4 
Other studies (Ref. 4) corroborated the mechanism of stable crack ex-
tension responsible for the crack which triggered the collapse. It was con-
cluded that fatigue was probably not the cause of the crack extension (Ref. 
4). The low live load stress range in the eyebar would not be large enough 
to cause appreciable fatigue crack propagation. 
-16-
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The two corrosion-fatigue cracks from which the fracture of the eyebar 
initiated are shown in Fig. 11. Figure 12 shows a sketch of the flaws and 
their dimensions (Ref. 2). Also shown in Fig. 12, are the results of a 
hardness survey through the thickness of the eyebar. Due to heat treat-
ment of the eyebar a harder layer existed at a depth of 0.1-0.4 in. from 
the surface. This also decreased the toughness of the material. Since 
5 
the two flaws lie in the area of highest hardness, the local fracture tough-
ness was less than the average value shown in Fig. 13 (Ref. 2). 
Examination of the flaws and the crack surface revealed considerable 
corrosion and corrosion product. At the location of the flaws, contami-
nated water could be trapped in a crevice area of high stress and high 
local hardness. Hence, stress corrosion appears to have been the oominant 
mechanism for the creation of the two initial flaws or cracks. These 
flaws coupled with the low toughness at the time of collapse caused the 
sudden brittle fracture phase in the lower limb of the eye of the eyebar 
and consequently the catastrophic failure of the Point Pleasant Bridge. 
Cyclic Loads and Cyclic Stresses (Known or Field Recorded) 
A traffic survey conducted by Ohio-DOT in 1964 indicated that 6,640 
vehicles (ADT) crossed the structure as a result of the two-way traffic. 
There were 5,040 of the vehicles that were passenger cars, and the remain-
ing 1,600 were trucks. 
The bridge was not posted for weight limits. However, an ''overload" 
permit was required for all vehicles over 70,000 pounds. On December 7, 
1967 a tractor trailer weighing 98,000 lbs. crossed the bridge without any 
unusual occurrences. 
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A computer analysis of the bridge was conducted after the collapse, 
and it was found that the unit stress at collapse was less than the 1927 
design unit stress for all essential structural members in the bridge 
(Ref. 1). Figure 15 summarizes the results for eyebars 11-13 (Ref. 4). 
The mechanical characteristics of the bridge steel obtained from tests 
after the failure are given in Fig. 16 a,b (Ref. 3). 
Temperature and Environmental Effects 
The atmosphere provided the necessary elements for the development 
of stress corrosion cracking in the heat treated 1060 eyebar steel. Thus 
the size of the corrosion induced cracks was increasing with passage of 
time. 
0 In addition, the recorded temperature at the time of collapse was 30 F 
(Ref. 1). The fracture resistance was then low enough in comparison with 
crack size so that onset of rapid brittle fracturing developed. 
The measured static fracture toughness KIC of the specimens from the 
eyebar material and the estimated dynamic toughness KID are plotted in 
Fig. 12. Approximate values of KIC and KID corresponding to the tempera-
ture of 30-32° F at the time of collapse are indicated in Fig. 12. 
Material "Mechanical, Chemical and Fracture Characteristics" 
Analysis in the Failure Regions 
Several specimens \·7ere tested from the shank portion of the eyebar 
members of the collapsed Point Pleasant Bridge. 
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Chemical and metallurgical characteristics of the material were re-
ported and evaluated in Ref. 2. The tensile and fatigue characteristics 
of the eyebar steel from the collapsed bridge was also investigated, and 
the results are reported in Ref. 4. 
The tensile strength values obtained from standard and special tension 
specimens at room temperatures met the minimum strength requirements of the 
original specifications, as can be seen in Tables 1 and 2. No major vari-
ation in the tensile properties of the eyebar steel is apparent. 
· An analyti~al and experimental study of the fatigue characteristics of 
the small specimens fabricated from the eyebars of the collapsed bridge 
showed that the small stress range levels probable at eyebar Cl3N would be 
too low to cause the imitation and extension of the flaws and cause failure 
by fatigue (Refs. 4,5). The design live load stress in the shank of the 
eyebar was 12.5 ksi. The dead load design stress was 36 ksi. At the time 
of failure, the total shank stress was estimated to be 41 ksi. The stress 
intensity estimate of the crack tip was about 50 ksi lrn. (Ref. 4). 
The measured static toughness KIC and the estimated dynamic toughness · 
Kid of the eyebar material are shown in Fig. 12 (Ref. 5). A temperature 
shift of 100° F was used to estimate the dynamic fracture toughness. At 
the failure temperature of 30-32° F, the value of KIC is 41 ksi ;in. and 
Kid is 26 ksi /In. (Ref. 5). 
The initial flaws or cracks from which the fracture of the eyebar 
initiated are shown in Figs. 10 and 11. Figure 11 also shows results of a 
hardness survey through thickness of the eyebar. Due to heat treatment of 
the original eyebar during manufacturing, the material in the center of 
-19- ' 
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the plate is harder than the material on the surface. The flaws are 
located in the area of maximum hardness (Ref. 5) which produces lower 
fracture toughness. It seems probable that the two corrosion cracks 
would have eventually coalesced and increased K substantially. Hence 
fracture would likely have occurred with a higher toughness material as 
well if it was stress corrosion sensitive. 
Visual and Fractographic Analysis of Failure Surfaces 
Examination of the flaw surfaces on the Cl3N eyebar, revealed con-
siderable quantities of corrosive products. Stress corrosion tests on 
the material showed that it was corrosion sensitive. The fatigue tests 
on specimens with machined surfaces indicated that eyebars of the structure 
should have adequate fatigue resistance (Ref. 4). 
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3. CONCLUSIONS A~~ RECOMMENDATIONS 
Conclusions Regarding Fracture/Failure 
The following conclusions can be made regarding the collapse of the 
Point Pleasant (or Silver) Bridge (Refs. 4,5): 
a) The tensile properties of the eyebars in the structure met the 
minimum requirements of the original design. 
b) The mechanism of crack extension of the initial flaws in Cl3N 
eyebar to the critical size at failure was most likely caused 
by stress corrosion. The eyebar material provided to be stress 
corrosion sensitive. The location of the initial flaws in an 
area of high local hardness in combination with stress corro-
sion sensitivity appears to have been the primary cause of 
·failure. 
Recommendations for Repair/Fracture Control 
This is not applicable to the case of the Point Pleasant Bridge 
failure. The structure collapsed suddenly before the flaws and stress 
corrosion cracking was detected. 
4. ACTUAL REPAIR/FRACTURE CONTROL EFFORTS 
Not applicable to this case. 
-21-
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5. POSSIBLE ADVERSE EFFECTS OF REPAIR 
Not applicable to this case. 
6. ACTUAL OR ESTIMATED REPAIR/REHABILITATION COSTS 
Cost of Failure Investigation 
This is not available. The failure of the Point Pleasant Bridge was 
investigated by Federal Highway Administration, Washington, D.C. (see, for 
instance, Reference List on this Summary). 
Cost of Repair/Rehabilitation 
Not applicable to this case. 
Original (or Adjusted) Cost of Structure 
This is not available. 
-22-
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TJ;,.Bi.":' 1 
TENSILE PROPERTIES fJF TEE P.~.7ERIAL AT Roo..! T:::M:PERATUP.E 
SPECIMEN TENSILE YTl"T J) ELCNGATION 
:t.1JMBER STRENGTH STRE!iGTH m 2 INCHES 
k.s.i. k.s.i. :2ercent 
1 ll6.1 76.9 23.62 
2 ll6.1 79.4 2l.50 
lt ll5.1 79.45 20.90 
5 ll4.95 77.3 20.50 
7 ll9.15 81.45 20.90 
8 1.22.15 83.15 21.29 
10 ll3.2 76.3 21.89 
ll ll3.55 79. 22.00 
AVERAGE ll6 79. 21.58 
TA3LE 2 
TENSION TEST RESULTS TCGETE!:R ;;-rrH THE MliHY".JM STRENGTH 
~UIREMEN'l'S OF ORIGINAL DESIGN SPECIFICATIONS 
Yield Strength TensUe Strength 
lt.s.i. lt.s.i. 
Average Results of 
Standard Specimens 79 ll6 
Special Specimen 82 109 
Values as Required* 
by Specification 75 100 to 105* 
* Taken from original drawing pre:pa.re:i by J. E. Greiner Co. 
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TP.BLE 3 COMPUTED STRESSES IN THE PROTOTYPE EYEBAR 
WHICH w~RE REPRODUCED IN TF~ MODEL EYEBARS. 
~URED .:EASt:RED 
DESIGN LOADS ACTUATOR LOADS TOTAL LOAD . IN STRESS IN !10DEL 
IN POUNDS IN POUNDS EYEBARS 11-13 EYEBARS 11-13 
IN POUNDS IN FSI 
Dead Load 67,200 68,500 36,600. 
Live Load 22,950 23,400 12,500 
Temp. 2,380 2,430 1,300 
Total 92,530 94,330 50,400 
Yield 137,600 140,400 75,000 
(Theoretical) 
NOTE: 
Total area of model eyebars 11-15 ~ere calculated as 2 x 2.4 x 0.39 • 
1.872 1n2 
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Fig. 2 Location of Joints Cl3, U7, and Ul3 
Typical eyebar cnain joint for portion& of the eyebar chain where 
the chain was not framed into truss members. Note hanger· strap 
and &trap plates in the center of photograph. The strap plate was 
connected to the top chord of truss members vertically below the 
eyeba r joint. This plate shows makeup of joint C 13 north. 
Fig. 3 Details of Joint Cl3 
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Oetaikd dia~ram of construction of joint U7 of the north truss of the 
Ohio side span showing the joint pin, the two sets of eyebars, gusset 
plates attaching members of the north truss to the eyebar joint, 
retaining plate and the retaining pin which was inserted through a 
concentric hole in the joint pin and which was installed with two nuts 
:>neither end of the retaining pin. The makeup of the retaining pin, 
retainer plates and the use of double nuts on each end of the 
retaining pin were. common to all eye bar joints except at the tops of 
~he two towers and at the connections of the eyebar chain with the. 
:hain bent post•. 
------------------...., 
Fig. 4 Details of Joint U7 
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Details of connection of Ohio end of lower chord of south truss of 
Ohio side span into south chain bent post on Ohio sid" of bridge. 
Note the square pin connected to vertical chain bent post. The 
lower chord of the side span truss ":'as permitted to move 
L-------------------------longitudinally through provision of a slotted section around the 
Fig. 5 
square pin to equalize expansion and contraction of tht: bridge due 
to temperature changes and changes in live load. The detail 
shown was that used to connect th" lower chords of both trusses of 
the two side spans into the four chain bent posts in the bridge. 
Details of Joint at Ohio End of the Point Pleasant Bridge 
(See Also Fig. 2) 
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Fig. 6 Point Pleasant Bridge (after collapse) 
Fig. 7 One of the Eyebar Joints (after collapse) 
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Fig. 8 Fractured Cl3N Eyebar 
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Fig. 9 Fracture Surface of Cl3N Eyebar 
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Fig. 10 Initial Cracks in Pinhole of Reyebar Cl3N 
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2.2 FATIGUE/FRACTURE ANALYSIS 
OF 
ILLINOIS RT. 157 OVER ST. CLAIR AVENUE 
-- A Brief Summary --
I.D. No. 36 
Town/City/etc. French Village 
Railway/Highway/Avenue: Illinois 157 over St. Clair Avenue 
County St. Clair 
State Illinois 
Owner Illinois 
-35-
Proj. 448 1 
1. DESCRIPTION AND HISTORY OF THE BRIDGE 
Brief Description of Structure: 
The Route 157 bridge located in St. Clair County, Illinois is a skewed 
seven span continuous structure 474 ft.- 6 in. long over St. Clair Avenue. 
It is composed of thirteen rolled WF beams spaced at 5 ft.- 6 in. and vary-
ing spans. Spans 2 and 6 are each 100 ft. long with 60 ft. suspended 
segments supported by cantilevering the adjacent spans. The suspended 
spans are supported by a rocker bearing on one end and by pin plate links 
on the other end, as illustrated in Fig. 1. Figure 2 shows a view of 
span 2. Spans 1 and 7 are 54 ft.-9 in. long and spans 3, 4 and 5 are 
55 ft. - 0 in. long. 
The original A7 steel rolled sections were W36X230 in spans 1, 3, 5 
and 7. The suspended spans were W36Xl50 sections as was span 4. Welded 
cover plates were attached to the bottom flange over the supports at piers 
1, 2, 5 and 6. Two additional A36 steel beams were added in 1966 and were 
W33X200 sections between pier 3 and the north abutment, W36Xl60 sections 
between pier 4 and the south abutment. The structure was designed for 
H20-44 loading. Figure 3 shows a schematic of suspended span 2. 
The structure was built in 1945. In 1966 it was widened by adding 
two beams to the west side of the structure. On October 23, 1978, the pin 
links supporting the ends o.f beams (No. 8, 9, 10) in the passing lane of 
span 2 were found to be fractured as illustrated in Fig. 4. The cracked 
plates were discovered by a district employee driving beneath the structure. 
The beams had dropped between 1/2 to 3/4 in. below the deck slab. Span 6, 
which is identical to span 2, was found to be structurally sound with no 
evidence of cracks in the hangers. 
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2. FAILURE MODES AND FAILURE ANALYSIS 
Location of Cracks, Failure Modes and Stages 
Figure 3 shows the locations of the fractured hanger plates in span 2. 
In addition to the hangers supporting beams 8, 9 and 10, seven additional 
beams had plate hangers which were either bowed or partially cracked, and 
these are also identified in Fig. 3. 
The cause of the failures appears to be due to rust and other corro-
sion product which builds up between the beam web reinforcement and the 
hanger plates. .Since the hangers were located beneath the expansion joint 
finger plates, water, salt and other debris came in contact with the pin-
ned connections of the hanger plates. This resulted in a freezing_ of the 
lower pins. Hence, rigid joints developed with passage of time. 
The frozen joints subjected the hanger plates to large in-plane bend-
ing stress as a result of traffic and thermal expansion. Measurements on 
other bridges with suspended span hangers have confirmed that the relative 
end rotation that is assumed to occur results in large bending stresses 
when frozen hanger plates exist. The repeated loading resulted in cracking 
and eventual failure of the 3/4 in. x 7 in. pin plates. 
Cyclic Loads or Stresses (Known or Field Recorded) 
No measurements or design stresses were avilable for this structure. 
The average daily truck traffic (ADTT) for 1980 was 300. The total 
daily traffic for 1979 was 18,600. The average daily truck traffic results 
in 110,000 cycles of random loading per year. Hence, about 3.5 million 
cycles of repeated load were experienced by the structure. 
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Temperature and Environmental Effects (Known or Field Recorded) 
No temperature data was available. However, it seems likely that the 
thermal expansion of the structure resulted in large bending stresses in 
the hanger plates. 
The slant fractures of the hangers do not suggest any evidence of 
cleavage fracture. (see sketch in Fig. 3). 
Material "Fracture, Mechanical and Chemical Properties" 
in the Failure Regions 
No tests were performed on the hangers. 
Visual and Fractographic Examination of Failu~e Surfaces 
Visual inspection of the cracked hangers revealed a 45° failure sur-
face, as shown schematically in Fig. 3. As can be Seen in Fig. 4, cor-
rosion product exists at the cracked area. No fractographic examination 
was carried out. 
Crack Growth (Initiation and Propagation) 
and Probable Causes of Failure 
The primary cause of failure was the development of frozen pin joints 
as a result of corrosion product. The hanger and girder web reinforcement 
became rigidly attached as a result of the water, salt and other debris to 
which the hangers were exposed. This prevented the links from rotating 
and accommodating the repeated loading from traffic and thermal expansion. 
The cracks develoved in the gross section at the edge of the frozen joint. 
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The corrosion product effectively welded the hanger to the web and prevented 
the net section from becoming critical. The fracture surface of the hanger 
from Beams 8 and 9 appeared to be "very old." The hangers on Beams 5, 6, 
7 and 11 were all bowed. 
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3. CONCLUSIONS/RECOMMENDATIONS 
Conclusions Regarding Fracture/Failure 
The cracked hangers in the Ill. 157 bridge appear to be repeated 
load induced as a result of the frozen pin connection. The suspended span 
end displacements subjected the hanger to high cyclic in-plane bending 
stresses from traffic and thermal conditions. The resulting cumulative 
damage caused cracks to form and propagate at the edge of the corrosion 
"welded" region. 
The highest thermal expansion and contraction stresses were probably 
induced during the periods June-August and December-February. This cor-
responds to the highest and lowest temperature per'iods. Final failure may 
have occurred during the winter period when the material toughness would 
be at its lowest level. 
Recommendations for Repair/Fracture Control 
The northbound passing lane was closed, and Beams 8, 9 and 10 were 
shored, as illustrated in Fig. 5 until the broken hangers were replaced. 
Fourteen additional hangers were replaced during subsequent maintenance 
operations. The hangers on the beams which were added in 1966, were 
inspected and found to be satisfactory. No evidence of cracking was 
observed. 
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4. ACTUAL REPAIR/FRACTURE CONTROL EFFORTS 
The cracked and defective hangers were replaced by Illinois Department 
of Transportation. Beams 7, 8 and 9 were jacked back into place, and new 
hangers and pins installed. All corrosion product was removed, and all of 
the pins were freed up. 
5. POSSIBLE ADVERSE EFFECTS OF REPAIR 
. No adverse effects are expected as a result of the repair procedures 
which were carried out. Other cracks should be prevented from developing 
as long as the hangers function as intended. 
5. ACTUAL OR EST~ATED REPAIR/REHABI~ITA!ION COSTS 
Cost of Investigation 
No investigation was carried out. 
Cost of Repair/Rehabilitation 
The cost of repairing the cracked and defective hangers with Illinois 
Department of Transportation personnel was $10,000, including traffic control. 
Original (or Adjusted) Cost of the Bridge 
The original cost of the structure was $120,836.96 in 1945. The cost 
of widening the structure in 1965 was $208,199.20. 
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TYPICPIL SECTION 
Fig. 1 Typical Hanger Section for Suspended Spans 2 and 6 
---
- ~ : ·:-... . ~. 
.. -
Fig. 2 View Showing Suspended Span 2 over St. Clair Avenue 
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Fig. 5 Steel Shapes Shoring up Cracked Beams in Span 2 
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3. COVER-PLATED BEAMS ru~D FLANGE GUSSETS 
The Yellow Hill Pond multibeam structures (I.D. 3) at Bridgeport, 
Connecticut have developed extensive fatigue cracks at the ends of cover 
plates. A summary of this cracking is provided hereafter. These cracks 
resulted from the large volume of truck traffic and the unanticipated low 
fatigue resistance of the large sized cover-plated beam members (Cat. E'). 
The King's Bridge in Austrailia (I .D. 1) is well known for its failure 
as a result of fatigue cracking and fracture from very large weld toe 
cracks that developed during fabrication in all four girders. 
A third structure experienced cracking at the cover plate end of one 
beam ir. New Jersey (I.D. 44). 
In addition to welded cover plates, several other Category E or E' 
details have experienced fatigue cracking at weld terminations. These 
include gusset plates welded to the flange and the termination of longitudi-
nal stiffener welds at transverse stiffeners or connection plates. Three 
structures have exhibited cracking at the end of flange gusset plates 
(I.D. 39, I.D. 66, and I.D. 85). 
The crack that formed in the Vermillion River Bridge, originated at 
the end of a longitudinal fillet weld that was used to attach a 3 ft. 
(.9 m) long lateral connection plate to the edge of a 8 x 8 x 1 in. 
(20 x 20 x 3 em) flange angle. The gusset plate lapped over the flange 
angle surface and was welded along both edges. An 18 in. (46 em) wide 
cover plate was also welded to the flange angles. 
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Two structures have had cracking at the end of longitudinal stiff-
eners that intersect transverse welded plates (I.D. 65 and I.D. 109). 
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3.1 FATIGUE/FRACTURE ANALYSIS 
OF 
YELLOW MILL POND BRIDGE 
-- A Brief Summary --
I. D. No. 
Town/City/etc. 
Railway/Highway/Avenue/etc. 
County 
State/Province 
Owner 
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3 
City of Bridgeport 
Interstate I-95 
Fairfield County 
Connecticut 
Connecticut-DOT 
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1. DESCRIPTION AND HISTORY OF THE BRIDGE 
Brief Description of Structure: 
The Yellow Mill Pond Bridge carries Interstate I-95 (Connecticut Turn-
pike) over the Yellow.Mill Channel (an extension of Bridgeport Harbor on 
Long Island Sound) is located in the City of Bridgeport, Connecticut. 
The simple spans of the Yellow Mill Pond complex were designed con-
sidering composite action between the rolled cover-plated steel beams 
and 7.25 in. (184 mm) reinforced concrete slab. In 1969 a 2 in. (51 mm) 
bituminous concrete overlay was placed on the concrete deck. 
The bridge complex consists of fourteen consecutive simple span 
cover-plated steel and concrete composite beam bridges crossing the Yellow 
Mill Pond Channel (fourteen bridges in each direction of traffic) (see 
Fig. 1). Each bridge carries three lanes of traffic. The typical posi-
tion of the main beams and diaphragms of the structure a:r.e given in the 
d · f lOU~) · F. 2 d 2 b plan an cross-sect1on o span . . . 1n 1gs. . a an . . The 
external facia beam (M88) of the eastbound bridge is skewed as four lanes 
of through traffic are being reduced to three lanes. 
In order to accommodate the Yellow Mill Pond Bridge structure to 
tidal shipping channel clearances, cover-plated beams were employed by 
the designers in lieu of deeper built-up girders. In the span 10, all 
beams are W36 A242 steel sections. The tension flanges of all beams 
except (M86) interior facia beam of the eastbound roadway are fitted with 
(*) This is the typical span at which field strain measurements were 
recorded and stress-range histograms developed (see also Ref. 1). 
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multiple cover plates (primary and secondary). The compression flanges 
have single cover plates. All cover plates are partial length with the 
exception of the primary plates of the external facia tension flanges of 
(H88) and (M83) which extends to full length. The cover plate ends are 
square, and their corners are rounded to a 3 in. (76 mm) radius of curva-
ture (for the cover plate details, see Figs. 3 and 4). 
Brief History of the Structure and Cracking: 
The Yellow Mill Pond Bridge was constructed in 1956-1957. It was 
opened to traffic in January 1958. In October-November 1970, the steel 
superstructure of the Yellow Mill Pond Bridge were inspected following 
the cleaning and repainting done by the contractor. On November 2, 1970, 
during a routine inspection of the repainting workmanship, it was dis-
covered that a crack had developed in the eastbound roadway in span 11. 
The crack started at the west end of the cover-plated beam and had pro-
pagated through the flange up to 16 in. (400 mm) into the web of one of 
the main girders (girder No. 4, span 11). Figure 5 shows a photograph of 
the beam as it appeared shortly after the fracture was discovered. The 
crack originated at the toe of the transverse fillet weld connecting the 
cover plate to the tension flanage of the beam (see also Figs. 6.a and 6.b). 
Inspection of fifteen similar locations on different girders on the 
same bridge revealed the possibility of incipient cracks of varying magni-
tude along eight of the cover-plate end welds. The two beams adjacent to 
the fractured beam had fatigue cracks which extended halfway through 
the tension flange at the end of cover plates. These were Beams 3 and 5 
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in Span ll of the eastbound roadway. The cracks in Beams 3 and 5 were 
inspected by ultrasonic testing and a crack depth of 0.625 in. (16 mm) 
was measured. 
In December 1970, following the detailed inspection, a section of 
fractured girder was removed, and all three damaged girders were repaired 
with bolted web and flange splices. In November 1973, the east end of 
Beams 2 and 3 of the eastbound roadway of Span 10 were inspected again. 
Fatigue cracks were observed in both girders at the toe of the primary 
cover plate transverse fillet welds. A crack depth of 0.275 in. (10 mm) 
was measured in Beam 2, and its presence was verified by the magnetic 
crack definer. 
In June 1976, the cover plate details in the eastbound and westbound 
lanes of Span 10 were inspected for fatigue cracking by visual, dye pene-
trant and ultrasonic inspection techniq~es. Twenty-two out of forty 
details were found to have cracks. The smallest visually observable 
crack was 0.25 in. (6 mm) long. Ultrasonic inspection provided confirma-
tion of cracks about 0.5 in. (13 mm) long at the west end of the east-
bound lane in Beams 3 and 7 of Span 10. The results of the inspection 
in terms of the crack depth and locations are given in Refs. 1 and 5. 
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2. FAILURE MODES AND FAILURE ANALYSIS 
Failure Modes, Stages and Location of Failure: 
In November 1976, during a brief inspection of Span 13 with field 
glasses from the ground level, four large cracks were observed. These 
cracks were approximately 6- 10 in. (150- 250 mrn) long and about 0. 5 in. 
4 
(13 rnm) deep. They had broken the paint film at the weld toe (see Fig. 6a). 
In September 1977, span 10 was inspected again. The secondary details 
at Beam 5 of the westbound bridge, and the secondary details of Beams 5 and 
6 of the eastbound bridge at the east end were inspected for the first time. 
No cracks were observed. Small cracks were found at the west end of the 
secondary details of Beams 4, 5 and 6 of the eastbound bridge. (These de-
tails were previously inspected in 1976, but no cracks were found at that 
time). In addition, several cracks were found in details in Span 12. The 
cracks were up to 15 in. (381 mm) long. 
In November 1979, several details in Span 10 were inspected again by 
visual and ultrasonic means. The ultrasonic inspection verified the crack 
found during the 1977 inspection. The secondary detail on Beam 4 of the 
eastbound bridge near the west end was cracked. The retrofitted details 
were also inspected, and only one crack was detected, which was growing 
from the root of the primary detail on the west end of Beam 2 of the east-
bound structure. The crack was 1. 25 in. (32 mm) on the surface, and ultra-
sonic inspection indicates 6 in. (152 rnm) length at the root. Small cracks 
were found for the first time at the west end of the secondary detail on 
Beam 2 of the eastbound bridge. 
The history of inspection of span 10 and the location of the cracks 
detected or found each time are summarized in Table 1. Figure 2a shows 
the location of these details. 
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Cyclic Loads or Stresses (Known or Field Recorded) 
The eastbound and westbound bridges of Span 10 were selected for two 
major stress history studies. Both of these studies were conducted by the 
State of Connecticut (CONN-DOT) and the Federal Highway Administration 
(Fffi~A). The first study was conducted in July 1971 (2), and the second 
between April 1973 and April 1974 (3). 
In the July 1971 study two electrical resistance strain gages were 
placed on the interior beams. One gage was placed midspan and the other 
4 in. (102 mm) from the end of the primary cover plate (the gages were 
either on the bottom flange or on primary cover plates). A typical stress 
histogram for the gage on a girder under the eastbound lanes is shown in 
Fig. 7. A typical stress histogram is given in Fig. 8 for the westbound 
lanes. The truck distribution and its position in the lanes were also 
concurrently recorded and the:ir weights were sampled (2). 
It can be seen from stress-range histograms of the eastbound bridges 
that 94-99% of the stress ranges occurring at the cover plate ends fell 
within 0.60-1.95 ksi (4.137 -13.445 MPa) levels. Very few events were 
found to have cyclic stresses in excess of 2.40 ksi (16.548 MPa). A 
single event exceeded 3.3 ksi (22. 753 HPa). At the midspan gages, 97-99% 
of all recorded stress ranges fell within the limits 0. 60- 2. 85 ksi 
(4.137 -19.650 MPa). Thirty-five events exceeded 3.0 ksi (20.684 MPa). 
The overwhelming majority of midspan stress ranges were below 3.6 ksi 
(24.821 ~~a). A large event equal to 7.2 ksi (49.643 MPa) occurred in 
only one case. The gross truck weights were fairly evenly distributed 
between 10,000 and 70,000 lb. with the maximum weights recorded between 
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90,000 and 100,000 lb. The distribution of truck traffic indicated that 
approximately 55 percent of the trucks were in the outer lane and 45 per-
cent in the middle lane. Less than 1 percent were in the inner lane 
The composition of the average daily truck traffic (ADTT ) at the Yellow 
Mill Pond Bridge was about the same as the gross vehicle weight distribu-
tion developed from the 1970 FHWA nationwide Loadometer survey. The 
one-way average daily traffic (ADT) and the average daily truck traffic 
(ADTT) on span 10 is plotted in Fig. 9 for 1958 through 1975. From 
January 1958 to June 1976 approximately 259 million vehicles have crossed 
Span 10. Approximately 13.5% of this total traffic flow is truck traffic. 
Therefore, approximately 35 million trucks crossed the eastbound and west-
gound bridges of Span No. 10 during the interval between 1958 and 1976 
The output of a gage on the diaphragm produced some of the most sur-
prising results within 63 hours, the bottom flange at midspan of the dia-
phragm was stressed to 3.0 ksi or more 2400 times. This included 27 stress 
cycles greater than 5.4 ksi. The only explanation for this phenomenon 
must be related to the rotation of the main girders. Rotation of the 
internal beams are restrained by the diaphram at their points of inter-
section with the girders unless some lateral movement of the latter is 
permitted. This might explain the high incidence of bolt failures in these 
connections. 
During the second study, from April 1973 to April 1974, the stress 
history of the eastbound bridge of span 10 was monitored by mechanical 
strain recorders that were attached at midspan to Beams 3 and 4 
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A comparison of the results with strains recorded at the midspan of Beams 3 
and 4 during July 1971 indicates that slightly higher stress range events 
occurred in 1973 as compared to the 1971 study. 
Also, a limited strain history record was obtained for the eastbound 
bridge of span 10 in June 1976. 
The Miner and root-mean-square (RMS) effective stress ranges for the 
July 1971 study do not differ as much as implied by the June 1976 study. 
Temperature and Environmental Effects (Known or Field Recorded): 
The material toughness for the Yellow Mill Pond Bridge girders satis-
fied the requirements for AASHTO temperature Zone 1. The transiti9n tem-
perature at 15 ft-lb. (20 joules) for the beam flange was 55° F (13° C) 
as shown in Fig. 10. The transition temperature diagram is given in 
Fig. 11 for the web. The web of the cracked beam showed evidence of some 
cleavage fracture. This rapid crack growth may have occurred in September 
1970 when a large overlaod is believed to have crossed the bridge 
In spite of the lower temperatures [i.e. less than 0° F (-l8°C)] the 
adjac~nt girders with sizeable fatigue cracks withstood these conditions. 
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Material "Chemical, Mechanical and Fracture Properties" 
Anal vsis in Failure Regions: 
In December 1970 after a detailed inspection, following the dis-
covery of cracks, a portion of the flange and web adjacent to the crack 
was removed for testing. 
The chemical analysis of the material from the web and flange of the 
W36X300 rolled steel beam indicated that excessive manganese was present. 
The chemistry check based on ASTM A.242 specifications yielded 1.69% 
manganese which is above the limit value 1.45%. All other chemical ele-
ments appear to be satisfactory and within tolerance limits (4). 
Mechanical tests of the flange and web material provided a 57.8 ksi 
(398.519 }~a) yield point for the flange and a 95.1 ksi (655.695 MPa) 
tensile strength. The web material had a yield point of 57.2 ksi 
8 
(394.383 MPa) and a tensile strength of 87.5 ksi (603.295 MPa). Both 
flange and web exhibited satisfactory elongation characteristics (i.e. 28%). 
The fracture characteristics of the web and flange material was 
assessed using Charpy V-notch impact tests. These tests revealed an 
interesting difference in transition temperature of the flange and web 
material. The flange material provided a +55° F (13° C) transition tem-
perature at 15 ft-lbs. (20.337 joules), whereas the web provided -10° F 
(-23° C) transition temperature. This is most likely due to the excess 
manganese and increased thickness of the flange material. Transition 
curves for both flange and web material are given in Figs. 10 and 11. 
Compact tension tests were also carried out, and these provided 1 sec. 
fracture toughness values of about 80 ksi ~. at -10° F. 
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Visual and Fractographic Examination of Failure Surfaces: 
The crack surfaces in the web and flange were subjected to visual 
examination in order to evaluate crack growth regions. Three dis-
9 
tinct areas or regions were noted. The fracture surface examinations indi-
cated that fatigue crack growth started at the weld toe and grew completely 
through the flange and into the web about 2 in. (50.8 mm). The crack path 
changed when it encountered a lamination condition near the center of the 
flange. The lamination retarded the advancement of the path. 
Near the edges of the beam flange, the crack path moved into a second 
crack growth region away from the weld toe. At this stage, tensile frac-
ture partially occurred as evidenced by some apparent necking. The frac-
ture surface in the web characteristically indicates that rapid crack growth 
developed after a 2 in. (50.8 mm) fatigue crack had penetrated into the web. 
The crack extended about 7 in. (177.8 mm) up the web and was finally ar-
rested near middepth. The fracture surface suggested a "brittle fracture" 
mode in the web. There was also some evidence of shear lips at the surface 
of the web plate. It is highly probable that the rapid crack extension 
occurred in September 1970 when a large overload crossed the bridge. 
A third region of apparent slow crack growth which likely occurred 
after the large overload was also observed. 
The fracture surface was coated with oxide and paint. This suggested 
that the crack existed for several months prior to its discovery on 
November 2, 1970 
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3. CONCLUSIONS AND RECO:HHENDATIONS 
Conclusions Regarding Fracture/Failure: 
The field observations on cracking of the Yellow Mill Pond Bridge 
yielded the following conclusions 
10 
a. Significant fatigue crack growth can occur at welded cover plate 
ends when a few stress cycles in the variable stress spectrum 
exceed the constant cycle fatigue limit and a large number of 
stress cycles accumulate (~ 10 7 ). 
b. It is possible that other comparable cover-plated beam bridges 
(with the flange thickness tf > 0. 8 in. (.20 mm) will require 
retrofitting in the future if subjected to high volume truck 
traffic. 
c. The observed field behavior at the Yellow Mill Pond Bridge is 
compatible and corroborated by the results of laboratory tests 
on full scale cover-plated beams. 
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Recommendations for Repair/Fracture Control 
Peening and gas tungsten arc remelting procedures were recommended 
and used to retrofit the cover-plated beams in Span 10 of the Yellow Mill 
Pond Bridge. THenty-five of the cover plate details in· Span 10 were 
treated. Of these, fourteen were peened and eleven were gas tungsten arc 
(GTA) remelted. Figure 12 shows a transverse fillet weld after the gas 
tungsten retrofit at each original cover plate weld. All retrofitting was 
carried out under normal traffic with the dead load in place. A peened 
weld toe at Yellow Mill Pond is shown in Fig. 13. The depth of indenta-
tion due to peening was approximately 0.03 in. (0.8 mm) 
All cracks that exceeded 1-1/2 in. length along the weld toe were 
spliced with bolted butt splices. Holes were placed in the girder web 
directly above the crack., Fi-p;ure 14 shows typical bolted joints used to 
splice across the crack locations. 
4. POSSIBLE ADVERSE EFFECTS OF REPAIR 
No adverse effects of repair and retrofit are expected in the case of 
Yellow Mill Pond Bridge. The end welds of the cover plates should be 
checked periodically in order to insure the integrity of the cover-plated 
girders. 
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5. ACTUAL OR ESTIMATED REPAIR/REHABILITATION COSTS 
Cost of Investigation: 
This is not available as a separate item. 
Cost of Repair Rehabilitation: 
The cost of the retrofit for the Yellow Hill Pond Bridge is given 
by CONN-DOT as $28,825.00 for the original bolted splices. 
Original Cost of the Bridge: 
The original cost was $4,944,333.00 in 1958. 
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Table 1: Insnection Historv 
(Span 10) . 
E"as t bound 
Detail Dec. Nov. June Nev. 1970 1973 . 1976 1976 
lES 
2EP 
2ES 
3EP 
JES 
4EP 
4ES 
5EP 
5ES 
6EP 
6ES 
7EP 
3HP 
3WS 
4 '\.,11' 
·4WS 
6HP 
6i·:'S 
X 
X 
X 
c 
X 
c 
X 
NC 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
c 
X 
c 
X 
c 
v .. 
X 
X 
X 
f! - Beam l~o. · 
X 
cv 
X 
c 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
E - East end of bea~ 
W - West end of beam 
c 
cv 
NC 
cv 
NC 
cv 
NC 
NC 
X 
NC 
X 
NC 
cv 
cv 
NC 
cv 
CV 
cv 
NC 
c 
NC 
NC 
.NC 
cv 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
? - Primary co~er plate detail 
S - Secondary cover plate detail 
NA - Not applicable 
R - Root Crack 
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I·Jestbound 
Sept. Nov. 
1977 1979 
June Sept. Nov. 
1976 1977 1979 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
c 
X 
X 
~c 
c 
X 
c 
c 
X 
X 
!iC 
c 
NC 
X 
c 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
cv 
R 
c 
cv 
c 
NC 
cv 
NC 
X 
X 
X 
cv 
cv 
c 
1\C 
cv 
cv 
c 
NC 
NC 
x· 
NC 
NC 
NA 
cv 
c 
NC 
cv 
NC 
c 
NC 
cv 
X 
X 
cv 
'NA 
X - ~o inspection 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
c 
X 
cv 
c 
X 
cv 
X 
cv 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
NC - No indication of cn.cking 
C - Visual indication 
of cracking 
CV - Crack verified by 
ultrasonic inspection 
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Fig. 4 Cover Plate Detail at Yellow Mill Pond 
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Fig. 5 Cracked Girder 4 in Span 11 
Eastbound of Yellow Mill Pond 
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Fig. 6a Typical Large Crack at Weld Toe at End of Cover Plate 
Fig. 6b Smaller Crack at Weld Toe of Co~er Plate 
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4. WEB CONNECTION PLATES 
Cracks that have developed in the web at lateral connection plates 
have generally occurred as a result of intersecting welds. One of the 
first bridge structures to exhibit this cracking was the Lafayette Street 
Bridge over the Mississippi River at St. Paul, Minnesota. A summary of 
the crack development is provided hereafter (I.D. 6). The primary problem 
was the large defect in the weld attaching the lateral connection plate to 
the transverse stiffener. Since this weld was perpendicular to the cyclic 
stresses, and the weld intersected with the vertical welds attaching the 
stiffener to the web and the longitudinal welds of the connection plate, 
a path was provided into the girder web. 
Similar cracks formed in at least five other bridge structures with 
similar intersecting welds (I.D. 39, 51, 61, 87). In two of these cases 
the cracks were discovered before the girder flange was cracked in two. 
Cracking was also observed in two other bridges where the lateral 
connection plates were installed on each side of the transverse stiffeners. 
(I.D. 33 and 63). This often provided an intersecting weld condition 
between the transverse stiffener welds and the longitudinal welds attach-
ing the connection plates to the girder web. Since no connection was 
provided between the lateral connection plate and the transverse stiff-
eners, out-of-plane movement occurred in the web gap or at the intersect-
ing welds. Tne resulting high cyclic stress conditions in the web caused 
vertical cracks to form in the web. This mode of cracking is shown in 
Fig. 58 of Ref. 2. 
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4.1 FATIGUE/FRACTURE ANALYSIS 
OF 
LAFAYETTE STREET .BRIDGE 
-- A Brief Summary --
I. D. No. 
Town/City/etc. 
Railway/Highway/Avenue/etc. 
State/Province 
Owner 
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St. Paul 
Lafayette Street 
Minnesota 
Minnesota DOT 
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1. DESCRIPTION AND HISTORY OF THE BRIDGE 
. Brief Description of Structure: 
The Lafayette Street Bridge spans the Mississippi River in St. Paul, 
Minnesota. The main channel crossing consists of two parallel structures 
composed of two main girders extending three spans over the Mississippi 
River with the central main span (Span 10) of 362 ft. (110 m) and side 
spans of 270 ft. (82 m) and 250 ft.-6 in. (76 m) (see Fig. 1) correspond-
ing to Spans 9 and 11, respectively. These continuous main girders extend 
beyond piers 8 and 11 as 40 ft. (12 m) cantilevers. The transverse cross-
section consists of two main girders connected by transverse floor beams 
and by transverse bracing, as shown in Fig. 2. The transverse floor beams 
support two stringers. 
The web and flanges of the main girders were fabricated from ASTM A441 
steel. 
Brief History of Structure and Cracking: 
The Lafayette Street Bridge was opened to traffic on November 13, 
1968. The southbound lanes were closed between May 20, 1974 and 
Octobe~ 25, 1974 for repairs to the deck and overlays. 
On May 7, 1975 a crack was discovered in the east main girder of the 
southbound structure in Span 10 (see Fig. 2). Figures 3, 4 and 5 show the 
crack developed in the main girder web and the lateral bracing gusset 
plates. 
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2. FAILURE MODES AND FAILURE ANALYSIS 
. Location of Fracture Failure Mode(s) and Stages: · 
The crack occurred in the "east" girder of the southbound lane in 
Span 10, 118 ft.-8 in. (36m) from pier 10. The web crack had propagated 
to within 7.5 in. (19 em) of the top flange when it was discovered on 
May 7, 1975. The entire bottom flange was fractured (see Figs. 3 and 7). 
A d '1 d d (l' 2) d . 1 . . f f d . eta1. e stu y · an v1.sua exam1.nat1.on o racture port1.ons 
of the girder web, flange and the gusset plate of transverse bracing indi-
cated that fatigue crack growth originated in the weld between the gusset 
plate and the transverse stiffener as a consequence of a large lack of 
fusion discontinuity in this location (see Figs. 3, 5, 6 and 8). The 
fracture surface of the web shows that a brittle or cleavage fracture 
occurred after the fatigue crack propagated into the web through the 
gusset-stiffener weld. As can be seen in Fig. 7, the cleavage fracture of 
web continued and also extended down into the bottom flange, and conse-
quently _the entire bottom flange was broken (see also Fig. 8) . 
. Cyclic Loads and Stresses (Known or Field Recorded): 
The estimated average daily truck traffic (ADTT) crossing the bridge 
was 1500 vehicles during the period November 1968- May 1975. Thus, 
approximately 3,300,000 trucks crossed the bridge prior to the time the 
crack was discovered. 
Stress range histograms for the main girders and other structural 
members are not available. However, the root-mean s·quare stress range was 
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approximated from the gross vehicle weight distribution in Ref. 1. A 
standard HS20 truck is used to generate a moment range in the main girder 
which varied from +3.814 ft-kips (+5.172 kNm) to -1.622 ft-kips (-2.199 KNm). 
This results in a stress range of 4.68 ksi (32 MPa) in the girder flange 
and 4.13 ksi (28 MPa) at the gusset-web connection. A few strain measure-
ments were acquired on the main girders near the fracture during passage 
of an HS 20 type truck and resulted in a stress range of about 2 ksi 
(14 MPa). 
Temperature and Environmental Effects (Known or Field Recorded): 
During the winter prior to May 7, 1975 the temperature at St. Paul, 
Minnesota was recorded at -8° F (-22° C) on March 13, 1975 and on 
February 9, 1975 the temperature in St. Paul reached -22° F (-30° C). 
Material "Fracture, Mechanical and Chemical Properties" 
in the Failure Regions: 
Four pieces (i.e. from I to IV, as shown in Fig. 3) of material from 
the flange, web and gusset plate were removed and tested (see Refs. 1,2). 
Charpy V-notch tests, tensile tests and chemical analysis were performed. 
The results are given in Fig. 9 and Tables 1 and 2. In addition, a few 
compact tension tests (KQ) were conducted on the web plate. 
The web plate was ·observed to satisfy the fracture toughness require-
ments of the 1974 AASHTO Specifications for Temperature Zone 2 [15 ft-lbs. 
(20 Nm) was reached @ 15° F (-9° C) for the web material]. The flange and 
the gusset plates, however, met the requirements of Temperature Zone 1. 
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The flange and web plate show correspondence with the requirements of 
A441 and the gusset plate with A36 steel. 
• Visual and Fractographic Examination of Failure Surfaces: 
The fracture surfaces of part of the web, flange, and gusset plate are 
given in Fig. 5, 6 and 7. From these photographs, it can be seen that 
the transverse and longitudinal single bevel groove welds that connect the 
gusset plate to the transverse stiffener and web did not penetrate to the 
backup bar on the root of the weld preparation. This resulted in a signi-
ficant lack of fusion. 
Further visual examination of the fracture surface indicated that 
fatigue crack growth initiated in the weld between the gusset plate and the 
transverse stiffener as a consequence of the fusion discontinuity mentioned 
above. The fracture surface of the weld indicates that mainly a cleavage 
or brittle fracture occurred in the web after the crack had propagated into 
the web through the gusset-stiffener weld. This cleavage or brittle frac-
ture extended down the web and into the flange (Refs. 1,2). 
Fractographic examination of failure_surfaces at several locations by 
the transmission electron microscope eorroborated the conclusions of the 
visual examinations (Ref. 1,2). 
• Crack Growth (initiation and propagation) and Probable Causes of 
Fracture/Failure: 
The primary cause of failure (Ref. 1,2) is the large lack of fusion 
discontinuity in the weld between the gus~et plate and the transverse stiff-
ener near the backup bars. This resulted in a fatigue crack initiation 
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in the web at the point of the gusset-stiffener-web intersection which 
later created essentially brittle fracture in part of the web and the whole 
cross section of bottom flange of the "east" girder. Probably, the brittle 
fracture of the web occurred during either one of the recorded cold days 
on March 13, 1975 and February 9, 1975. Thus, both fatigue and brittle 
fracture cracks were observed. The crack surfaces showed several stages of 
crack growth (see also Ref. 1,2). 
Final fracture of the web occurred as further fatigue crack growth 
and yielding of the gusset plate occurred which permitted the crack to open. 
This eventually led to the final girder fracture. 
3. CONCLUSIONS/RECOMMENDATIONS 
• Conclusions Regarding Fracture/Failure: 
The fracture of the "east" main girder of the southbound lane of the 
Lafayette Street Bridge was due to the formation of a fatigue crack in the 
lateral bracing gusset plate to transverse stiffener weld. This fatigue 
crack originated from a significant lack of fusion region near the back-up 
bars. At the failure gusset. this groove weld intersected the transverse 
stiffener-web weld and thus provided a direct path for the fatigue crack 
which penetrated the web. Subsequently this fatigue crack precipitated a 
brittle fracture of part of web and all of the tension flange (see Ref. 1,2~ 
• Procedure u~ed for Repair/Fracture Control: 
If other fatigue cracks are removed or properly·arrested, the material 
used in this structure will provide adequate resistance to brittle fracture. 
It is very probable that other discontinuities due to lack of fusion exist in 
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other similar transverse stiffener-gusset plate welds in the two bridges. 
Therefore, all gussets located in the regions of cyclic stress range and 
tensile stress should be properly treated to prevent (and to detect) any 
fatigue crack growth into the girder web(l, 2), 
The scheme used to retrofit the structure is given in Fig. 10. Two 
vertical holes 1.25 in. (32 mrn) were cut into the gusset plate and ground 
smooth at the corners of the gusst-transverse stiffener-web interface. 
Additionally, two smaller vertical holes were drilled through the gusset 
plate and ground smooth at the tips of groove welds which join the gusset 
plate to the transverse stiffener. In the first set of holes [1.25 in. 
(32 mm)], the web surface and the gusset should be carefully inspected by 
6 
a dye penetrant after the material is removed. If no crack indication is 
observed, then the detail can be regarded as adequate. Otherwise, additional 
holes were to be cut into the girder web with a 1.25 in. (32 mm) hole saw 
on the two diagonal lines from opposite sides of the web surface, as shown 
in Fig. 10. After these plugs are removed, the holes should be ground 
smooth and the exposed web surface checked with dye penetrant to insure 
that the web crack does not extend beyond the holes. The holes should be 
ground smooth before the area is painted. 
A suggested redesign for the type of the "gusset-transverse stiffener-
web" connection is given for future use in Refs. 1 and 2. 
4. POSSIBLE ADVERSE EFFECTS OF REPAIR 
No adverse behavior of importance is expected. Some cracking may 
develop in the isolated transverse welds between the holes in the gusset 
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After the repairs there was a slight sag_observed in the south facia 
girder at the location of the original fracture (Ref. 3). According to 
the Minnesota-DOT the repair did not have any significant effect on the 
load-carrying capacity of the structure (Ref. 3). 
5. ACTUAL OR ESTIMATED REPAIR/REHABILITATION COSTS 
Cost of Investigation of Fracture: 
The cost of investigation of the brittle fracture developed in the 
girders of the Lafayette Street Bridge is estimated by Minnesota-DOT as 
$14,620.00 (Ref. 3). 
Cost of Repair/Rehabilitation: 
The total cost of repair/rehabilitation, excluding the costs for 
investigation, is given as $161,120.17 (Ref. 3). 
Original or Adjusted Cost of the Bridge: 
The original cost of the bridge was approximately $4,750,000.00 
according to the Minnesota-DOT (Ref. 3). 
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TABLE 1.-Physicel Properties 
------------ ··--
Property ... -·=c· Fl~nge (A441) Web (A441) lGusse~A36j.-
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
----------~--------------{a) Mechanical 
------·--------------
----
Thickness. in inches {milli- 2-1/2 1/:! 1/2 
lllctcrs) {M) ( 13) {13) 
Yield stress. in kips per 46.0 53.7 37.') 
square inches {meganew- {317) {370) {2(>1) 
tons per square 111ctcr) 
Tensile strength. in kips per 7n.2 X 1.8 f.7.0 
square inch (meganewtons {52.~) (51'.4) (462) 
per square meter) 
Elongation. as a percentage 32.1! ~0.0 36.4 
Reduction in area, as a per-
cent age 65.8 68.0 67.1 
{h) Chemical 
c 0.19 0.23 0.25 
Mn I. 18 1.17 0.!!7 
p 0.046 0.024 0.()31! 
s 0.030 0.044 0.03R 
Si 0.23 0.14 0.06 
Cu 0.25 0.18 ILOif. 
Va 0.046 0.032 O.IX14 
TABLE 2.-K 1c Fracture Tests 
====;;====·==r==~-===;===;:==-==-=--= .. :..-=-=== ..:o..;.-=.~c=·; 
Test Crack 
Speci- temperature, depth, u;. Failure K v• in kips per square 
men in degrees in inches load P0 . in inch ymch (rnega-
num- Fahrenheit (milli- pounds newtons per square 
ber (Celsius) meters) a/"' (newtons) meter per meter 3/2) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
------~----------~-------+---~-+---------!----------------
1 o• <-IX·> 1.20 0.480 s.X75 
(30.5) (26,133) 
2 -25" (-32") 1.20 0.4RO 6,850 
(30.5) 00.470) 
3 -120° ( -84°) 1.23 0.491 4,300 
()1.2) (19,127) 
4 
- 150" (- I 0 I") 1.24 0.496 4.850 
(31.5) (21.574) 
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5. TRANSVERSE GROOVE WELDS 
}~ny groove welds placed into bridge structures were not well executed 
and inspected during the initial applications to welded structures in the 
late 1940's and 1950's. This lack of quality control resulted in large 
lack of fusion defects, slag, and other discontinuities which have led to 
fatigue crack growth and fracture. 
At least four different types of groove weld details have experienced 
crack propagation. One such condition was found to occur in the Aquasabon 
River Bridge in Ontario (I.D. 5), where a rolled section was haunched by 
welding in an insert plate. This resulted in a short .length of vertical 
groove weld perpendicular to the stress field. An embedded discontinuity 
and the poor quality of the detail resulted in crack propagation. 
Cracks have been found in the flange and web splices at groove welds 
in at least four bridges (I.D. 23, 49, 65, 82). The flange groove weld 
cracks detected in the Quinebaug Bridge appear comparable to those 
observed in the Aquasabon River Bridge. Fatigue crack growth developed 
from large unfused region of the weldment. 
In two of the structures, cracks were found in the groove welded 
splices of A514 steel tension members (I.D. 23, 49). In both cases, 
part of the cracking was traced to weld repairs. Other cracks were found 
to be related to cold cr~cking which was apparently not detected at the 
time of fabrication. These structures were fabricated during the period 
1969- 1973. Only the cracks found in the 124 Bridge (I.D. 23) were found 
to have experienced fatigue crack growth. No evidence of fatigue crack 
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extension was detected in the Silver Memorial Bridge (1.D. 49) nor the 
Fremont Bridge (1.D. 65). 
Comparable cracks have been observed in the weld of groove welded 
cover plates. These welds were used to splice two different thickness 
plates which were then attached by fillet welds to either rolled sections 
or to riveted built-up girders. Four different bridges are known to have 
developed cracks at such details (1.D. 47, 69, 70, 90). A review and 
summary will be given of the cracking that developed in the 111.51 
Bridge at Peru (I.D. 70). 
A third kind of groove welded detail that has experienced cracking 
occurs at splices in continuous longitudinal stiffeners. These attachments 
were considered secondary components, and no weld quality control was 
imposed on the groove weld splice. The first such structure to experience 
cracking at this detail was the Quinnipiac River Bridge near New Haven, 
Conneticut (I.D. 4). A summary and review of this structure is provided 
hereafter. At least three other bridges have developed cracks at such 
splices (I.D. 12, 30, 95). One of these structures developed a crack 
during a cold winter prior to being placed into service. In every instance 
of cracking, no weld quality control was imposed on the longitudinal 
stiffener splices. Some of these were in tension zones. As a result, 
cyclic stresses resulted in crack propagation from large defects, and 
these eventually resulted in fracture~ 
The fourth groove weld detail that has resulted in cracking is the 
electroslag weld. The fracture of an 179 bridge flange at Neville Island in 
1977( 3) has resulted in detection of significant flaws in at least five 
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other bridge structures. Except for the 179 structure, all discontinu-
ities in the electroslag welded bridges were detected and retrofitted 
before significant crack propagation developed. The electroslag welds 
were found to have a lower level of fracture toughness than implied from 
qualification tests. Furthermore, detection of the fabrication discon-
tinuities was found to be difficult and not reliable. As a result of the 
179 failure and these other experiences, electroslag welds are not per-
mitted in tension components of bridge structures(4). 
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5.1 FATIGUE/FRACTURE ANALYSIS 
OF 
I.D. No. 
Town/City/etc. 
AQUASABON RIVER BRIDGE 
-- A Brief Summary --
5 
Railway/Highway/Avenue: Highway 17 (Trans-Canada Highway) 
State/Province . Ontario, Canada 
Owner Ontario Department of Highways 
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FATIGUE/FRACTURE ANALYSIS 
OF AQUASABON RIVER BRIDGE 
-- A Brief Surr~ary --
1. DESCRIPTION AND HISTORY OF THE BRIDGE 
Brief Description of Structure 
-1 
The Aquasabon River Bridge is located on the north shore of Lake 
Superior on Highway 17 (Trans-Canada Highway) 130 miles (210 km) east of 
Thunder Bay, Ontario. The structure was completed in 1948. The three-
span continuous beam structure has a composite steel beam-reinforced con-
crete slab. It was designed by the Ontario Department of Highways to 
accommodate an H20 truck load. 
The 200 ft. (61 m) structure has three spans of 52 ft. 5 in. (16 m) 
80 ft. (24.40 rri) and 51 ft. 2 in. (15.60 m)as shown on Fig. 1. The super-
structure consists of four longitudinal 33 in. (84 em) WF girders con-
nected to 15 in. (384 mm) transverse floor beam stringers. The steel 
structure supports a 7 in. (178 mm) reinforced concrete deck. The main 
girders are haunched at both piers and abutments. These haunches •-vere fab-
ricated by cutting the bottom flange from the web fillet and welding a 
parabolic insert plate into the web which resulted in a 51.25 in. (1.30 m) 
deep section at the piers and abutments (see Fig. 2). 
The main girders were field spliced at two points in the center span 
22 ft. (67 m) from each pier as shown in Fig. 2. The splice points were 
placed at the points of dead load contraflexure. The riveted splice con-
sisted of 5/8 in. (16 nun) flange plates on interior and 1/2 in. (12. 7 mm) 
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plates on the exterior girders. All had two 3/8 in. (10 mm) web plates 
for shear splice. 
The reinforced concrete floor slab was connected to the girders by 
channel-type shear connectors of 11 in. x 3 in. (275 mm x 75 mm) welded 
at 1 ft. 6 in. (0.457 m) intervals as shown in Fig. 2. 
Brief History of Structure and Cracking: 
The Aquasabon River Bridge was completed in 1948. In 1963, cracks 
were discovered at the vertical butt weld detail in three of the six 
haunch inserts of the north interior main girder as shown in Fig. 2b. 
(Ref. 1). One of these cracks extended 44 in. (1.12 m) into the girder 
web along a diagonal line starting from the vertical butt weld detail. 
-2 
In 1973, the structure was subjected to rigorous testing to determine 
its safe load-carrying capacity. Prior to the 1973 tests, dye-penetrant 
and magnetic-particle inspection techniques were used on the repaired and 
other 21 remaining original welds. As a result, four other weld cracks 
were discovered. The location of individual cracks are marked on Fig. 1. 
One of these cracks is shown in Fig. 3. 
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2. FAILURE MODES AND FAILURE ANALYSIS 
Location of Fracture, Failure Modes and Stages: 
The fatigue cracks that developed were in the main WF girders and are 
identified in Figs. 1 and 3 (Ref. 1). These cracks propagated from large 
initial weld imperfections or inclusions in the short transverse groove 
welds at the ends of the parabolic haunch inserts in the main girders (see 
Figs. 3, 4, 6 and 7). Of 24 welded details, seven failed. By 1963, three 
of the six haunch inserts in the north interior girder had developed 
cracks. These were repaired by welding cover plates over the cracks. 
By 1973 four more welded details developed cracks. One of the cracks pene-
trated 7 in. (178 rnm) up the web beyond the 2.5 in: (64 rnrn) transverse 
weld and had cracked about 65% of the bottom flange (Ref. 3). With large 
imperfections residing near the bottom of the web, crack growth developed 
in the web and then into the flange as a part circular crack, as sho~m in 
Fig. 4. The enlargement of this crack extended it into the flange and up 
the web. After the crack penetrated through the flange, most of the 
fatigue resistance was exhausted. All cracks were discovered before the 
flanges fractured, because the details were located near the contraflexure 
points where the dead load stress was small. The stages of crack growth 
are indicated in Fig. 4. 
Cyclic Loads and Stresses (Kno~~ or Field Recorded) 
A rigorous field testing of the Aquasabon River.Bridge was conducted 
in 1973. Two fully loaded vehicles each \-lith the gross vehicle weight 
GVW = 197,000 lb. (89,360 kg) distributed on five axles carrying the minimum 
payload of 153,000 lb. (69,400 kg) were used. The payload can be placed 
'i'Jm7 JZM•~_J\\1~~ 
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on the semitrailer to produce any tandem axle weight up to 110,000 lb. 
(49,900 kg). These loads were applied in four increments, while stresses 
in critical areas were monitored. Pier settlements were also measured. 
Dynamic strains were recorded with the test vehicle loaded to a gross 
weight of 91,000 lb. (41,280 kg). The vehicle crossed the bridge at vary-
ing speeds between 30 to 40 mph (48 to 80 km/h). Based on the dynamic 
strain measurements and traffic conditions, a representative stress range 
histogram (S ) was determined (see Fig. 5). 
r 
The Stress Range Histogram was used to estimate the effective root-
mean-square stress range SrF~s· If all stress range conditions above 
0. 85 ksi (5. 9 MPa) are considered, this results in S rRMS = 1. 92 ksi 
(13.2 MPa). The effective stress range using Miner's rule was equal to 
SrHiner = 1. 85 ksi (12. 76 MPa). 
A sample of vehicles crossing the bridge indicated that each vehicle 
produced from six to seven stress cycles. 
Temperature and Environmental Effects (Known or Field Recorded) 
It appears that temperature and environmental effects were not signi-
ficant factors in the development of cracks in the short transverse groove 
welds of the Aquasabon River Bridge. The examination of the crack surface 
and the weld detail indicated that the cracks were stable fatigue cracks. 
This is reasonable considering the low dead load at the inflection 
points. As a result, the maximum stress was small, and this permitted the 
development of large fatigue cracks without brittle fracture 
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Haterial "Chemical, Hechanical a:1d Fracture Characteristics" 
Analysis on the Failure Regions: 
-5 
Web cutouts, taken from the weld failure zones as shown in Fig. 6 and 7. 
were analyzed to determine their chemical composition. The material used 
in the bridge is A7 steel base material. The chemistry checks provided 
0.24% C, 0.74% Hn, 0.09% Si, 0.01% P and 0.03% S. The fracture toughness 
characteristics of the base material was not determined. 
Visual and Fractographic Analysis of Failure Surfaces: 
Visual examination of failure surfaces indicated that stable fatigue 
crack growth developed from imperfections in the transverse groove weld 
(see Fig. 6). The surfaces examined were coated with oxides suggesting 
that the crack surfaces were exposed for a considerable period of time. 
No fractographic examination was carried o~t with the electron microscope. 
Crack Growth (Initiation and Propagation) and Probable Causes 
of Failure: 
An examination of fracture surfaces indicated that the cracks in the 
Aquasabon River Bridge were stable fatigue cracks. There was no 
evidence of brittle fracture (Ref. 2). The fatigue cracks originated at 
large weld imperfections in the short transverse groove welds at the end 
of the haunch inserts in the main girders as shown in Figs. 2, 3, 4 and 6. 
The crack growth (Ref. 2) developed in two stages as shown schemati-
cally in Fig. 4. The first stage corresponds to the growth from the large 
inclusions in the transverse groove welds. The fatigue crack continued 
-99-
Proj. 448 -6 
to grow and propagated into the flange and up the web. During the second 
stage, the crack grew as penny-shaped circular crack through the flange. 
The crack eventually developed into a through crack in the flange. 
For the crack sho\vn in Fig. 6 it was estimated that the effective 
stress range was SrRMS = 1.92 ksi (13.2 MPa) which occurred about 
1,340,000 cycles each year. Approximately 3.5 years would be required 
before the crack penetrated into the bottom· flange during the first stage 
of growth. An addition twenty years would be required before the crack 
propaged through the thickness of the flange. The results of the analysis 
are in good agreement with the actual field behavior of these details. 
The first cracked details were detected in 1963 after fifteen years of 
service and in all probability had a more severe initial discontinuity 
than the detail analyzed (Ref. 1). 
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3. CONCLUSIONS/RECO~~ENDATIONS 
Conclusions Regarding Fracture/Failure: 
The cracking that developed resulted from large imperfections that 
were fabricated in the short transverse groove welds. These welds were 
insufficient length to produce sound welds. 
-7 
The welded connection which caused the problem was difficult to fab-
ricate. In 1948, equipment for nondestructive inspection was not avail-
able. Thus, the weld quality was poor and permitted fatigue crack propa-
gation to develop under the normal stress spectrum that the bridge was 
subjected to. 
This structure demonstrates the necessity to provide sound groove 
welds perpendicular to the cyclic stress. It also suggests that short 
transverse groove welds are difficult to produce with sound welds and 
should be avoided. 
Recommendations Regarding Repair/Fracture Control: 
Fatigue cracks in weld details originating at extremely large 
initial weld imperfections and inclusions were retrofitted as explained 
in the following section (see also Ref. 1). 
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4. ACTUAL REPAIR/FRACTURE CONTROL EFFORTS 
The fatigue cracks discovered in 1963 in the transverse (or vertical) 
weld detail in the three of the six haunch inserts of the north interior 
girder were repaired (Ref. 1). The repairs were made by welding cover 
plates or insert plates (see Fig. 3). Prior to the load tests in 1973 
a through inspection of the repairs and remaining transverse weld details 
revealed four other weld cracks. The transverse weld area was cut out in 
a circular shape, and an insert was welded in its place. Where the crack 
penetrated the bottom flange, it was gouged out and filled with weld mate-
rial at a slow rate of deposit, by using low hydrogen-coated electrodes. 
All repaired surfaces were subsequently ground smooth .and flush· to elimi-
nate any stress concentrations. 
5. POSSIBLE ADVERSE EFFECTS OF REPAIR 
The probable adverse effects of the original repairs might be the 
possibility of new imperfections or inclusions fabricated into -the repair 
welds. Installation of bolted flange splices were later applied, as cracks 
were also observed in the groove welds that connected the flange to the 
web plate insert. Figure 8 shows the flange splice detail. 
This subsequent retrofit should offset and prevent any significant 
distress from developing in the structure. 
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6. ACTUAL OR ESTIMATED REPAIR/REHABILITATION COSTS 
Cost of Investigation: 
According to the Ontario Department of Highways' estimate, the 
inspection and investigation of the cracking in the Aquasabon River 
Bridge is $8,200.00 in 1979. 
Cost of Repair: 
The cost of repair and retrofit of the bridge in 1979 was given as 
$92,141.00. 
Original Cost or Adjusted Cost of Structure: 
This is given as $74,616.00 in 1947 by the Ontario Department of 
Highways. 
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Table 1 Expected Maximum Live Load Stresses 
(Loading= two 177,000 lb. vehicles) 
L oca :irJ:1 - y Ex;sc~ed Stresses, tsi 
::-ef. East Brg. Live I Dead I To":al 
2!_;. I !~azimu:n :Snd Span -20.1 I - 9.0 I -29.1 
I I 44 1 
-
2:::::.. ::au::ch · .. :elci 
I Detail -15.8 I .,. 2.5 -13.3 I 60' East Pier +17. 4 "-14.1 i +31.5 
-
I 
I 
I 
30' 
-
Splice Zone -13. a - 2.0 I -15.9 / i 
I 
l 100' Ce!:ter 2;::3.:--. -2C.6 I -10.5 -3l.1 I I i L_ ______ --- i 
- ive = Tensile Stress 
+ ive = Co~pressive Stress 
Table 2 Summary of Estimated Life with Crack Growth Stages 
(Aquasabon Bridge) 
Stage 1: Crack Growth Through web 
Initial Crack 
Size, a1 , in. 
0.25 
0.30 
0.32 
Stress Cycles 
srRHS = 1. 92 ksi 
25,360,000 
8,175,000 
4,500,000 
Stage 2: Crack Growth Through Flange 
b.i tial Crack 
~adius, in. 
1.40 
1 L.:: 
-.. ./ 
l. 50 
31,700,000 
26,200,000 
I 21 ' 4CO ' 000 
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Fig. 1 
WEST ABVT. 
Plan and Elevation of Aquasabon Bridge (Crack Locations are indicated with mark X) 
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Fig. 2a Main Girder Haunch Detail, Field Shear Splice and Connector Detail 
-- Aquasabon Bridge 
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Fig. 2b Location of Weld Failure in Main Girder 
(see Fig. 3 for a detailed photograph of circled area) 
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~· 
~ . 
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Fig. 3 Typical Crack at Vertical Butt Weld Detail 
(Terminal Point of Haunch Insert Detail) 
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I. 
INCLUSION 
Fig. 4a Details of Weld Inclusion 
STAGE I 
BOTTOM 
FLANGE 
Fig. 4b Assumed Stages of Crack Growth 
STAGE 2 
' I / -
" ,/at / BOTTOM 
-....... -/ FLANGE 
--
(Outer Edge of Weld Inclusion is shown as dark line) 
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Fig. 6 Crack Surface at Weld Detail 
(Inclusion area is the dark 
area in the photograph) 
··~ ______ ._ __ .. ·········--------
.... ~--. -- --------· --- ------. -
Fig. 7 Circular Cut-Out Section at 
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5.2 FATIGUE/FRACTURE ANALYSIS 
OF 
QUINNIPIAC RIVER BRIDGE 
-- A Brief Summary --
I.D. No. 
Town/City/etc. 
Railway/Highway/Avenue 
State/Province 
Owner 
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North Haven 
Interstate Route 91 
Connecticut 
Connecticut DOT 
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1. DESCRIPTION AND HISTORY OF THE BRIDGE 
Brief Description of Structure 
The Quinnipiac River Bridge on Interstate 91 near New Haven, 
Connecticut (see Fig. 1 a,b) is a four span structure over the Quinnipiac 
River. Span 1 is of composite construction with \\1F beams and welded 
girders. Spans 2, 3 and 4 are noncomposite welded girders of cantilever 
type with a suspended center span. The suspended part of the structure in 
Span 3 is 165 ft. (50.3 m) long between the hinges which connect it to the 
anchor spans (Spans 2 and 4, see Fig. 1). The span lengths are 
62 ft.- 12 in., 112 ft., 220 ft. and 111 ft. -1 in. for the Spans 1, 2, 3 
and 4, respectively. The entire structure is on a skew, as shoWn in 
Fig. 1. _The cross-sections of Spans 2, 3 and 4 are composed of nine paral-
lel welded girders supporting each roadway in between metal team-type 
guard rails separating the traffic. The main girders have transverse 
X-type bracing and longitudinal stiffeners. 
Th~ roadway is a 7-3/4 in. thick reinforced concrete deck. This con-
crete deck forms a composite system with WF beams in Span 1. 
Brief History of Structure and Cracking 
The structure was opened to traffic in 1964. In November 1973 a 
large crack was discovered in the south facia girder of the suspended span 
in the center portion of the bridge. The bridge had experienced approxi-
mately nine years of service life at the time the crack was discovered. 
The exact loaction of the crack in the south facia girder of the sus-
pended span is shmm in Fig. 1. 
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2. FAILURE MODES AND FAILURE ANALYSIS 
Location of Crack, Failure Modes and Stages 
As shown in Fig. lb and Fig. 2, the crack developed in the south 
facia girder web. The crack propagated approximately to the mid-depth of 
the girder, as shownin Fig. 2b, and had penetrated the bottom flange of 
the girder at the time it was discovered. The location of the crack is 
shown on the schematic profile of the bridge in Fig. 1. It is approxi-
mately 59 ft. - 6 in. from the left support of the noncomposite suspended 
span. 
2 
A detailed study (Ref. 1) of the fracture surfaces indicated that the 
fracture had initiated at the unfused butt weld .in the longitudinal stiff-
ener. The portions of the fracture surfaces in the vicinity of the butt 
weld were severely corroded from exposure to the enivornmental effects. 
The crack surface indicated that some crack extension probably developed 
from the unfused section of the butt weld across the thickness of the 
stiffener during transport and erection. 
Examination of the crack surface in the web adjacent to the longi-
tudinal stiffener showed that a "brittle fracture" had occurred following 
the penetration of the web thickness by fatigue crack growth. Study of 
the fracture surfaces shown in Figs. 4, 5 and 6 revealed that the cleavage 
fracture propagated throughout the depth of the fractured web and pene~ 
trated some distance into the flange before it had arrested. Several 
stages of crack growth and the failure modes starting from the unfused 
butt weld on the longitudinal stiffener-girder web interface are indicated 
in a schematic manner in Fig. 9. 
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Cvclic Loads or Stresses (Kno~~ or Field Recorded) 
The stress range histograms for the girders were obtained in 1981. At 
the critical section of girder, three load cases exist: (1) stress a11 
due to the "live load,_" (2) stress a dl due to "dead load," and (3) residual 
stress a due to welding. 
rs 
The equivalent stress range for live load are approximated from 
Miner's rule using gross vehicle distribution given in Ref. 2. This is 
approximately S M' ~ 1.95 ksi (13.4 MPa) in the flange where the design 
r ~ner 
stress range S D . 
r es~gn 
4.35 ksi (30.0 MPa). The corresponding stresses 
at the longitudinal stiffener areS M' ~ 1.17 ksi (8.1 MPa). The maxi-
r ~ner · 
mum live load stress at the longitudinal stiffener is estimated to.be 
2 ksi (13. 8 MPa). (See Ref. 1 for details.) 
The average daily truck traffic (ADTT = 4300) crossing the bridge 
was estimated to produce 1.600.000 random cycles per year corresponding 
to the S M' ~ 1.17 ksi (8.1 MPa). 
r ~ner 
The stress adl due to dead weight was 4.95 (34.1 MPa) at the critical 
cross-section (see Ref. 1 for details). 
Temperature and Environmental Effects (Known or Field Recorded) 
As shown in Fig. 9, Stage III of crack growth was the brittle frac-
ture of the ~.;reb probably during a time of low temperatures. Comparison of 
the fracture surfaces from the three point bend tests indicated that the 
web had fractured when the temperature was between 10° F (-18° C) and -10° F 
(-25° C). Brittle fracture initiated in a zone of high residual tensile 
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stresses. Once the crack became unstable, it propagated through the web 
and was eventually arrested in the girder flange. It is highly probable 
that the brittle fracture occurred during the period of December 1972 -
March 1973, when the material toughness of the web would be decreased by 
low temperatures to a minimum level (Ref. 4). 
Material "Fracture, Mechanical and Chemical Properties" 
in the Failure Regions 
Several pieces of the web and flange material at the cracked area 
(see also Fig. 4) were removed. Standard ASTM Type A Charpy V-Notch (CVN) 
tests, and tensile tests were conducted on the web and flange material 
(Ref. 1). 
The tensile tests provided a yield strength of 36.8 ksi (254 MPa) and 
an ultimate strength of 60.9 ksi (420 MPa). The results of the CVN tests 
are summarized in Fig. 10. Both flange and web material satisfied the 
toughness requirements for Group 2 of the 1974 Interim AASHTO specifica-
tions. The average CVN impact value for the web was 20 ft-lb. (27 J) at 
40° F (4° C). The flange provided 37ft-lb. (47 J at 40° F (4° C). 
Several three-point bend specimens were al~o fabricated from the 
web material. A notch with a 45° chevron front was machined at the center 
of the specimen to initiate fatigue crack growth. 
The specimens were tested at temperatures of -40° F (-40° C), -20° F 
(-20° C), and a 0° F (-18° C). From a comparison of the fracture surface 
of the web crack with the fractures of the K test specimens an estimate 
c 
of the temperature at which brittle fracture occurred was made. On this 
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basis, it is believed that the fracture occurred at temperatures between 
~10° F (-25° C) and 10° F (-14° C) (see also Fig. 11). It is apparent from 
Fig. 10, that CVN energy absorbtion and consequently the dynamic toughness 
of the girder material decreased significantly at 0° F (-18° C). The esti-
mated fracture toughness of the web steel from the J-lntegral Analysis are 
plotted in Fig. 11. These tests indicated that the fracture toughness of 
the web material was betweenlOO ksi and 150 ksi at the time of the fracture. 
Visual and Fractographic Examination of Failure Surfaces 
The fracture surfaces of flange-web longitudinal stiffener-web inter-
section (at which the crack originated), and the ends .of the longitudinal 
stiffener are given in Figs. 4, 5 and 6 respectively. 
Visual examination of the fracture surfaces (see Figs. 4, 5 and 6) 
indicated that the failure had initiated at the web-stiffener intersection 
due to an unfused butt weld in the longitudinal stiffener. The web frac-
ture's surface indicated that brittle (cleavage) fracture occurred follow-
ing the' penetration of the web thickness by a fatigue crack. 
Replicas of the web-longitudinal stiffener intersection (Fig. 7) and 
near the flange-web intersection (Fig. 8) were made and examined with the 
transmission electron microscope. The examination of web-stiffener inter-
section confirmed that fatigue crack growth had· occurred (see Fig. 7) in 
that region. The brittle (cleavage) fracture extended into the flange 
(see Fig. ~t· 
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Crack Growth (Initiation and Propagation) 
and Probable Causes of Failure 
6 
The primary cause of failure was the inadequate butt weld made across 
the width of the long~tudinal stiffener. It is probable that some crack 
extension from the unfused section occurred during transport and erection 
of the girder. Several stages of crack growth based on the visual and 
fractographic examination of the fracture surface of the web .are shown 
in Fig. 9 (see also Ref. 1). 
Stage III in Fig. 9 was the brittle fracture of the web after the 
initial fatigue crack became unstable and propagated rapidly down the web 
and arrested in the flange. This stage likely occurred during low tempera-
ture in the period of December 1972 - March 1973. 
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3. CONCLUSIONS/RECOH:HENDATIONS 
Conclusions Regarding Fracture/Failure 
During its nine years of service life, the fractured girder is esti-
mated to have sustained 14.5 million cycles of random truck loading. The 
final brittle fracture and failure of the girder resulted from an initial 
crack which started from an unfused butt weld in the longitudinal 
stiffener-girder web interface which enlarge in fatigue. The final 
failure occurred at the end of several stages and modes of cracking as 
shown in Fig. 9, probably during the period of December 1972- March 1973, 
when the material toughness of the web would be decreased considerably by 
low temperatures. 
Recommendations for Repair/Fracture Control: 
Reference 1 analyzes in detail the cracking and subsequent brittle 
fracture and failure of Quinnipiac River Bridge. However, no recommenda-
tions w~re presented in Ref. 1 as to the repair and rehabilitation of the 
structure. 
The information file on the bridge indicates that the fractured south 
facia girder was repaired by Conn-DOT with spliced bolted plates following 
removal and grinding smooth of the poor quality butt weld in the longi-
tudinal stiffener-web interface which initiated the Stage I in Fig. 9. 
Figure 12 shows the bolted splice detail used i~ repairing the 
cracked girder. In addition, several other inadequate groove welds were 
detected, and holes were drilled in the web in order to isolate the crack 
which was propagating into the girder web. 
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4. ACTUAL REPAIR/FRACTURE CONTROL EFFECTS 
The fractured south facia girder of the Quinnipiac River Bridge was 
repaired by the Connecticut-DOT personnel, as schematically shown in 
Fig. 12. After necessary grinding of flame cut surfaces in the web and 
flange, bolted splice plates were installed to restore the integrity of 
the structure (3). Holes were drilled in the web to isolate a second 
crack near midspan. 
5. POSSIBLE ADVERSE EFFECTS OF REPAIR 
8 
Not expected in this case (3) provided all the inadequate goove welds 
similar to the one which caused the fracture of the south facia girder 
were taken care of as recommended in the previous section. 
6. ACTUAL OR EST~~TED REPAIR/REHABILITATION COSTS 
Cost of Investigation 
This was not available (probably not documented as a separate item by 
the Connecticut-DOT). 
Cost of Repair/Rehabilitation 
The repair cost of the fractured girder according to a Connecticut-
DOT estimate was $7,960.00. 
Original (or Adjusted) Cost of the Bridge 
The original cost of the structure was given as $2,236,912.00 by the 
Connecticut-DOT. 
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5.3 FATIGUE/FRACTURE ANALYSIS 
OF U.S. 51 OVER 
ILLINOIS RIVER AT PERU 
I.D. No. 70 
Town/City/etc. Peru 
Railway/Highway/Avenue U.S. 51 
County · LaSalle 
State/Province Illinois 
Owner Illinois 
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1. DESCRIPTION AND HISTORY OF BRIDGE 
Brief Description of Structures 
The U.S. 51 Bridge over the Illinois River at Peru is a 2292 ft. 
(765 m) thirteen span structure with the three main truss spans consisting 
of a cantilever truss 1077 ft. (360 m) long. The suspended center span of 
the truss is 477 ft. (160m), and the two side spans are 265ft. (90 m). 
The approach spans consist of two 75 ft. (25 m) single span units, one two 
span and two three span units, all with spans of ± 137.5 ft. (± 46 m). 
Except for Spans 1, 2 and 3, each span is constructed with four riveted 
plate girders spaced 10 ft. - 3 in. (310 em) apart. Span 1 has six girders, 
and Spans 2 and 3 have five girders. Figure 1 shows the plan and elevation 
of a typical 137.5 ft. (46 m) span with five girders. Welded cover plates 
were attached to the riveted plate giiders at the piers and at midspans, 
as illustrated in Fig. 2. 
The girder webs were fabricated from A7 steel. The flange angles and 
cover plates were furnished A373 steel. 
The bridge is one of the few early girder bridges that combined 
riveted girders and welded cover plates. 
Brief History of Structure and Cracking 
The structure was built in 1958. On July 22, 1980, painters reported 
a cracked cover plate at a transition weld, as shown_ in Fig. 3. As of 
January 30, 1981 district maintenance personnel had located thirteen 
transverse cracks in the bottom cover plate groove welds, including two 
-133-
Proj. 448 2 
locations in the negative moment region adjacent to Pier 2. Cover plates 
were cracked in two at two locations, one including the outside leg of a 
flange angle, as shown in Fig. 4. Eight girder cover plates were cracked 
between 2 and 4 in. (5 and 10 em) from each edge of the cover plate. At 
three locations, grinding revealed full width subsurface cracking, as 
illustrated in Fig. 5. Four out of six girders were cracked near the 
quarter point of the north approach span. 
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2. FAILURE MODES AND FAILURE ANALYSIS 
Location of Fracture, Failure Modes and Stages 
Of the thirteen transverse cracks detected in the cover plate groove 
welds, two were in the compression flange of the negative moment regions 
adjacent to pier 2. The cover plates were cracked completely at two loca-
tions. The cracks all appeared to be fatigue cracks, which had propagated 
from large internal flaws in the cover plate groove welds. 
Ultrasonic testing of suspected weld defects in Spans 11, 12 and 13 
(corresponding to the riveted plate girders in Spans 1, 2 and 3, respec-
tively) was also carried out. These tests revealed a 3/4 in. x 7/16 in. 
(2 em x 1 em) crack in the outstanding leg of an 8 in. x 6 in. x 7/8 in. 
(20 em x 15 em x 2.25 em) bottom flange angle near pier 12. All cover 
plate butt welds were ground smooth and tested with liquid penetrant in 
order to locate subsurface cracks. 
_Cyclic Loads and Stresses (Known or Field Recorded) 
The 1979 estimated annual daily traffic crossing the bridge was 
10,700 vehicles per day. The 1980 estimated annual daily truck traffic 
was 1950 ffiulti-unit vehicles per day, including occasional 120,000 lb. 
(54,400 kg) permit loads. 
The design stress range in Span 1 was found to equal 10 ksi (68.95 MPa) 
at the groove weld near the 0.26 point from the north approach for HS20 
loading. T~e stress ranges in Span 2 were found to equal 8.5 (58.6) and 
11:4 ksi (78.6 MPa) at the groove welds in the positive moment region near 
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the 0.23 and 0.55 points where cracks had been detected. The stress range 
adjacent to pier 2 in the compression flange was 4.4 ksi (30 MPa). 
The net section properties were used to estimate stresses in the ten-
sion flanges of the positive moment areas and the gross section was used 
for the compression flange in the negative moment regions. 
Temperature and Enviornmental Effects (Known or Field Recorded) 
There was nothing available. 
Material "Fracture, Mechanical and Chemical Properties" 
in the Failure Regions 
There was nothing available. 
Visual and Fractographic Examination of Failure Surfaces 
There was nothing available. 
Crack Growth (Initiatio~ and Propagation) 
and Probable Cause of Failure 
The primary cause of failure was the poor quality of the groove welds 
at the thickness transitions of the cover plates. This was due to incor-
rect procedures used during fabrication and resulted in poor weld quality. 
Large cracks appear to be fabricated into the members as a result. 
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3. CONCLUSIONS/RECOMMENDATIONS 
Concl~sions Regarding Fracture/Failure 
The groove weld transitions at all cover plate splices were ground 
to expose subsurface cracks. 
Butt welds that had surface cracks less than 1/16 in .. deep were 
ground smooth, and the crack removed. The .joints were also liquid pene-
trant tested to insure that no evidence of cracking remained. 
Recommendations for Repair/Fracture Control 
All groove welds which were found or suspected to be defective were 
retrofitted with bolted splice plates. A typical splice is shown ln 
Fig. 6. The repair work was carried out by Illinois DOT day labor crews. 
Those groove welds that were found to be acceptable by nondestructive 
inspection were ground smooth and left as constructed. 
·Actual Repair/Fracture Control Efforts 
5 
All defective butt welds were ground down a maximum of 1/4 in. (6 mm). 
Contact surfaces between the splice plates and existing cover plates were 
ground smooth to ensure proper fitting. 
Bent cover plates were used to splice across the defective butt welds 
in Spans 2 and 13. 
Additional bolts were added to compensate for the forces induced by 
the sloped bearing face. Figure 6 shows the general splice detail used 
throughout the structure. 
-137-
Proj. 448 
Possible Adverse Effects of Repair 
No adverse effects are expected as a result of the repair procedures 
that were carried out. 
Actual or Estimated Repair/Rehabilitation Costs 
Cost of Investigation 
This was not available. 
Cost of Repair/Rehabilitation 
The repair cost for retrofitting the cracked cover plates was 
$32,035.64 (day labor costs 1980). 
Original (or Adjusted) Cost of the Bridge 
The original cost of the structure in 1958 was $2,539,737.88. 
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6. WEB PENETRATIONS 
The cracking of the rigid frame bents of the Dan Ryan elevated transit 
structure in Chicago in 1978, resulted in an examination of other struc-
tures with comparable details. In the Dan Ryan structures, longitudinal 
girders framing into the steel box bents had their bottom compression 
flanges pass through slots in the box girder web. A detailed description 
of this cracking is given in the summary that follows (I.D. 7). 
In the Dan Ryan structures, the flange plates that passed through the 
web slots were groove welded to the web. However, large lack of fusion 
defects were found to exist in the web at the tips of the flange plates. 
Two other bridge structures have experienced cracking at similar lack 
of fusion conditions (I.D. 40 and I.D. 105). In both instances the.details 
were retrofitted before significant damage developed by isolating the 
detail with holes similar to the condition described for the Dan Ryan. In 
the Girard Point pier caps (I.D. 40) the flange plates were connected to 
the web slots by exterior fillet welds only. In the Metro pier cap 
(I. D. 105) vertical reaction brackets were passed through the web. These 
brackets were welded to the web using backup bars and the resulting crack-
like condition and lack of fusion adjacent to the flange resulted in 
significant crack growth. 
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6.1 FATIGUE/FRACTURE ANALYSIS 
of 
DAN RYAN RAPID TRANSIT STEEL BOX BENTS 
-- A Brief Summary --
I. D. No. 
Town/City/etc. 
Railway/Highway/Avenue 
County 
State/Province 
Owner 
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Chicago 
Dan Ryan Rapid Transit 
Cook 
Illinois 
Chicago Transit Authority 
Proj. 448 1 
1. DESCRIPTION AND HISTORY OF THE STRUCTURE 
Brief Description of the Structure 
The Chicago Transit Authority's (CTA) Lake- Dan Ryan Rapid Transit 
Line provides direct service between· the city center and the south and 
west sectors of the city. The tracks ascend from the median onto a via-
duct which carries them through a curve of 400 ft. or 120m radius to a 
smaller junction curve which joins them with the old North-South Elevated 
structure at 17th and State Streets. The side view and underview of the 
structure are shown in Figs. la and b. 
General features of the viaduct at the location of cracked bends Nos. 
24, 25, 26 are shown in Figs. 2a and 2b. The superstructure consists of 
four continuous plate girders which carry a cast-in-place concrete· deck and 
two tracks. The rails of the two tracks are on wooden ties resting on bal-
last. The bents supporting the four continuous I-beam plate girders have a 
box-shaped cross-section consisting of two column legs and a horizontal box 
member as shown in Fig. 2b. The stringer bottom flanges plass through 
flame-cut slots near the bottom of the side plates or webs of the box 
girders. The stringer flange was inserted through these slots and then 
connected to the supporting box girder web by groove welds all around the 
flange surface. 
The stringers at the location of failure have a track curvature of 
400 ft. or 120 m in the horizontal plane, and they intersect the boxes at 
different angles (approximately 45°). With the exception of bent No. 35, 
the bents were fabricated with portions of the superstructure girders or 
stringers welded integrally within the boxes. The girder stubs project 3 to 
4 feet from the sides of the boxes and are connected with the continuous . 
girders by a pinned link or bolted connection (see also Fig. la). 
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Brief History of the Structure and Cracking 
The entire structure was designed in 1967 in accordance with the 
criteria and procedures established by the American Railway Engineering 
Association (AREA), the American Welding Society Specifications, and the 
2 
CTA design policy for elevated railways. The construction of the Dan Ryan 
Line started in April 1968 and was complete and opened to traffic in 
September 1969. On an average day, 46 7 tra,ins (in both directions) pass 
over this viaduct. The trains vary in length from eight cars during the 
rush hours to two cars during the nighttime(1 •2 •3). 
On January 4, 1978, a crack was discovered in one of the steel box 
girders in bents (or frames) near 18th and Clark Streets. Subsequent 
inspection of the structure verified the existence of this crack fn bent 
No. 24 and also revealed that bents Nos. 25 and 26 were cracked as well. 
A typical crack is shown in Figs. 3a and 3b. The most recent inspection 
prior to the discovery of the cracks was conducted in July 1976, and no 
significant cracks were found at that time. 
Initial examination of fractures in bents Nos. 24, 25, and 26 
indicated that they originated from fatigue cracks at or near the welded 
junctions where the bottom flanges of stringers intersect the steel box 
bent side plates (see Figs. 3 and 4a, b, and c). 
Prior to the discovery of the fractures, temperatures in the Chicago 
area were extremely low on several occasions. There were five occasions 
when the temperatures dropped below 0° F, and the coldest trnperature 
recorded at Hidway Airport was -7° Fin December 1977. 
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2. FAILURE MODES AND FAILURE ANALYSIS 
Location of Crack(s), Failure Modes and Stages 
The field examination and measurements indicated the location shape 
and pattern of the crack, as shown in Figs. 4a, b, c. The common feature 
of the cracks in bents Nos. 24, 25 and 26 was their close proximity to the 
vertical edge of the bottom flange of the stringers(1 • 2 •3). The cracks 
completely separated the box girder bottom flange plate and both side 
plates or webs in all three bents Nos. 24, 25 and 26. Openings at the bot-
torn flange of about 3/4 in. (20 mm) were measured. They were arrested at 
the edge of, or with only very little penetration into the top flange plate 
of the box girder of the bents. In bent No. 24, the crack extended into 
the web of the plate girder (see Fig. 4a). 
The initial field examination of fractures in bents Nos. 24, 25 and 26 
indicated that they initiated at the welded junction of a plate girder or 
stringer bottom flange tip to the supporting box girder side plate. Chevron 
markings were observed on the fracture surfaces pointing toward the welded 
junction. The fracture surfaces on bents Nos. 25 and 26 appeared to be lightly 
rusted, while the fracture surfaces on bent No. 24 was more heavily rusted. 
The trajectory of the crack in the box girder of each bent was 
influenced by the dominance of tension, shear, and flexural stresses 
(see, for instance, Figs. 4a, 4b and 4c). 
The examination of the fracture surfaces in each bent showed that a 
brittle fracture occurred after fatigue cracks developed from the unfused 
welds at the edges of the bottom flange of stringers (or I-bearns) inter-
secting horizontal box girder of bents( 3). In the fractured bents, the 
intersections were connected by partial penetration welds on the outside 
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and little or no weld inside. Typical stages of crack growth in one of the 
box girders are presented in Fig'. 5. 
Cyclic Loads or Stresses (Known or Field-Recorded) 
Following the discovery of cracking in the bents of the Dan Ryan Rapid 
Transit, a reanalysis of the bents based on the finite element method was 
performed. The stress analysis indicated that the computed stresses were 
generally less than the values allowed by the governing specifications of 
the American Railway Engineering Association. The maximum design shear 
stress in the web plate in the east side of bent No. 24 near stringer 
girder No. Gl27 was 17.27 ksi (119 MPa) which exceeded the value of 
12.5 ksi (86 MPa) ~urrently allowed by these specifications(l, 2). · 
The normal design cyclic stress range during passage of a train was 
estimated to be about 3.2 ksi (22 MPa) at the edge of the stringer flange. 
With variable amounts of impact and multiple presence of two trains on 
occasion, it was estimated that an effective stress range of 1.4 ksi (10 MPa) 
was reasonable. for the trains that had crossed the structure. About 7 million 
.variable stress cycles had occurred before rapid crack extension. 
Temperature and Environmental Effects (Known or Field-Recorded) 
The temperatures in the Chicago area were known to be extremely low 
prior to the discovery of the fractures. There were five occasions when 
the temperatures dropped below 0° F (18° C), and the coldest temperature was 
recorded at the Midway Airport on December 1977 of -7° F (22 C). Low tempera-
tures were again experienced in Chicago on January 3, 1978 at the time the 
crack in the box girders of the viaduct d . d(l,2) V.'aS lSCOVere . 
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Material Fracture, Mechanical and Chemical Properties 
on the Failure Regions 
5 
Several sample pieces were recovered from the fractured box 
girders(l, 2). From this material specimens were fabricated. Tensile 
tests, chemical analysis, Charpy V-notch tests (CVN), Compact Tension 
Fracture tests (CT) and metallographic and fractographic examinations were 
conducted on these samples(1 • 2•3). 
The tensile tests provided a yield strength (0.2% offset) of 33.7 ksi 
(235 MPa) and an ultimate strength 69.6 ksi (480 MPa). Machining and test-
ing was done according to ASTM Designation E8. 
The chemical analysis performed on the specimens was done according 
to ASTM Designation E350. 
Both tensile and chemical tests indicated that the material used in 
the structure conformed to the ASTM requirements for A36 steel (1 • 2 •3). 
Charpy V-notch tests (CVN) .were performed on the specimens in accord-
ance with ASTM Designation E23. The results are presented in Fig.· 6. The 
results ·indicated that all plates satisfied the impact requirements of the 
AASHTO specifications [15 'ft-lb. (20 joules) at 40° F (4° C)] for a mini-
mum service temperature of -29° F (-34° C) for Zone 2. The transition 
temperature behavior for the material in the range between +40° F (4° C) 
and +70° F (+21° C), as shown in Fig. 6( 2) 
Compact tension fracture (CT) specimens were tested at a one second 
loading rate between -30° F (-34° C) and +30° F (-1° C) in general accord 
with ASTM Designation E399. The results did not fulfill the requirements 
of AS~}f E399, and therefore the stress intensity factor Kic had to be 
obtained by a J-Integral approximation. 
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The results are summarized in Fig. 7. It is apparent from Fig. 7 
that a significant increase in toughness developed about 10° F (-12° C)(l). 
Visual and Fractographic Examination of the Failure Surface 
Visual examination of fracture surfaces indicate that the stringer 
bottom flange tip was partially welded to the box girder side plate. 
Paint was also noted in gas holes and other. unfused portions of the 
fracture surfaces in bent Nos. 24 and 26. Slag, blowholes and paint on 
unfused regions were observed in the welded junctions(l, 2). 
A detailed microscopic examination was carried out on the fracture 
surfaces of bent No. 26 (see Fig. 5) and to a limited extent on bent 
Nos. 24 and 25. The examinations were made by both the transmission elec-
tron microscope and the scanning electron microscope. The microscopic 
examination showed that the major portion of the fracture surface below 
and above the welded juction is coarse grained and contains chevron 
markings, typical of brittle fracture(1 •2•3). 
The examination of a piece removed from bent No. 24 indicated that 
crack growth initiated near the inside flame cut surface and also at the 
exterior weld surface and extended toward the outside. Similar observa-
tions were made for bent No. 25. 
The microscopic examination established that fatigue cracking (see 
Fig. 8) in the welded junctions had preceded the subsequent brittle frac-
tures. The estimated length of flaws in bent Nos. 24, 25 and 26 
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(vertical height of the flame-cut region) plus additional height of fatigue 
cracking was 3 in. (8 ern), 3 in. (8 em) and 2 in. (5 em), respectively. 
The metallographic examination did not reveal any defects in the 
steel. The appearance of the grain structure near the surface was con-
sidered to confirm both fatigue and fracture modes of crack propagation. 
Crack Growth (Initiation and Propagation) 
and Probable Causes of Fracture Failure 
The field examinations of the fractures in bent Nos. 24, 25 and 26 
indicated that the fatigue cracks originated at the partially welded 
junction ~f an I-beam plate girder (or stringer) bottom flange tip to the 
side plate of the box bent( 2•3). Numerous weld deficiencies were apparent 
such as slag, blowholes, etc. Subsequent microscopic analysis of the 
failure surfaces confirmed the above observation (see Fig. 8). 
The laboratory testing verified that the combination of stress con-
centration at the point of origin, fatigue cracking and cold temperatures 
was sufficient to cause the brittle fracture of box girder bents. 
It can be concluded that the severe stress concentration and the lack 
of fusion in.the welds at the junction of the stringer bottom flange and 
side plate of the box girder (or bent) is the primary cause of the cracks 
which occurred in the bents of the Dan Ryan Rapid Transit struct~re( 2 • 3 • 4 ). 
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3. CONCLUSIONS/RECOMMENDATIONS 
Conclusions Regarding Fracture/Failure 
A detailed examination of the fracture surfaces from the cracked 
steel pier bents of Dan Ryan Elevated structure has shown that these frac-
tures were all caused by fatigue cracks( 2 •3). These cracks originated from 
poor quality welds at the edges of stringer bottom flanges where they inter-
sect box bents (see Fig. Sb). 
During fabrication slots for the stringers flanges were flame cut into 
box girders. Subsequently stringers were inserted through these slots and 
connected to the box bent girder web by welding. This kind of connection 
created the high stress concentration at the weld adjacent to the stringer 
flange. Thus, the joint was very sensitive to fatigue crack propagation 
at very low levels of stress range(1 •2 •3). 
The fatigue cracks developed at welds adjacent to the stringer flange 
edge in box bent girders reached a critical condition at the low tempera-
tures that occurred in Chicago in late December, 1977 and early January, 
1978. Thus, fatigue cracks, poor quality welds, high stress concentrations 
and low temperatures occurring simultanously caused the brittle fractures 
of box girders which were discovered in early January, 1978(l, 2). 
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Recommendations for Repair/Fracture Control 
A detailed repair and fracture control plan for the bents of the Dan 
Ryan Rapid Transit is given in Refs. 2 and 4. Specifically for locations 
where flanges pass through the web, any retrofit must reduce the severe 
9 
stress concentrations at the intersection of the stringer·bottom flange and 
box girder webs (or side plates) and also reduce high residual stresses 
from weld shrinkage. 
For this purpose, "dumbbell" type retrofit holes and saw cuts were 
installed on side plates of the box bents near the tips of all stringer 
bottom flanges as shown in Fig. 9. In addition, 1 in. diameter holes at 
the tip of the cracks in the fractured bents were .used to arrest the 
cracks(2 •4 ). The cracked side plates and bottom plate of the horizontal box 
member of each bent are to be repaired with bolted splice plates. Also, 
the depth of the horizontal box member cf each bent is to be increased by 
addition of a "U" shaped section which will be bolted to the underside of 
the existing box as shown in Fig. 10. 
Prior to retrofitting the structures and after one week of lack of 
service, temporary support cribbing was erected under each cracked bent to 
provide support to the cracked members. These cribs have remained in 
place pending the final repair( 2). 
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4. ACTUAL REPAIR/FRACTURE CONTROL EFFORTS 
Immediately following the discovery of cracks in box girder side 
plates (or webs) on January 3, 1981, Department of Public Works of the 
City of Chicago started the construction of temporary support structures 
under the box girders at Bent Nos. 21 through 26( 2). 
Each temporary steel support structure consisted of jacking beams 
10 
placed on both sides of the box girder and supporting the existing longi-
tudinal plate girders. Jacking beams were supported by a steel falsework 
tower with bracing resting on timber mudsill and crushed stone( 2). The 
temporary support structures were to carry the weight of the tracks and 
. '1 h . d f' d . ( 2) tra1ns untl t e permanent repa1r an retro lt recommen atlons were 
implemented. 
Holes were placed at the flange tip of all details.as shown in Fig. 9. 
5. POSSIBLE ADVERSE EFFECTS OF REPAIR 
In the case of Dan Ryan Rapid Transit Structure no adverse effects of 
repair are expected. However, the field inspection of the structure at 
critical details in intervals to preclude the possibility of fatigue crack 
growth ·should be continued. 
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6. ACTUAL OR ESTIMATED REPAIR/REHABILITATION COSTS 
Cost of Investigation 
This is not available. 
Cost of Repair/Rehabilitation 
The cost of repair/rehabilitation is not available. 
Original or Adjusted Cost of the Structure 
The original cost of the structure is not available. 
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Fig. l.a General View of Dan Ryan Rapid Transit Structure 
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Fig. l.b View of Cracked Bents Looking.West from Clark Street 
(Arrows Are Pointing to Locations of Fracture). 
-157-
I 
,__. 
lll 
00 
I 
~ct_ PI '-R 20 
I A . 
¢. PI!;.R 1.7. 
(, I.IIHG'-'1~ 
t H. O. TRAC¥-~ ct ~1Hg.~7 -?. 
C.R.I.ARR.Ri 
SE.CTION A-A 
(HPANOE.D SC~t.E.) 
• .... H 
DAN RYAN RAPID TRANSIT ELEVATED STRUCTURE INVESTIGATION 
PIER LOCATION PUN 
DE LEUW, C_ATHJ;:R & COMrlRY • COIISULTIR.8 £118111££U AIIO PLAIIIIUS 
CHICAGO • IlliNOIS 
«t_ 5.t>.TRACil 
<l PI~ 'Z7"'J__. 
. ct,l.liNG'-ttiJ--
¢,f.UNG'- F-1 J__. 
~ PI'A 2&-J--
Fig. 2.a Schematic Plan and Locations of Cracked Bents (Bent Nos. 24, 25, 26) 
ST R'-I:T 
I 
I~ 
Ut 
cc 
I 
l 
' 
Fig. 2.b 
ttt CCI.. puq Pll!&J 
2 r- and Crack Locations Bent No. u 
~-... 
..... 
,-1-=- y -::a.,.~"'fu ff~ 
lt.'-•"•11W'•r-olllllii• 
lltl!O!I 1!-!1 
IOl!QI! fLMH bu PIJM, 
::-JI. .......... .-c~ 
..... , ...... ........ 
..... .... r:-=:~·-"'~~~=·""•'"' 
~ 
II:PAitf:~ ~ ~~~ WCMtlll 
.._,ltf~ OP hMIMIIIttwt 
DAN RYAN RAPID TRAHIIT 
COM HUCf ., •• t 
ll(VATlD IJftUCnntl 
• l4fH Ullffl TO I ClAitll: lfllllll 
. rot R DllAill 
'"'" .. 
MAI..I: ~~·.:.. f·4MW •I _;:......_ .... 
I 
t-' 
0"' 
0 
I 
·~ .... 
. . 
·J~ 
•. t". 
Box Girder 
(a) Location of Fracture (Bent No. 26) (b) Close-up View of Cracked Box Girder Web 
Fig. 3 Fracture of the Box Girder (Bent No. 26) 
of outside pl.atc girder under south-bound ~<t 
~------,Jt~v-~~: ~-~-4·-~----~A~ 
cracks -1 
Elevation of east •ide plate 
r-
T,~ 7.41''2 
I, 
> IY'4 
1 
Section II-A 
"''I'' -2. t;." r--~-~1· 
.. 
V,c;, 
c f:'\EA~VR~D 
WIOTI( OF 
c. R,lo.. c."'-
Elevation of west side plate 
Section B-B 
Fig. 9-.-- Cr.tck pr<>fllc on 1\cnt No. 21, 
Fig. 4.a Crack Profile on Bent No. 24 
-161-
, 1-- 4. of outside plate--L __ 40_:_1," _ J~ '2J H __ j girder under south-
/ ; . UounJ tracks 
I I -i' r--
Ye." . ~ I 
c 
~ 
I 
vi)" 
(_ rv!EoA'S\IRE-0 
.,.Jit:>TI-\ oF 
uu\c.~;:. 
Elevation of c~st •ide plate 
Elevation of west side plate 
Section C-C 
F . 4 b Crack Profile on Bent No. 25 l.g. . 
-162-
c 
J_J 
ELEVATION OF WEST SIDE PLATE 
I • 132 
I • 1 'a 
• \_MEASURED 3116 WIDTH OF CRACK 
EAST SID 
SECTION D·D 
F . 4 Crack Profile on Bent No. 2b l.g. .c 
-163-
I 
r' 
(j\ 
.t~ 
I 
Inside I Outside 
.... ... 
of Box Girder 
--f--- Brittle Fracture 
Fatigue ---1_ 1\ 
Crack 
,.......,....., ___ Fatigue Crock From 
Outside Surface 
Painted ----r\\' 
Surface 
Study Region 
--+---Brittle Fracture 
(a) Stages Fatigue Crack Growth (b) Fracture Surface of Box Girder Web 
Fig. 5 Schematic of Fracture Surface at Bent No. 26· 
80 
"' 60 
.D 
...l 
I 
20 
----• 13ent No. 
-- --• Otnt No. 
----"' 11entNo. 
· • • • • • 0 Dent No. 
24} 
25 
26 
25 
3/4" web plate 
Ji" flange plate 
) I 0 
I 
·; .... I . / 
. / 
/ 
/ 
/ 
Bottom 
Flange 
.I~ 
0 .. ····; 
~All test~; meet cut rent 
Well 
Platt' 
1-----------------;;~rL---1/ AASHTO requlrem .. nt for 15 
Zor.e 2 cf I 5 ft-lbp@ 40'?F • 
.. ··~· 
. . . . 
.Temperature, °F • 
Fig. 6 Comparison.of CVN Test Results 
-165-
400 
300 
_,...,. 
·= 
. ·-1 
~ 200 
:::::: 
1 00 
0 
-SO 
-8---§ 
0 
-30 -10 10 
o_ 
Test Temperature J: 
30 
Fig. 7 KIC vs. Test Temperature 
-166-
50 
Fig. 8 Fatigue Crack Growth Striations in Region 3 
on Box Girder Web Surface at Bent No. 2b (X17000) 
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7. WELDED HOLES 
Several bridges have developed cracks as a result of misplaced holes 
that were subsequently filled with weid. This has resulted in lack of 
fusion and other cracklike defects at each welded hole that eventually 
experienced significant crack growth and fracture. 
At least three multibeam bridges developed major cracks in one or more 
girders as a result of welding-up misplaced holes. The Ill. 57 overpass 
at Farina (I.D. 54) is reviewed and summarized hereafter. Welded-up mis-
placed holes in rolled sections resulted in the cracking of one of the 
beams. Similar conditions were found in two structur~s in Iowa (I.D. 57 
and I.D. 89). 
In every instance cracks were observed to originate at several holes. 
These often linked and resulted in fracture of the section. Only the 
Illinois structure experienced a crack that turned and traveled down the 
~ength of the beam. 
A similar condition was found to exist in a cover-plated plug welded 
chord of the Burned River Truss Bridge in Ontario (I.D. 55). The cover 
plate was attached to a rolled section with plug-welded holes. This 
created- a lack of fusion and defect condition that was similar to the weld 
filled holes. The crack eventually caused the chord to fracture. 
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7.1 FATIGUE/FRACTURE ANALYSIS 
OF 
COUNTY HIGHWAY 28 BRIDGE OVER I-57 
-- A Brief Summary --
I.D. No. 54 
Town/City/etc. near Farina, Illinois 
Railway/Highway/Avenue: County Highway 28 over I-57 
County Fayette County, Illinois 
State Illinois 
Owner Iiiinois-DOT 
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1. DESCRIPTION AND HISTORY OF THE BRIDGE 
Brief Description of Structure: 
The county Highway 28 bridge over Interstate I-57 is located north of 
Farina, Illinois in Fayette County. The structure is a skewed four-span 
composite-reinforced-concrete-slab steel-beam bridge. It was completed 
and opened to traffic in 1968. The bridge primarily carrieslocal traffic 
over Interstate I-57. 
The general plan and elevation of the structure is given in Fig. 1. A 
typical cross-section is shown in Fig. 2. The bridge has a 32 ft. wide 7 in. 
thick reinforced concrete deck supported by five continuous W36Xl50 steel 
beams of ASTif A36-67 steel. It has two 95 ft.- 5 in. midn spans. and two. 
55 ft. - 8-1/2 in. side spans. The concrete slab is connnected to the main 
girders with shear studs with different spacings depending on the location 
along the span. 
The entire structure was constructred in accordance with the "AASHO 
Standard Specifications for Road and Bridge Construction,''January 2, 1958; 
the supplemental specifications, dated January 3, 1966; and the current 
specifications of Illinois-DOT. 
Brief History of Cracking: 
On March 8, 1977 a large crack in the south side of the first interior 
girder (Girder No. 2) of the second span was discovered by a construction 
technician while driving under the birdge (1). The fracture in the stringer 
originated at one of the four horizontal rivet holes which were mispunched 
and later improperly repaired and filled with weldments. 
During the winter of 1976-77 very low temperatures of -20° F (-29° C) 
were experienced in the area where the bridge was located (1). 
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2. FAILURE MODES AND FAILURE ANALYSIS 
Location of Fracture, Failure Modes and Stages: 
The location of the fracture in the south interior beam is shown in 
Fig. 3, and a detailed schematic drawing is given in Fig. 4 (1). 
2 
There were two seperate fractures which started from two holes filled 
with weldment immediately under the clip angle supporting the diaphragm 
(1,2). Both cracks were initiated from weld filled holes with large slag 
inclusions. Both fractures propagated down through the flange of interior 
beam 2B2 at a common termination point. These cracks also extended up and 
turned longitudinally along the web at about middepth. One crack extended 
about 1 ft. (0.305 m) while the other curved upward and extended hori-
zontally approximately 15 ft. (4.57 m), reaching the next diaphragm as 
illustrated in Fig. 4. Photographs showing the cracks and the plug holes 
are given in Figs. 3 and 5. 
Several pieces, including the crack surface, were removed by flame 
cutting at locations shown in Fig. 7. 
The results of mechanical and fracture tests of the material and 
visual examination of the fracture surfaces shown in Fig. 5 and 6 indi-
cated that the failure was primarily a brittle fracture along the entire 
length of the cracks. 
There was very little ductility in the fracture. ·The brittle fracture 
probably occurred during the extremely low temperatures recorded in the 
area during the winter of 1976-77. Close examination of the plug welds 
show the existence of the herring bone patterns near the slag and voids in 
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welds (1,2). Thus, the fracture likely initiated from fatigue sharpened 
cracks originating from slag and voids in the plug welds. During low tem-
peratures, the brittle fracture resistance was decreased. The small crack 
from plug weld 4 (probably occurred at about the same time as the cracks 
from plug weld 3) propagated, as shown in Fig. 4.b, in brittle failure mode 
down toward the bottom flange and intersected the crack from plug weld 3. 
Cyclic Loads and Stresses (Known or Field-Recorded): 
The normal traffic using county Highway 28 bridge over I-57 is com-
posed mainly of automobile and light farm equipment (1). There are no 
truck traffic counts available. Illinois-DOT estimated the ADT.to be 400 
vehicles in 1976 (3). The computed design stress in the bottom flange 
adjacent to the origins of fracture is 15.2 ksi (104.8 MPa) based on the 
HS 20 truck loading (3). 
A series of field live-load tests with loaded trucks were conducted 
on the bridge following the repair of the fractured beam. During these 
tests a dump truck was loaded with gravel to a gross vehicle weight of 
44,700 lb. (98,500 kg). This truck was driven across the bridge in order 
to determine the live load response of the structure. 
A series of strain gages were installed on the replacement beam 2B2 
at several locations including the fracture initiation point (for strain 
gage locations, see the schematic figure included in Table 1). This gage 
was used to estimate the maximum live-load stresses (1). Results of thes 
field tests are summarized in Table 1. The measured stress ranges in 
Beam 2B2 were all quite low with the maxi~um stress range being 3.46 ksi 
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(23.9 MPa). The ASTM A36-37 steel used in the beam has a yield point of 
43.5 ksi (300 MPa). Therefore, live-load tensile stresses observed in the 
beam even with the addition of the dead-load stresses are well below the 
yield point of the steel. Welding residual stresses from the weld filled 
holes would introduce stresses near the yield point at each hole. 
Temperature and Environmental Effects (Known or Field Recorded): 
The time the fractures of the south side interior girder in the bridge 
over I-57 were discovered, temperatures in the locality during the 1976-77 · 
winter were as low as -20° F (-29° C). Aside from the low service tempera-
ture, no other significant enironmental effects were apparent. 
Material "Fracture, Hechanical and Chemical Properties" 
Analysis in Failure Regions: 
The lower portion of the beam 2B2 in the shape of a tee-section was 
removed from the bridge by flame cutting between two bolted splices. 
Specimens fabricated from this portion of the beam 2B2 were used for ten-
sile tests, Charpy V-Notch tests, fracture toughness tests and for the 
chemical analysis (1). 
The results of chemical analysis_indicated that the chemical composi-
tion of the steel was well within the chemical requirements specified for 
A36 steel (1). 
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Tensile tests were also conducted on specimens fabricated from beam 
2B2. The test results indicated that the web material had an average 
yield point of 43.5 ksi (300.0 MFA) and an ultimate strength of 71.3 ksi 
(491.6 MPa). Similar results were obtained for the flange. The tensile 
properties of the steel satisfied the specification requirements for 
ASTM A709 Grade -36 steel (A36 steel). 
5 
Charpy V-Notch tests were carried out in accordance with ASTM 
standard A370. Four sets of standard size specimens were cut from the web 
and flange of the fractured girder. 
The test results are summarized in Fig. 8. Both longitudinal and 
transverse specimens were tested from the beam web. All of the specimens 
tested at 40° F (4° C) exceeded the 15 ft-lb. (20 J) requirement of the 
AASHTO specifications for A36 steel: 
Web specimens "WL" with their lengths parallel to the 
direction of rolling of the beam (the notch being perpen-
-dicular to the direction of rolling) 
Web specimens "WT" with their lengths transverse to the direction 
of rolling (the notch being parallel to the direction of rolling). 
Two sets of flange specimens were cut with their lengths parallel to the 
direction or rolling of the beam and their notches parallel to the surface 
of the flange, and 
Flange specimens "FT" was located at the top of the flange, 
Flange specimens "FM" was located at the middepth of the flange 
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In addition to the Charpy V-Notch tests, fracture toughness tests 
were conducted· on bend specimens in order to establish the toughness of 
the steel. Since A-36 steel was used in the beam, valid Kic tests were 
not possible. Static fracture toughness values, KQ, for the steel were 
estimated from the maximum load. No load-deflection data was acquired, 
6 
hence a more accurate determination using the J-integral was not possible. 
These tests provided KQ values of about 49 ksi /irl. (53. 9 MPa ;; ) at -20° F 
(-29° C). A single test at -40° F (-40° C) yielded 50 ksi lin. (55 MPa /;). 
These results were compatible with the estimated K values provided by the 
c 
Barsom-Rolfe correlation equation and the intermediate rate temperature 
shift. 
In addition to the Charpy V-Notch and KQ tests, a series of tensile 
tescs were conducted on rectangular specimens containing plug welds (1). 
The test specimens were approximately 3 in. (76.2 mm) wide. The speci-
mens were machined such. that the plug weld was centered on the width of 
the specimen. Three tests were carried out at -20° F (-29° C) and one 
at -L:0° F (-40° C). The results are summarized in Table 2. 
All of these tests failed at nominal stresses on the gross section 
that were well in excess of the yield. Obviously, none of the plug welds 
in these specimens had initial flaws that were· as large as those at· the 
failure section. Failure occurred at stresses about midway between the 
yield point and tensile strength of the base plate. 
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Visual and Fractographic Analysis of Failure Surface: 
Visual observations indicated that the plug welds initiated the 
fracture of Beam 2B2. 
7 
Photographs of one of the fracture surfaces are shown in Figs. 5 and 
6. These indicated that a small shear lip is visible along the outer 
edges over most of the length. Figure 3a demonstrates a similar condition. 
No spalled paint exists at the plug weld and for a distance of about 1 in. 
(25 rnrn) each side of the plug welds. Therefore, the mill scale is spalled 
off and confirms the plastic behavior associated with the shear lips. The 
herringbone surface patterns and the fine texture of the surface near the 
plugs in Fig. 5 also show the brittle fracture characteristic which caused 
the sudden unstable crack propagation at a low nominal stress level (1). 
The slag and the voids which initiated the unstable crack growth are also 
visible in Fig. S. The herringbone patterns in Fig. 6 point towards the 
plug welds. 
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3. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Conclusions Regarding Fracture/Failure: 
The investigation of the fracture of a rolled beam in Fayette County 
Highway 28 Bridge indicated the following: 
The maximum live load stresses in the cracked beam was measured 
to be 3.46 ksi (23.86 MPa) which was far below the AASHTO allow-
able stresses for such a member (1). 
The chemical and mechanical properties of the steel were well 
within ASTM-A36 specifications (1). 
8 
The steel met the Charpy V-Notch requirements for service tempera-
tures down to -30° F (-34° C) which was lower than the tempera-
tures experienced by the fractured beam (1). 
Fatigue cracks and subsequent brittle fracture resulted from 
the prescence of plug welded holes. These welded holes resulted 
in large cracklike discontinuities that were susceptible to 
crack propagation. The fracture surfaces shown in Figs. 5 and 6 
show the cracks that formed at the welds. Radiographs of other 
weld filled holes showed plug welds with slag inclusions and voids. 
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Recommendations Regarding Repair/Fracture Control: 
It can be expected that cracking will develop in other mispunched 
holes that are filled with weldment. The problem can be avoided by leav-
ing the holes and installing high strength bolts rather than welding. 
9 
Existing weld filled holes should be removed by drilling or coring 2n 
order to remove the discontinuities and prevent any further undesirable 
cracking. 
4. ACTUAL REPAIR/FRACTURE CONTROL EFFORTS 
The repair of county highway 28 bridge over I-57 was carried out as 
follows: 
The fractured section of Beam 2B2 was removed by flame cutting the 
lower portion of the beam in the form of a tee-section about 10 in. 
(254 mm) below the top flange for the entire length between splices. 
A new tee-section that matched the section removed was field-welded 
horizontally to the remaining section of the web and then bolted to the 
adjacent beam segments using the existing splice plates. The repaired 
portion of the beam is shown in Fig. 7. The tee-section removed from 
the structure was used to fabricate test specimens in order to establish 
the chemical, ·physical; and fracture toughness characteristics of the 
steel (1,2). Fractographic studies were also carried out on the original 
crack surfaces on these specimens. 
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5. POSSIBLE ADVERSE EFFECTS OF REPAIR 
No adverse behavior is anticipated from the repaired member. Non-
destructive tests were carried out on the longitudinal field weld. 
Furthermore, it is located near the neutral axis, so no appreciable cyclic 
stress is likely to ever occur at that level. 
6. ACTUAL OR ESTIMATED REPAIR/REHABILITATION COSTS 
Cost of Investigation: 
No direct investigative costs were accounted for. All costs were 
included in the cost of retrofit/repair. The University of Illinois 
studies were carried out as part of their ongoing work. 
Cost of Repair: 
Available records (3) indicate that the cost of the repair was 
$13,150.00 in 1977. 
Original or Adjusted Cost of the Structure: 
The county highway 28 bridge crossing over Interstate of I-57 was 
awarded at a cost of $164,607.85 in 1958 (3). 
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TABLE 1: ~1E..<\SURED STRAINS AND COHPUTED STRESSES 
Truck Run 
1. Crawl --
(Centered on Beam 
line 2, SOuthbound 
2. Crawl --
(Right wheels over 
Beam Line 2, 
Southbound 
3. 30 mph -
(Centered on Beam 
1 ine 2, Southbound 
Gage 
Location 
44 
34 
44 
34 
44 
34 
Spl•ct I 
{ 
I 
IN BEAM 2B2 UNDER TEST TRUCK 
Tension 
Stress 
ksi (MPa) 
2.56 (17.65) 
2.21 (15.24) 
2.28 (15.72) 
1.98 (13.65) 
2.84 (19.58) 
2.47 (17.03) 
I. 
Si.ew 
t 
Compression 
Stress 
ksi (HPa) 
0.34 (2.34) 
0.28 (1. 9 3) 
0.34 (2.34) 
0.28 (1.93) 
0.62 (4.28) 
0.56 (3.86) 
17'-11\f:!' 
SpiiCI 2 
I 
I 
t 
·-- ~--­
! j ... ... 
-I 
I '' ~""-r.;;;~! 
Replocement Boom 292 
Norl" ~-
Stchon C ··:. 
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• Stro•r~ Goo•• 
+ Boll rtolet 
Stress 
Range 
ksi (HPa) 
2.90 (19.99) 
2.69 (17. 77) 
2.62 (18.06) 
2.26 (15.58) 
3.46 (23.86) 
3.03 (20.89) 
TABLE 2: TENSILE TEST OF SPECINENS WITH PLUG WELDS 
Specimen Tensile Stress on 
Spec. Gross Area Test Temp. Strength Gross Area 
No. • 2 (mm 2 ) OF (oC) kips (kN) ksi (MPa) ~n. 
lOa 1. 842 (1188) -20 (-29) 100.97 (449.1) 54.82 (378. 0) 
lOb 1. 822 (117 5) -20 (-29) 1'05.13 (467.6) 57.70 (397.8) 
lOc 1.815 (1171) -20 (-29) 114.9 (511.1) 63.31 (436.5) 
lOd 1.807 (1166) -40 (-40) 99.6 (443.0) 55.12 (380.0) 
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8. CANTILEVER FLOOR BEAM BRACKETS 
One of the earlier types of cracking that was found to develop in 
highway bridges was fatigue cracks that were discovered in the tie plates 
connecting transverse floor beams and cantilever brackets across the main 
girders 
The first such cracking was found in the Allegheny River Bridge 
(I.D. 16) and was observed to originate from the rivet holes used to 
attach the plate to the main longitudinal giders. Shortly thereafter, 
cracks were observed in the Lehigh River and Canal Bridges (I.D. 14). 
These particular cracks were found to originate from tack welds used to 
connect the tie plate to the bracket prior to shop installation of the 
rivets. 
A summary and review of the Lehigh Canal Bridge is provided hereafter 
(I.D. 14). Detailed measurements and an assessment of the crack develop-
ment was made on the Lehigh Canal Bridge. This study demonstrated that 
unforeseen in-plane displacements of the tie plate, as a result of rota-
tion of the longitudinal girders at a cross-section was the reason such 
cracks developed. 
One other bridge experienced distress at the girder-bracket joint. 
The South Bridge (I.D. 17) was found to have a number of rivet heads 
cracked off. The in-plane movement of the connection plate distorted the 
rivets and caused prying of the rivet heads which resulted in separation. 
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8.1 FATIGUE/FRACTURE ANALYSIS 
of 
LEHIGH C~~AL BRIDGE 
-- A Brief Summary --
I. D. No. 
Town/City 
Railway/Highway/Avenue 
County 
State/Province 
Owner 
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Allentown, PA 
U.S. 22 in Pennsylvania 
Lehigh 
Pennsylvania 
Penn-DOT 
1 
1. DESCRIPTION AND HISTORY OF THE BRIDGE 
Brief Description of the Structure: 
The Lehigh Canal and River Bridges consist of two adjacent twin struc-
tures which carry the eastbound and westbound lanes of U.S. Route 22 over 
the Lehigh Canal and River near Bethlehem, Pennsylvania. Each bridge is a 
two girder continuous structure extending over three spans with small 
haunches at the interior piers. The schematic plan and elevation is shown 
in Figs. 1. a and 1. b. A side view photograph of the b·ridge is given in 
Fig. l.c. The typical cross-section and tie plate details are shown in 
Figs; 2.a and b, respectively. 
Brief History of Structure and Cracking: 
The twin bridges (one for the westbound lane and one for the east-
bound lane) were constructed in 1951-1953 and were opened to traffic in 
November 1953. 
During the spring of 1972, inspection by PennDOT personnel revealed 
several 'fatigue cracks in the tie plates connecting the transverse floor 
beams and cantilever brackets across the main girders (Refs. 1,2) as 
shown in Fig. A. A more detailed description and the location of these 
fatigue cracks in the tie plates is given in Refs. 1 and 3. The cracks 
started at the edges of the tie plates at a tack weld which connected the 
tie plates to the outrigger brackets during fabrication. 
The cracks were discovered after the twin bridges were subjected to 
nineteen years of traffic. U.S. Route 22 on which the bridge is ·located 
carries substantial amounts of heavy truck traffic. 
2 
2. FAILURE MODES AND FAILURE ANALYSIS 
. Location of Crack, Failure Modes and Stages: 
The approximate location and length of the fatigue cracks and stresses 
in the tie plates of one side span are shown in Figs. 3.a and b. Through-
out the length of the Lehigh Canal and River Bridges, most of the tie plate 
cracks were at or near the outside edge of longitudinal or main girders 
(Ref. 1). Several of the plates had cracked across their entire widths. 
All observed cracks appeared to be through the thicknesses of the tie 
plates as shown in Figs. 3 and 4. All fatigue cracks initiated from the 
edge of tie plates where a tack weld was used to connect the plates to the 
outrigger or cantilever bracket during fabrication (Refs. 1,2). See, for 
instance, Fig. 4. 
A detailed study of the actual traffic conditions and the stress his-
tory measurements (Refs. 1,2,3) indicatated that the fatigue cracks 
developed and propagated slowly from the ends of the tack welds, due to 
out-of-plane displacements at the top flange of the main girders. These 
displacements are shown schematically in Fig. 5. Corresponding strain 
measurements are illustrated in Fig. 6 • 
. Cyclic Loads and Stresses: 
The stress range histograms for two tie plates and one of the main 
girders are given in Fig. 7. The Gross Vehicle Weight distribution of 
trucks crossing the structure in 1972 is given in Fig. 8. 
The total number of trucks that have traveled over the bridge during 
the nineteen year period bet\veen 1953 and 1972 was estimated from PennDOT 
traffic count data. The AQTT is plotted in Fig. 9. This ranged from 
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2,038 trucks per day (in 1953) to 3,709 (in 1972). The total volume from 
1953 to 1972 was estimated to be 18.9 million trucks (Refs. 2,3). 
The measured stress range occurrences at the gages on the tie plates 
3 
were used to determine an effective stress range using Miner's Rule and the 
RMS* methods. These were then adjusted to the plate edges·where the crack 
growth originated. 
The S n~rs and S M' stress range values at the plate edge and the r~· r 1ner 
fatigue cycles corresponding to the truck traffic of 18.9 million are plotted 
in Fig. 10. The data from the Lehigh Canal Bridge is seen to lie somewhat 
above the lower confidence limit for AASHTO Category D as shown in Fig. 10 
(Refs. 2,3). The tie plates that plotted above thts limit would be ex-
oected to exhibit visible fatigue cracking. 
The stress range values plotted in Fig. 10 demonstrate that Miner's Rule 
and the RMS method both provide a reasonable correlation between observed 
tie plate behavior and laboratory results. 
The· Live Load stresses in the main longitudinal girders were similar to 
those observed in longitudinal members of other bridges (the ~faximum Live Load 
stress range was 55 MPa or 8 ksi). The live load stresses in the tie plates 
connecting the outrigger brackets and floor beams were much higher than those 
observed in the longitudinal member tthis is mainly due to the out-of-plane 
displacements of the main girders (Refs. 1,2)]. 
Temperature and Environmental Effects (Known or field Recorded): 
In this particular case there were no known temperature or other en-
vironmental effects that played a role in the cracking of the tie plates. 
*Root-Mean-Square 
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Material "Fracture, Mechanical and Chemical Properties" 
Analyses in Failure Regions: 
Since the tie plate cracks were fatigue cracks resulting from cyclic 
loads and no sudden unstable crack propagation was observed, the tie plate 
fracture properties were not obtained. 
Visual and Fractographic Analysis of Failure Surfaces: 
4 
The only fractographic studies of failure surfaces were visual and low 
magnification examination of the crack surfaces at the bridge site. 
3. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The fatigue cracks that formed in the tie plates originated at tack weld 
ends where high stress ranges were introduced as a result of out-of-plane 
displacements. Tne cantilever load for which the bracket and tie plate were 
designed did not result in a significant stress from traffic. The connection 
of the plate to the longitudinal girders resulted in a secondary unaccounted 
for cyclic stress that resulted in fatigue cracks. Stress measurements in-
dicated that the most severely stressed plates were near the reactions and 
that those particular plates had likely cracked after a few years of service. 
Cracking of the tie plates did not seriously impair the performance of 
the structure as the web connection of the bracket was able to resist the 
applied loads. 
It was recommended that the structure be retrofitted by removing the 
existing cracked and uncracked tie plates and replacing them with new plates 
that were not attached to the longitudinal girders . 
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4. ACTUAL REPAIR AND FRACTURE CONTROL EFFORTS 
The tie plates on the Lehigh Canal and River Bridges were replaced 
with new tie plates during the bridge deck replacement that was undertaken 
during 1977 and 1978. This involved removal of all existing cracked and 
uncracked plates and replacing them with the plate shown in Fig. 11. 
5. POSSIBLE ADVERSE EFFECTS OF REPAIR 
In the new tie plate configuration as shown in Fig. 11, the bolts 
connecting the tie plates to the main girders are eliminated. Thus, the 
out-of-plane displacements of main girders under Live Loads will not influ-
ence the tie plate behavior. Therefore, no adverse effects due to replace-
ment of tie plates are expected. 
6. ACTUAL OR ESTIMATED REPAIR/REHABILITATION COSTS 
Cost of Investigation: 
The total cost of investigations of causes of cracking producing both 
the laboratory and field investigations is not available. However, the 
field investigation only was estimated to cost $4,000.00 by PennDOT. 
Cost of Repair/Rehabilitation: 
It was estimated that $29,787.00 was required to make the necessary 
retrofitting and corrective action during the time period in which the 
reinforced bridge deck was also completely replaced.· 
Original or Adjusted Cost of Structure: 
The .initial cost of the structure is not available, as it was built 
as part of a large section of Route 22 and only the total cost of the con-
struction is available. 
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8.2 FATIGUE/FRACTURE ANALYSIS 
OF 
ALLEGHENY RIVER BRIDGE 
-- A Brief Summary --
I.D. No. 16 
Town/City near Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 
Railway/Highway/Avenue: Pennsylvania Turnpike 
County 
State 
Owner 
Pennsylvania 
Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission 
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1. DESCRIPTION A~~ HISTORY OF THE BRIDGE 
Brief Description of Structure: 
The Allegheny River Bridge is a four-span continuous beam-girder 
bridge and a five-span truss bridge over the Allegheny River outside 
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania on the Pennsylvania Turnpike. The bridge deck 
carries both eastbound and westbound traffic. The top view and side view 
of the bridge is shown in Figs. 1. 
1 
The plan and elevation of the end span and the second span of the 
four-span continuous girder bridge is shown in Fig. 2. A typical cross-
section and the original tie-plate details for the floor beam bracket 
connection are shown in Fig. 3. The end span is 104 ft.- 4 in" (3~.822 m), 
and the second span is 130 ft.- 5 in. (39. 777 m) long. The end span con-
tains a hinge 78 ft.- 3 in. (23.866 m) from the west abutment, as shown in 
Fig. 2. The longitudinal girders are 7 ft. - 0. 5 in. (2 .148 m) deep with a 
haunch at the piers of 9 ft.- 1.5 in. (2. 783 m). 
The reinforced concrete slab in the end span is supported by twelve 
longitudinal Wl2X62 stringers resting on the floor beams and outrigger 
brackets. The floor beams are composed of built-up I-beams (web: 
66in. x 3/8 in. (168 em x .10 em), flanges: 6 in. x 6 in. x 0.5 in. 
(15 em. x 15 em. x 1 em) angles with outrigger brackets (see Fig. 3). 
Ihe second span has a similar load-carrying system. 
The original tie plate detail [14 in. x 0.5 in. x 4 ft. - 8 in. 
(35.5 em x 1.27 em x 1421 em)] which connected the floor beam top 
flange to the outrigger bracket flange is shown in Fig. 3.b. 
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Brief History of Structure and Cracking: 
The Allegheny River Bridge was constructed in 1952. During the fall 
of 1971, preliminary inspections by the Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission 
personnel revealed several fatigue cracks in the tie plates (1). In 
January 1972 all tie plates were again checked for fatigue cracks. The 
approximate locations and length of cracks in the end and second spans is 
given in Fig. 4. It was also observed that some of the rivets connecting 
the tie plates to the first inboard or to the first outboard stringer 
failed. These rivets are indicated by darkened circles in Fig. 4 (1). 
A typical cracked tie-plate is shown in Fig. 5. 
In the spring of 1972, the original_ cracked tie plates were repaired 
with groove welds and reinforcement tie plates were added as well. 
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2. FAILURE MODES AND FAILUE ANALYSIS 
Location of Fracture, Failure Modes and Stages: 
The location and approximate lengths of the fatigue cracks in the tie 
plates in the end and second spans are shown in Figs. 4.a and 5. Most of the 
cracks were at or near the piers and abutments, i.e. near the supports. 
All cracks originated from rivet holes in the region where the tie plates 
were connected to the main longitudinal girders (see Fig. 4.a). 
A detailed study (1) of the traffic conditions and stress history 
measurements indicated that the fatigue cracks initiated and developed 
from the tie plate rivet holes due to horizontal in-plane bending of the 
tie plates. This horizontal bending was induced by the longitudin?l dis-
placement of top flange of the main girder under traffic loads. Similar 
cracks due to out-of-plane displacements were also observed in the Lehigh 
Canal and River Bridge on U.S. 22, near Allentown, Pennsylvania (2). 
As shown in Figs. 4 •. a and 5, some of the tie plate rivets (indicated 
by the filled circles in Fig. 4.a) became ineffective or failed completely. 
Cvclic Loads and Stresses (Known or Field-Recorded): 
A strain gage recording of the strains in the tie plates of the 
Allegheny River Bridge was undertaken from November 10, 1972 to November 17, 
1972 (1). The position of strain gages are shown in Fig. 4.b. From these 
recordings several stress range histograms were developed. A typical 
stress range histogram for the tie plate (gage 18) is shown in Figs. 6.a 
and b (1). All tie plates provided stress ranges in the order of 12 to 
18 ksi ($3 to 124 HPa). 
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Stress distributions in the tie plates in~icate that the cracked 
plates were subjected to high bending stresses in a horizontal plane, as 
shown in Fig. 7. The measured stresses suggested that the horizontal 
bending was induced by a relative movement between the girder and the ends 
of the tie plate. The stress range distribution caused by a truck at each 
of the gaged tie plates is shown in Fig. 8. Bending stresses in tie plates 
were higher near the abutment and pier. This agreed well with the cracked 
tie plate pattern shown in Figs. 4.a and 5. 
Very low live load stresses were observed in the main .girders and the 
floor beams. The main girder stresses as a result of an HS20-44 truck in 
one lane of the bridge provided a maximum live load stress of 2.4 ksi 
(16.54 MPa) and a stress range of 4.65 ksi (32.04 MPa). Both of these 
measurements were well below the calculated design live load stress 
9.6 ksi (66.19 MPa) (1). 
Traffic counts were also taken during the in-service testing in 1972. 
The results are given in the histogram of traffic flow in Fig. 9 and also 
in Fig. 10. The survey was comparable to the 1970 FHWA Nationwide sur-
vey (1). The total volume of truck traffic that crossed the bridge durtng 
the twenty years of service between 1952 and 1972 was 20.7 million vehicles. 
This corresponds to at least 20.7 million cycles of loading for each tie 
plate. The number of cycles for the truncated (SRM) root-mean-square 
stress ranges when stresses below the crack threshold are neglected are 
tabulateo in Table 1. The estimated number of RMS stress range cycles for 
several tie plates are also plotted in Fig. 11 (1). 
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~Tien all stress cycles were considered, the effective stress ranges 
decreased and are also plotted in Fig. 10 at 20.7 x 10 6 cycles. 
5 
The (~1S) and Miner effective stress range procedure was used to cor-
relate the tie plate behavior with available test data. Table 1 and 
Fig. 11 both indicate that reasonable correlation was obtained between 
the observed behavior and the measured stress range spectra. Both the RMS 
and Miner effective stress ranges and the cumulative stress cycles sug-
gested that fatigue distress should develop in the tie plates. 
Temperature and Environmental Effects (Known or Field-Recorded): 
In the case of the Allegheny River Bridge, there were no suspected 
or recorded temperature or other environnental effects that influenced 
cracking of the tie plates. 
Haterial "Fracture, Mechanical and Chemical Properties"· 
Analysis in Failure Regions: 
The tie plate cracks and failed rivets were all fatigue induced due 
to horizontal bending of tie plates. No sudden, unstable crack propaga-
tion was observed. The fracture toughness of the tie plate material was 
no.t determined. 
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Visual and Fractographic Examination of Failure Surfaces: 
The failure surfaces were only examined visually. The crack surface 
showed clear evidence of fatigue crack growth. 
Crack Growth (Initiation and Propagation) and 
Probable Causes of Fracture/Failure: 
The fatigue cracks initiated and grew from the rivet holes in tie 
plates. Some of the rivets in the tie plates were cracked ~s a result 
of horizontal bending in the tie plates. The stress distribution pattern 
in tie plates indicated that horizontal bending of. tie plates was induced 
by the relative longitudinal displacement of top flange of the main girder 
and the floor beam under cyclic live load as shown in Fig. 7 (1). The 
locations of cracked tie-plates are indicated in Fig. 4.a, and a typical 
tie plate with cracks initiated from rivet holes is presented in Fig. 5. 
-220-
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3. CONCLUSIONS AND RECO}lliENDATIONS 
Conclusions Regarding Fracture/Failure: 
All fatigue cracks found in the tie plates of the Allegheny River 
Bridge originated from ri~et holes; most of the cracks were located near 
the piers or supports and were formed where tie plates, connecting the 
brackets and floor beams, were riveted to the main longitudinal girders. 
The fatigue cracks developed due to the out-of-plane displacements which 
introduced high horizontal bending stresses in the tie plates (1). The 
connection of the plate to longitudinal main girders resulted in secondary 
cyclic stresses causing the fatigue cracks in the rivet holes. 
Stress relief in tie plates was accomplished naturally under service 
conditions through the shearing of some of the rivets as well as by the 
fatigue fracture of the tie plates (1,2). Fatigue cracks in tie plates 
have occurred in other birdges under similar circumstances*. 
4. ACTUAL REPAIR/FRACTURE CONTROL EFFORTS 
During the spring of.l972, reinforcement tie plates 
[17 in. x 0.5 in. x 4 ft.- 7.94 in. (431.8 mm x 12.7 mm x 1420.9 mm)] were 
added to the structure. The original cracked tie plates were first groove 
weld repaired at the crack locations, and the rei~forcement plates were 
·placed over them. The bolt holes in the reinforcement plates were matched 
to those of original tie plates for ease of installment. The reinforcement 
plates were high strength bolted to the original tie plates, girders, 
floor beams, outrigger brackets, and the neighboring stringers as sho~~ in· 
Fig. 12. Also, the lock nuts are tack welded . 
.;, see FATIGUE/FRACTURE OF LEHIGH CA~AL A:\D RIVER BRIDGE -- A Brief Summary 
Lehigh University, Fritz Engineering Laboratory Report 448, 1981. 
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5. POSSIBLE ADVERSE EFFECTS OF REPAIR 
From the approximate analytical and field measurements given in 
Ref. 1, it can be concluded that increasing the width of the tie plates 
will cause the horizontal bending moment in the tie plate to increase due 
to the elongating and shortening of the girder. Also, depositing tack 
welds at the lock nuts decreased the fatigue resistance. 
Since the cause of longitudinal displacement at the tie plates has 
not been eliminated, horizontal bending stresses will continue to be 
developed at the edge of reinforcement plates. Tack welds are expected 
to initiate fatigue cracks. Similar cracks developed from tack welds and 
were observed in the Lehigh Canal and River Bridges (2,3). 
6 .. ACTUAL OR ESTIMATED REPAIR/REHABILITATION COSTS 
At the time this "Brief Summary" was being prepared no estimates 
regarding the cost of investigation of cracking, costs of retrofit and 
the original cost of the bridge were available. 
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TABLE l RMS AND MINER STRESS RANGE AND CYCLE DATA 
FOR TIE PLATES 
Adjusted Adjusted Number SrRMS SrMINER Cumulative of 
Stress at at Frequency 
Cycles Rivet Hole Rivet Hole (% above Plate Gage ksi (MPa) ksi (MPa) Threshold) X 10 6 
ABUT 3 6.4 (44.1) 7.3 (50. 3) 61.20 20.7 
ABUT LT ll 6.5 (44.8) 8.6 (59.3) 26.72 20.7 
3A RT 15 5.7 (39.3) 6.6 (45.5) 55.00 20.7 
. 5 RT 18 7.1 (49. 0) 8.4 (57.9) 49.86 20.7 
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9. TRANSVERSE STIFFENER WEB GAPS 
Cracks were found during construction at the ends of transverse 
stiffeners on several plate girder bridges. A detailed summary of two 
Cuyahoga County bridges (I.D. 41 and I.D. 42) is given hereafter. 
The results of the investigation of this cracking showed that the 
primary cause was out-of-plane movement of the short web gap at the end of 
the stiffeners and the flange. 
Similar cracking at the ends of transverse stiffeners was detected 
in other bridges (I.D. 114). In this case the cracks were found to have 
formed in the fabricating shop, while the girders were handled (I.D. 114). 
Cracking of a similar nature was found in web gaps of intersecting 
vertical and transverse stiffeners. These cracks occurred as the large 
web plate was moved and turned in the shop (I.D. 53). 
In all of these cases handling resulted in high cyclic stresses in 
the girder webs at the short gap regions. These cyclic stresses either 
occurred as the girders we-re handled in the shop or developed as the 
girders were shipped. The swaying motion of the girders supported on 
rail cars created high repeated stresses at the weld terminations in the 
web gaps. 
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9.1 FATIGUE/FRACTURE ANALYSIS 
of 
CUYAHOGA COUNTY BRIDGES (CUY-90-1365L) 
-- A Brief Summary --
I.D. No. 
Town/City/etc. 
Railway/Highway/Avenue 
County 
State 
Owner 
41 
Cleveland, Ohio 
Interstate I-90 over Conrail Tracks 
Cuyahoga 
Ohio 
Ohio-DOT 
-237-
1. DESCRIPTION AND HISTORY OF THE BRIDGE 
Brief Description of the Structure 
The Cuhahoga County Bridge (CUY-90-1365) carries Interstate I-90 traf-
fic over the Penn Central Railroad yard tracks in Cleveland, Ohio (Fig. la). 
The superstructure in each traffic direction is composed of nine continuous, 
built-up steel girders with an 8-1/2 in. (215 mm) reinforced concrete slab 
extending over several spans. The eastbound and the westbound traffic is 
separated by a concrete guard wall placed along the centerline of the roadway. 
The structure has three main spans with lengths of 135 ft. (41 m), 
140 ft. (43 m) and 93 ft. (28 m). The two side spans are 88 ft. (27 m) 
and 62 ft. (19 m) long. The plan of the structure and the elevation is 
given in Figs. la and lb. The main girder arrangements, the transverse 
and lateral bracing, and the cross-sections are given in Figs. 2, 3 and 4. 
The structure was designed in accord with the 1965 AASHO Specifications 
including Ohio-DOT Supplements. The design loading was the HS 20-44 truck 
and the_Interstate Alternate Loading. The mainline ADT in 1970 was 50,738. 
The structural steel is ASTM A36. 
Brief History of Structure and Cracking 
On May 1-3, 1972, during the erection of steel girders on the east-
bound portion of the Cuyahoga County Bridge (CUY-90-1365) an inspection by 
Ohio-DOT personnel revealed cracks on some of the erected girder webs on 
the eastbound bridge near the abutments. All of the· steel superstructure 
for the eastbound structure and the first span of th_e westbound bridge 
were erected. Erection of the remaining steel was stopped so that a 
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thorough inspection and rechecking of all girders by MPI (Magnetic Particle 
Inspection) and by dye penetrant could be made. The cracks were of two 
kinds as shown in Figs. 7 and 8. 
A sample plug was removed from Girder 138Gl at stiffener 13. This 
sample plug contained both types of cracks. Figure 9 shows one side of the 
web prior to the removal of the sample core. The crack which formed in the 
girder web at the end of the weld toe can be seen in Fig. 10. Figure 11 
shows a. cut through the core sample with a polishe4 and etched surface of 
the half section. Both types of cracks are visible in the photograph. The 
cracks tend to turn and move up the web as they increase in siz~. 
The field examination of other girders with. cracked details exhibited 
similar characteristics. 
All evidence from the field inspection and subsequent laboratory 
studies on the sample core removed from Girder 138Gl indicated ~hat the 
cause of cracking was cyclic loading. The cracks were fatigue cracks. No 
brittle behavior or cleavage fracture was observed. Relatively large out-
of-plane cyclic web bending stresses were introduced into the girders dur-
ing rail transportation on a flat car _(see Fig. 12) from Columbus, Ohio, 
to the bridge site. The cyclic displacement resulted in high stress ·range 
excursions in the web gap of stiffeners adjacent or at the support points. 
Cyclic Loads and Stresses (Known or Field-Recorded) 
The cracked girders were shipped after fabrication from Columbus, 
Ohio, to the Cuyahoga County Bridge site by rail and truck transportation. 
The girders shipped by rail were arranged together as shown schematically 
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in Fig. 12. Host girders were supported at two locations using wooden 
blocks and tie down rods. 
The cracks were only observed in the girders which were shipped to the 
construction site by rail. There were no detectable cracks on the girders 
shipped by truck. No defects were found when the web gap at the stiffener 
opening was near the top flange. The cracks on the rail transported 
girders all occurred at stiffener locations. approximately 25-30 ft. 
(8-9 m) from the center of the girder. This placed the cracks at stiffeners 
adjacent to the wooden supports on which the girders rested during trans-
port on the gondola car. 
The crack locations are indicated in Figs. 5 and 6 (3). 
Several core type specimens were removed from cracked regions-. Rec-
tangular specimens were removed from the web near the abutments in order 
to determine the fracture properties of the steel. These specimens were 
shipped to Lehigh Universitj for testing and evaluation (4). 
2 FAILURE MODES AND FAILU.RE ANALYSIS 
Location of Fracture, Failure Modes and Stages 
The cracks were only observed in positive moment regions at the end of 
stiffeners cut short of the bottom flange. ~~en cracks occurred in stiff-
ener details cut short of the bottom flange, they were always observed to 
be near the girder support points during the rail tr?nsportation. The 
stiffeners were attached to both sides of the web which resulted in cracks 
on both sides. ~vo types of cracks were found. 
-240-
1. Cracks at the end of the stiffener weld wrapping around the 
weld toe and extending parallel to the longitudinal axis of 
the girder as shown in Fig. 7. 
2. Cracks at the end of the stiffener in the weld which sometimes 
extended into the web as illustrated in Fig. 8. 
Since only vertical tie down rods were used to support the girders, 
they offered little restraint to lateral movement of the girder sections. 
Consequently, local twisitng of the girder flanges at the girder supports 
would result in relatively high out-of-plane web bending strains in the 
web gap at the cut-short stiffeners near the support points (4). This 
cyclic out-of-plane movement of the web and the resulting cyclic stresses 
caused the development of fatigue cracks at the stiffener ends near the 
wooden blocks. The out-of-plane movement of the web is shown schemati-
cally in Fig. 13. 
Temperature and Environmental Effects (Known or Field-Recorded) 
In the case of the Cuyahoga County Bridges, the temperature and the 
environmental effect did not contribute to the cracking of the girder webs 
at the end of transverse stiffeners. 
Material "Mechanical, Chemical and Fracture Properties" Analysis 
in the Failure Region 
The material used in the girder webs of the Cuyahoga County Bridges is 
the ASTif A36 steel. Mill reports indicated that the steel met the mechani-
cal requirements of the ASTI1 standards . 
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The fracture toughness of a typical girder web was determined by mak-
ing transverse Charpy V-notch (CVN) tests. The small section removed from 
Girder 172Gl was used to fabricate CVN specimens which are summarized in 
Fig. 14. At 40° F (4° C), the average absorbed energy was 16.8 ft-lb. (23 Nm) 
The results indicated a good toughness in the girder web material (4). 
Fatigue crack formation in the girder webs without evidence of rapid 
fracture was compatible with the measured toughness of the girder web 
steel (4). 
Visual and Fractographic Examination of Failure Surfaces 
The fracture surface topography from the sample plug shown in Fig. 10 
was examined under the electron microscope. Figure 15 shows the fatigue 
striations that were detected in the web at the weld toe of the far side 
stiffener (4). The fatigue crack had propagated 0.2 in. ( .5 mm) into the 
web at the weld toe. The striation spacing varied between 5-15 micro-inGhes 
(0.1-0.4 micro-meters). 
The fatigue crack surface in the weld on the near side stiffener had 
numerous oxides and other impurities due to the atmospheric influences 
which prevented detection of fatigue striations (4). 
The striation spacing observed in the base metal near the surface of 
the web indicates relatively high web bending stresses of variable ampli-
tude. After the cracks 'propagated a few hundredths of an inch, the crack 
surface exhibited the characteristics of high stress. fatigue. The stri-
ation spacing suggested that between 1000-10,000 cycles would be needed to 
propagate the cracks detected at Stif:ener 13 on Girder 138Gl (4). 
-242-
3. CONCLUSIONS AND RECO~lliE~~ATIONS 
Conclusions Regarding Fracture/Failure 
The cracks found at the ends of transverse stiffeners cut short of the 
tension flange on continuous plate girders for the Cuyahoga County Bridges 
(CUY-90-1365-L&R) were fatigue cracks. No rapid fractures were observed. 
All cracks were caused by large cyclic web bending stresses in the short 
length of the girder web, the stiffener end, and the flange-to-web fillet 
weld. 
The cracks were only found in the positive moment regions of the 
girders. All cracking was confined to the stiffeners located near the 
wooden blocks used to support the girders during rail transit to the bridge 
site. Relatively small out-of-plane movement of girders during transit 
introduced large bending strains at the end of the cut-short stiffeners 
in the girder web near the wooden supports, resulting in the fatigue cracks. 
The cracks were all parallel to the bending stresses that would occur 
in the webs. 
Recommendations for Repair/Fracture Control 
The following repair procedures were used in order to prevent future 
crack growth during the serv~ce life of the Cuyahoga County Bridges (4): 
1. Cracks in Stiffener Welds Only 
Cracks that propagat~d into the weld metal near the stiffener 
end were repaired by grinding out the crack and the weld metal 
around it. The ground out region was checked by nondestructive 
testing in order to insure the complete removal of crack tips. 
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2. Cracks Propagated into the Web Plate 
These cracks either initiated from the weld toe termination at 
the end of the stiffener or propagated through the weld into the web. 
They were retrofitted by drilling 7/16 in. (11 mm) holes at the end 
of each crack and grinding the cylindrical surface of the hole 
smooth as shown schematically in Fig. 16. 
The sample core holes that were cut into the girders were ground and 
any crack tip that extended beyond the core hole was removed as well. 
4. ACTUAL REPAIR/FRACTURE CONTROL EFFORTS 
The cracks were removed in the field according to the recommendations 
given above. The holes at the ends of the cracks were filled with high 
strength bolts which were tightened to a high preload. 
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5. POSSIBLE ADVERSE EFFECTS OF REPAIR 
None of the cracks observed were detrimental to the safety of the 
bridge during construction. The cracks were all parallel to the stresses 
caused by dead and live loads. Repairs were made during construction and 
should insure that further crack growth does not develop during the service 
life of the structure. No adverse effects are expected from repairs. 
6. ACTUAL OR ESTIMATED REPAIR/REHABILITATION COSTS 
The bid price of the Cuyahoga County Bridges was $2,203,883.10. The 
bid price for the structural steel, excluding field painting was $924,056. 
The investigation of the fracture including the repair of the cracked 
girder webs was $12,335.67 in 1973. No costs are available on the repairs. 
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Fig. 11 Macro-etched Section of Sawcut 
Showing Cracks into Web and Weld 
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9.2 FATIGUE/FRACTURE ANALYSIS 
of 
CUYAHOGA RIVER BRIDGE (No. CL~-80-1843) 
-- A Brief Summary --
I. D. No. 
Town/City/etc. 
Railway/Highway/Avenue 
County 
State/Province 
Owner 
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42 
near Independence, Ohio 
I.480 
Cuyahoga 
Ohio 
Ohio-DOT 
Proj. 448 l 
1. DESCRIPTION AND HISTORY OF THE BRIDGE 
Brief Description of the Structure 
The Cuhahoga River Bridges are twin structures on Interstate I-480 
carrying east and westbound traffic on separate roadways over the Cuyahoga 
River, the Ohio Canal, the B & 0 Railroad and abandoned Penn Central Rail-
road tracks. The twin bridges are located near Independence, Ohio. The 
total length of each bridge is 4150 ft. (1266 m), and the width is 71 ft. 
(22 m) over 15 spans. The spans adjacent to the west and east abutments 
are 220 ft. (67 m) and 180 ft. (55 m), respectively. Eleven inner spans 
are 300 ft. (92 m) long, and the two remaining spans are each 225 ft. 
(69 m) long. The overall view of the bridges is given in Fig. 1. 
Each roadway is supported by four continuous main girders with two 
stringers resting on a transverse beam between girders .. The main girders 
are about 10 ft. (3 m) high and shop-wdded with field assembled bol teli 
splices. The main girders are hauriched at the supports between west abut-
ment and the pier 11. The schematic plan and profile of the twin bridges 
are given in Fig. 2. The typical main girders and the bridge cross-
sections are shown in Figs. 3a and 3b, respectively. 
The structure was designed to satisfy the 1965 AASHO Specifications in-
cluding 1966-1967 Interim Specifications and the Ohio "Supplement" to these 
specifications. The design loading is HS-20-44 and Inters tate Alternate Loading. 
Brief History of Structure and Cracking 
In April 1972, while erection of structural steel was progressing from 
west to east, the inspection of a v.'ind damaged girder revealed a crack in the 
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web at the open end of an intermediate stiffener. This resulted in examination 
of other girders on the ground and piers resulting in the discovery of several 
cracks near the bottom and of stiffeners cut short of tension flange (1). 
All cracks were found to be fatigue related (2). They were caused by 
the relative out-of-plane movements and bending of the short length of web 
between the stiffener and the web-to:...flange fillet weld (2;3). The rela-
tive movement is believed to be caused by the cyclic swaying motion of the 
girders while in transit to the construction site and/or wind induced 
motion during storage on the ground. A typical crack is shown in Fig. 4. 
2. FAILURE MODES AND FAILURE ANALYSIS 
Location of Fracture, Failure Hodes and Stages 
Several girders with the cracked stiffener details were examined on 
April 17, 1973 at the Cuyahoga River Bridge site (2,3). The results of the 
examination of a typical girder is surnmuarized in Fig. 5. The location of a 
sample plug taken out of Girders 1204CL is also shown in Fig. 5 with a small 
circle at the end of the stiffener. The field examination of other girders 
showed that the cracks indicated in Fig. 5 are typical for all the cracked 
girders (2). 
The field examination and detailed evaluation of the sample taken from 
the main girder plugs indicated that all cracks were fatigue cracks. They 
were grouped into four categories as follows (2,3). 
(1) Cracks between the Stiffener \.Jeld and Web: This type is shown 
schematically in Fig. 6. The plug removed from Girder 1204CL is-shown in 
Figs. 5, and Figs. 7 and 8 exhibit this kind of crack. Cyclically applied 
loads caused fatigue cracking which peeled the weld away from the web surface. 
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(2) Cracks across the Weld: These cracks were observed at the ends of 
many stiffeners and, in some cases, did not propagate into the web. This type 
of crack is shown schematically in Fig. 9 and is also visible· in the sample 
plug in Fig. 7. The polished and etched surface shown in Fig. 10 indicates the 
crack was started in the heat affected zone. 
In several instances, the cracks in the weld at the end of the stiffener 
extended completely across the weld and penetrated into the web as shown 
schematically in Fig. 9. All cracks exhibited characteristic of fatigue 
crack propagation. 
(3) Cracks at Fillet Weld Toes: These cracks formed at the weld toes 
at the end of stiffeners adjacent to the tension. flange (see Fig. 5). This 
type of crack is shown schematically in Fig. 11. The sample plugs indicated 
that the crack had propagated into the web at the end of the fillet weld and 
turned and moved up the web after a short distance into the web as shown in 
Fig. 12. 
(4) Cracks in Web Surface Opposite Stiffener: Several surface cracks 
were observed in the web opposite the stiffener. The sample plug removed from 
Girder 2406AR contained this type of crack. This crack was initiated on the 
net sur.face and did not join the crack propagating into the web from the end 
of transverse stiffener detail. Crack initiation from the web surf~ce opposite 
the stiffener indicates the presence of large cyclic strains on the web surface. 
Eighty to ninety percent of the cracks observed in the main girders of 
the Cuyahoga River Bridge were type 1. The remaining cracks were distributed 
among other types described. The cracks detected in ~he girder at the 
stiffener details were a new phenomena at the time they were observed. This 
type of cracking had not been detected prior to their occurrence in Ohio. 
-264-
Proj. 448 4 
All macroscopic visual evidence from the field inspection and subsequent 
laboratory examination of the crack surfaces of the sample cores removed from 
the girders indicated that the cause of crack formation and propagation was 
cyclic loading. 
Cyclic Loads and· Stresses (known or field-recorded) 
It is known that the main girders of the Cuyahoga River Bridge were 
shipped from Chicago to the bridge site by rail transportation (2,3). 
Because of their size a single girder was transported on three flatbed cars 
as shown in Fig. 13. All girders were supported at two locations using the 
tie-dow'!l arrangement given by section A-A in Fig. ],3 .. The two supports were 
either located on the first and third flat cars or both supports -were placed 
on the center flat car over the axles. One inch steel rods were used to 
provide longitudinal restraint to moveme~t. This restraint system permitted 
relative movement between the top and bottom flange during rail shipment. The 
relative movement was caused by swaying of the girder and resulted in large 
cyclic out-of-plane bending stresses in the short length of web between the end 
of the stiffener and the flange-to-web fillet welds. Similar cyclic stresses 
could have occurred due to wind induced swaying motion during storage. The 
cyclic motion of the girder cross section is shown schematically in Fig. 14. 
Thus a condition was created which resulted in large cyclic strains and 
fatigue crack propagation. 
Temperature and Environmental Effects (known or field~recorded) 
Temperature effects, if any, did not contribute to the fatigue cracks 
in the stiffener details. 
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The cyclic out-of-plane movements of girder webs in the narrow gap 
between the end of the stiffener and the bottom flange would also have been 
caused by wind induced vibrations during storage. 
Material "Fractu-re, Physical and Chemical Properties Analysis" 
in Failure Regions 
The web plates were fabricated from ASTil A588 steel. Mill test reports 
indicated that the steel met the physical and chemical requirements (3,4). 
Longitudinal Charpy V-notch (CVN) tests at 40~ F (4° C) were reported 
for information from the heaviest gage plate in a lot. The_ mill reports 
show absorbed energy that varied from a low of 24 ft-lbs. (33 Nm) to a high-
of 130 ft-lbs. (176 Nm) (3). Since the web plates were 123 in. (3124 mm) 
wide, they had been cross-rolled, and hence, the CVN values are indicative 
of the toughness in both the transverse and longitudinal directions (3). 
The cracks in webs did not show any evidence of cleavage or brittle 
fracture. 
. Visual and Fractographic Analysis of Failure Surfaces 
None of the fracture surfaces exhibited any cleavage or brittle frac-
ture characteristics. 
The fractographic examination of failure surface revealed the presence 
of striations which verified the existence of fatigue crack propagation (3). 
Figure 15 sho~~s the fatigue striations found using the electron microscope 
on the surface of the cracked weld shown in Fig. 7. Figure 15 shows the 
striations in Region 1 adjacent to the stiffener near the point of crack 
initiation at a magnification of 19000X. The striatio~ spacing is roughly 
10-15 micro-inches (2.5-4.0 micro~meters) and height of the photograph is 
about 0. 0001 in. (. 0025 mm). 
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On the basis of the striation spacings observed on the surface of several 
cracks between 1000 and 10,000 cycles of stress were needed to propagate the 
crack (3). 
Crack Growth (Initiation and Propagation) and Probable Causes 
of Fracture/Failure 
· The field inspection, visual and fractographic examination of the crack 
surfaces of sample cores showed that the cause of crack formation was cyclic 
loading or fatigue (3). Fatigue cracks developed at the end of stiffeners 
as a result of large cyclic out-of-plane bending stresses in the short gap 
between the stiffener end and the flange-to-web fillet weld. The small out-
of-plane movements of the top flange relative to the bottom flange due to 
cyclic swaying motion of the girder occurred during rail transportation to the 
bridge site and/or wind induced motions while in storage. The effects of the 
relative lateral deformation between the two flanges would be concentrated in 
the gaps between the end of the transverse stiffener and web-to-flange fillet 
weld (see also Fig. 14). 
The stiffener welds ~ere terminated very close to the web-to-flange weld. 
The residual stresses due to stiffener-web welds, will create high tensile 
residual stresses between the stiffener end and the flange (3). The presence 
of residual tensile stresses in the gap means that each cycle of web bending 
stress is effective in causing crack growth at the ends of the stiffeners 
(2,3). The cracks followed the direction of the cyclic bending stress and 
propagated in planes parallel to the longitudinal direction of the girder. 
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3. CONCLUSIONS/RECOMMENDATIONS 
Conclusions Regarding Fracture/Failure 
The cracks at the end of stiffener welds in the main girders of the 
Cuyahoga River Bridge exhibited the characteristics of fatigue cracks. No 
cleavage or brittle crack propagation was observed (3). All cracks were caused 
by large cyclic out-of-plane bending stresses in the gap between stiffener ends 
and the flange due to the swaying motion of the girder during rail transit to 
the site and wind induced motions during storage (?,3). 
The cracks are primarily parallel to the longitudinal direction of the 
girder and to the nominal bending stresses. The high toughness of web material 
and the orientation of fatigue cracks indicate tnat there is no danger of 
sudden brtttle fracture of the main girders. Construction and erection loads 
should have no effect on the cracks (2,3). Hence, it was concluded that 
repairs can be made while the erection and construction are continued. 
Recommendations for Repair/Fracture Control 
In order to prevent possible subsequent crack growth during the service 
life of the Cuyahoga River Bridge the following repair procedures were used ( 3}. 
(1) Cracks between Stiffener Welds and Webs: Since these cracks are 
parallel to the stress field, then need not be repaired. The short length of 
the weld cracked from the web at the end of the stiffener has no significant 
influence on the performance of the web stiffeners and there will not be any 
crack propagation under subsequent traffic loads. 
(2) Cracks in the Stiffener Helds: The cracks, t·hat have propagated into 
the ~eld near the stiffener end should be repaired by grinding out the crack. 
The ground out region should be checked by non-destructive inspection to insure 
re=~~al of the crack. 
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(3) and (4) Cracks Propagated into the Web Plate: These cracks are 
of concern during the service life of the structure and further propagation 
in the \veb or into the flange must be prevented. 
This can be accomplished by drilling 7/16 in. {11 mm) holes at the 
end or the tip of each crack as shmm ·in Fig. 16d. The cylindrical surface 
of the hole should be ground smooth. 
8 
Sample Plug Holes: The holes cut into the web to prevent removal of the 
sample plugs will serve as crack arrestors and should remain provided the 
crack tip has not extended into the web plate. To eliminate any remaining 
crack tips, holes can be drilled adjacent to the plug holes as shown in Fig .. l6d. 
These holes can be ground smooth, painted, and filled up with special non-
corrosive filler. 
4. ACTUAL REPAIR/FRACTURE CONTROL EFFORTS 
Ohio-DOT and the contractor of the Cuyahoga River Bridge superstructure 
concurred with the recommendations given in (3) regarding the repair and 
fracture control. 
5. POSSIBLE ADVERSE EFFECTS OF REPAIR 
No adverse effects are <.::Xpected. 
6. ACTUAL OR ESTIMATED REPAIR/REHABILITATION COSTS 
The original total cost of the structure (or total bid price) is 
$19,747,802.36 in 1972 which includes the superstructure only. The sub-
structures were contracted separately. 
The total cost of the field inspect:on and repair was $169,495.28. 
-26S.-
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Fig. 1 General View of Cuyahoga River Bridge (No. CUY-80-1843) 
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Girder 1204 CL 
Web 
l}: 
AA 
Longitudinal stiffeners at 0/5. 
2 Transverse stiffeners on both sides 
ot CB 1 near side only at other locations. 
3 ·9in. weld return at end of stiffener 
web weld. 
4 All crocks ore only visible on the near 
side of web. No through crocks 
observed. · 
Fjg. 5 Typical Cracks in Girder 1204 CL of 
Cuyahoga River Bridge (CUY-80-1843) 
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Fig. 6 Schematic of Crack Growth between Transverse Stiffener 
Weld and Web -- Crack Type (1) 
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Fig. 7 Sample Plug from Girder 1204 CL . 
(Note crack in weld and crack between weld and web) 
(Note Fig. 5 for location of sample plug) 
Fig. 8 Nacro-etched Section of Stiffener Weld 
showing crack between weld and web -- Crack Type (1) 
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Fig. 10 Macro-etched Section of Weld and Web 
Showing Crack Surface in l~eld (see also Fig. 7) 
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Fig. 12 Macro.:.etched Section of Right Portion of Saw Cut 
Sample Plug from Girder 1102G 
(Note Crack Growth Into and Up Web) 
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Fig. 15 Fatigue Crack Striations in Region 1 
(see sketch and Fig. 7) --
Height of the phato about 0.0001 in. - 19000X 
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Plug Hole 
Fig. 16 Schematic for Suggested Retrofit/Repair Procedures 
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10. FLOOR B~~ CONNECTION PLATES 
One of the most common sources of fatigue cracks during the past 
seven or eight years is the cracking in the web gaps at the ends of floor 
beam connection plates. These plates have been welded to the web and 
often the compression flange of the main longitudinal girders, but have 
not been attached to the tension flange. At least 28 bridge structures 
have developed cracks at these connections. 
Distortion of the transverse connection plate web gap .in the longi-
tudinal girders occurs as a result of deformation in the floor beam. The 
floor beam end rotation caused by bending of the floor beam and the rela-
tive end movements creates large cyclic stress conditions that leads to 
rapid development of fatigue cracks when the structure is on a high volume 
road. Even less heavily traveled bridges crack with time. 
A detailed discussion of two typical cases is provided hereafter for 
bridges I.D. 13 and I.D. 58. The Poplar Street Bridge (I.D. 13), was 
one of the first bridge structures that exhibited cracking in the web 
·gap at floor beam connection plates. 
After discovery of similar web cracks in floor bea~girder bridges in 
· 1978, Iowa DOT conducted a detailed survey of 39 structures with comparable 
details. The Polk County Bridge near Des Moines (I.D. 58) is typical of 
the type o.f structure and illustrates· the cracking that developed and the 
retrofit proceudres used to correct the condition. Twenty-one of the 39 
structures in Iowa were found to have some evidence of cracking. 
Cracks have been found in at least six states with this type of bridge 
and general detail at the floor beam girder connections. 
-287-
10.1 FATIGUE/FRACTURE ANALYSIS 
OF 
"POPLAR STREET COMPLEX" BRIDGES 
--.A Brief Summary 
I.D. No. 13 
Town/City/etc. East St. 
Railway/Highway/Avenue I-55 and 
County St. Clair 
State/Province Illinois 
Louis 
I-70 
County 
Owner Illinois-DOT 
-288-
1. DESCRIPTION AND HISTORY OF THE BRIDGE 
Brief bescription of Structure 
The Poplar Street Complex Bridges are located on the east bank of the 
Mississippi River in East St. Louis, Illinois. The complex is one of the 
largest and busiest interchanges in the State of Illinois. It serves as 
a focal point for Interstate Highways I-55, I-70 and U. S. Route 40 which 
join and cross the Mississippi River. It starts with the Poplar Street 
Bridge over the Mississippi River on the west and ends northeast of 
Broadway in East St. Louis, as shown in Fig. 1. It consists of several 
ramps and viaducts consisting of multispan continuous two girder type of 
bridges, as shown in Fig. 2. 
The majority of the two-girder I-beam bridges in the complex are on 
horizontal curves with radii approximately 1800 ft. (550 m). The tor-
sional and side-sway (transverse) rigidty of the system are provided by 
closely spaced transverse floor beams which are rigidly connected to the 
two main girders. The floor beams support the longitudinal stringers 
and the reinforced concrete deck, .as shown in Fig. 3. 
Brief History of the Bridge and Cracking 
The Poplar Street Complex Bridges were designed in 1964. The entire 
complex was designed by a consulting engineering firm for the Illinois 
Department of Highways Bridge Division. The design of the welded details 
and transverse stiffeners conformed to the AASHO and State of Illinois 
design specifications and current practice in effect in 1964 and throughout 
the design period. The structures were built between 1967 and 1971. 
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In late 1973, the complex was inspected in depth for the firsi time 
by a bridge inspection team from the Illinois Department of Transportation. 
During this inspection, several types of cracks and web buckling were dis-
covered and reported (1). The fatigue cracks consisted of the following 
conditions (1,2,3): 
Fatigue cracks in the bottom "web gap" region of main girders 
at floor beam connection plates 
Fatigue cracks in the upper "web gap" region of main girders 
at floor beam connection plates 
Fatigue cracks in the girder webs at the ends of bearing 
stiffeners of the main girders. 
These latter cracks were located at the ends of the continuous main 
girders. In addition to these cracks, there were instances of web buckling 
at the girder end supports a few inches above the bottom flange (1,2,4). 
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2. FAILURE MODES AND FAILURE ANALYSIS 
Location of Fracture, Failure Modes and Stages 
The general location of the fatigue cracks were predominantly near 
the supports or adjacent to the piers of the bridges in the complex. These 
cracks can be grouped into three general types as follows (2,3,4): 
1. Fatigue cracks in the web in the bot tom "web gap" region between 
the lower end of the floor beam-to-main girder connecting plate 
and the bottom flange of the main girder (web cracks in lower or 
bottom "web gap" region) (see Fig. 4). 
2. Fatigue cracks in the web in the upper "web gap" region between 
the top end of the floor beam to girder connecting plate and the 
top flange of the main girder (web cracks in the top or upper 
"web gap" region) (see Fig. 5). 
3. Fatigue cracks at the ends of bearing stiffeners which were also 
used as floor bea~to-girder connection plate. 
Types 1 and 3 web cracks were near the end supports of the main 
·girders. However, Type 2 web cracks were only observed at the upper end 
of the floor beam connecting plates which were located in the negative 
moment regions. There were no web cracks detected in the positive moment 
regions of the spans. 
Type 1 web cracks were first observed at the end of the girder under 
the end of floor beam connecting plate which was positioned 7 in. (18 em) 
toward the center of the span from the center of the be~ring stiffeners. 
Most of these cracks started near the lo~er end of the vertical connecting 
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plate and extended in both directions in the girder web as shown in Fig. 4. 
The longest crack was 19 in. (48 em) long. Occasionally two cracks were 
observed at the same location; one immediately under the lower end of 
connecting plate, the other among the edge of the web-to-flange weld toe. 
The former was shorter in length than the latter. The Type 2 web cracks 
in the upper gap regions were found in the negative moment·regions (see 
Fig. S) where the floor beam connection plate was not welded to the tension 
flange. 
The Type 3 cracks occurred at bearing stiffeners which were also used 
as a connecting plate for the end floor beam at a few supports or piers. 
These cracks were observed at the top end of the bearing stiffener which 
was not welded to the top flange. 
In addition to the fatigue cracks, web buckling was also observed at 
the end of several girders. This buckling of the \veb occurred a few b.ches 
above the bottom flange and was often associated with the separation of 
the top bearing plate from the bottom flange of the girder due to the 
seized expansion bearings. In some cases, web cracking developed above 
the web-to-bottom flange weld toe. This crack started ·at the end of the 
girder and progressed horizontally toward the bearing stiffeners. 
Cyclic Loads and Stresses (Known or Field Recorded) 
The mainline ISS and 170 east and westbound structures were subjected 
to 5250 ADTT (multi units per structure) in 1980. Several of the ramps 
experience about 200 ADTT. The ADTT has varied between 4000 and· 5250 since 
the mainline structures was opened in 1967. 
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In order to determine which mode of displacement was causin~ the web 
cracking, a series of field measurements were conducted in July, 1975. The 
web gaps at several floor beams were selected for the strain measurements. 
Some of the typical locations were (2): 
1. At the end of the girder where the floor beam connected to a 
connection plate 6 in. (152 mm) away from the bearing stiffener. 
2. At the end of the girder where the floor beam connected directly 
to the bearing stiffener. 
3. At intermediate floor beams 
At the floor beam-bearing stiffener connection, gages were placed at 
each end of the connection plate-bearing stiffener~ All other strain 
gages were placed near the web gap between the end of the connection plate 
and the tension flange as illustrated in Fig. 6. 
Behavior at End Supports 
When the connection plate also served as a bearing stiffener, it was 
not welded to the flange at either end. No crack had formed at the lower 
gap, however, cracks had developed at the upper end of stiffener-connection 
plate. The strain gradient and stress range spectrum at the lower gap 
were relatively small, i.e. the adjusted root-mean-square stress range was 
5
rRMS 
SrRMS 
6.54 ksi, while at the upper gap the adjusted stress range was 
14.4 ksi, as can be seen in Fig. 7. Figure 8 shows the time-
-stress response at the end support and at interior floor beam connections. 
At the end reaction the. stress range was always-less than 5 ksi 
.;.;hich indicated that cracking wou1d not develop, and none '..Jas observed. 
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Since the connection plate at the end reaction was welded to the top 
flange, no movement could occur and no damage was detected. 
Behavior at Interior Floor Beams (Positive Moment Region) 
The connection plates were tight fitted to the tension flange and 
welded to the top compressi-on flange in the positive moment regions. A 
stiffener was also welded to the outside web surface and cut short of the 
flange by about 5/8 in. (16 rnm), as shown in Fig. 5. No cracks were 
observed in the positive moment regions. The strain gage meaasurements 
indicated that stresses were below the fatigue limit, as can be seen in 
Fig. 8. 
Behavior of Floor Beams (Negative Moment Region) 
In the negative moment regions where the connection plates were not 
welded to the top flange, cracks developed. The strain measurements indi-
cated that the stress range at the weld toe was high even at the end of 
cracked "webs, as can be seen in Fig. 8. At the bottom gap, the connection 
plates were welded to the flange, and no cracks were detected. 
Behavior at Interior Supports 
The strain measurements at interior supports showed that web gap 
strains were small and comparable to those at interior floor beams at 
positive moment regions. The reason for this is that at the interior sup-
port, there is a concentrated reaction force which creates frictional 
resistance bet~een the ends of the connection plate and the flanges: 
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However, at least one location experienced a large crack at an in.terior 
support, as can be seen in Fig. 9. This crack was discovered in January 
1978. No retrofit holes have been installed at the interior support. 
Temperature and Environmental Effects (Known or Field Recorded) 
These effects did not appear to play a significant role in the 
fatigue cracks that developed in the main girder webs of the Poplar Street 
complex. However, the thermal movement of the girders caused the girder 
to bend because of the seized expansion bearing. This resulted in a sepa-
ration between the bottom flange and the top bearing plate and contributed 
to web buckling, as illustrated in Fig. 10. 
Material "Fracture, Mechanical and Chemical Properties" 
l~o information was acquired as it was not considered to contribute to 
the development of fatigue cracks in girder webs. 
Visual and Fractographic Analysis 
No crack samples were removed from the girder web. 
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3. CONCLUSIONS/RECOMHENDATIONS 
Conclusions Regarding the Fracture/Failure 
The cracks in the web gaps between the end of the floor beam connec-
tion plates and the gi·rder flanges are all fatigue related. These fatigue 
cracks have resulted from cyclic out-of-plane web bending stresses due to 
out-of-plane displacement of the web in the gap region, as shown in Fig .. 6. 
The severity of this displacement was greatest at the end bearing, at the 
top flange of intermediate floor beams in the negative moment regions of 
the girder, and at the top flange of interior supports. This was confirmed 
by field test measurements in typical gap regions under actual traffic 
conditions (2). The rotation of the floor beam which ·was rigidly connected 
to the main girder pushed the web out-of-plane, v."hich caused high cyclic 
stresses along the toe of the web-to-flange welds and the stiffener connec-
tion plate ends. 
The longitudinal orientation of the cracks in girder web relative to 
the stresses from loading are such that they do not affect the girder 
strength. However, corrective repairs were needed to prevent the cracks 
from growing perpendicular to the stresses in girder webs. 
Recommendation for Repair/Fracture Control 
Based on the observed behavior at the Popl.ar Street Complex, the fol-
lowing procedures for repair and corrective action were used (2): 
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At Girder Ends: 
1. In general, welding the floor beam connection plates to the 
flanges would prevent the relative displacement that occurred 
between the end of the connection plate and the girder flange. 
Figure 11 shows retrofit procedures for the cracked and buckled 
ends. 
2. At the ends of the existing web cracks along the weld toe of the 
web-to-flange connections (at either top or bottom flange) 5/8 in. 
(16 mm) holes were drilled through the web, as shown in Fig. lla. 
3. The web cracks at the ends of connection plates or stiffener-
connection plates were also drilled to prevent cracks from 
propagating. 
4. The cracks were gouged and welded up to the hoie and then the 
surfaces were painted. 
At Interior Floor Beams and Interior Supports: 
1. Holes should be drilled at the end of the cracks similar to the 
case shown in Fig. 12, and the crack should be grouted with an 
epoxy and painted over to prevent rust formation. Two holes 
were drilled near the ends of the crack along the web-flange 
weld, as shown in Fig. 12. Holes were also drilled on each side 
of the stiffener to permit the crack to develop between them and 
accommodate out-of-plane displacements. This will not likely 
prevent rusting, because of the continued relative movements of 
the crack surfaces.· 
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Crack Growth (Initiation and Propagation) 
and Probable Causes of Cracking 
The measurements at all floor beam locations indicated that the pri-
mary stresses occurring in the web gap regions were due to an out-of-plane 
movement of the girder web. This resulted from the rotation of the ends 
of the floor beams as they "were loaded by traffic passing over the bridge 
structure. Since the floor beam connection· plates were welded to the main 
girder web, and in some cases the compression flange, the floor beam end 
rotation was transmitted into the web by the connection plate. The connec-
tion plate stiffened most of the region of the web where it was attached. 
Consequently, the rotation of the ends of the floor beam forced the web 
gap to deform, as sho~~ schematically in Fig. 6. This resulted in-high 
stresses in the web gap regions where the upper and lower flanges of the 
main girder were restrained against twisting. Fatigue cracks developed 
at the end of the stiffener welds and along the toe of web-to-flange welds. 
4. ACTUAL REPAIR/FRACTURE CONTROL EFFORTS 
The recommendations were implemented by the Illinois-DOT in 1975-76. 
Holes were drilled in the girder webs at 751 locations, as shown sche-
matically in Fig. 12. Ninety-seven of these lo.cations were known to have 
cracks. In addition, at the girder ends, the stiffeners were welded to 
the tension flanges, as shown in Fig. 11. Figure 13 shows the retrofitted 
ends of two girders. Also apparent are the neoprene bearings that were 
installed in place of the rocker supports. The large crack sho\m i~ Fig. 9 
V.'as repaired by installing splice plates ,,,hich can be seen in Fig. 14; 
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5. POSSIBLE ADVERSE EFFECTS OF REPAIR 
All web cracks were parallel to the primary bending stresses in the 
girder web. After the corrective action and repairs were performed, no 
adverse effects are expected. Routine inspection should permit any crack 
initiation at the drilled holes to be detected. The retrofit of the web 
cracks was carried out in 1975-76. No cracks have reinitiated from the 
drilled holes up to 1981. 
6. ACTUAL OR ESTIMATED REPAIR/REHABILITATION COSTS 
The original construction cost of the Poplar Street complex 
was $18,185,555. 
The repairs to the girder ends, the drilling of.holes at inter-
mediate floor beams in the negative moment regions and the replace-· 
ment of bearings cost $3,387,730.80 
The large crack found at the pier of Ramp C was retrofitted by 
district maintenance per~onnel at an estimated cost of $38,522.16. 
-299-
7. REFERENCES 
1. Bureau of Design, Bridge and Traffic Structures Section 
"Investigation Report on Poplar Street Complex Bridge, 
East St. Louis, St. Clair County, Illinois11 . Illinois 
Department of Transportation Report, June 1974. 
2. Fisher, J. W. 11 Report on Investigation of the Girder Web Crackings 
at Floor Beam Connection Plates of Poplar Street 
Complex" prepared for H. W. Lochner, Inc., Consulting 
Engineers, Chicago, Illinois, October 1975. 
3. Fisher, J. W. 11Fatigue Cracking in Bridges from Out-of-Plane Dis-
placements11 Canadian Journal of Civil Engineering, 
Vol. 5, No. 4, 1978, pp. 542-556. 
4. Hsiang, W. 
"Repair of Poplar Street Complex Bridges in East St. Louis" 
Transportation Research Record 664, Bridge Engineering 
Vol. I (Preceedings of a Conference by Transportation 
Research Board, September 25-27, 1978, pp. 110-119) 
-300-
Fig. 1 Layout of the Poplar Street Approaches 
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Fig. 5 Crack in Web of Negative Moment Region 
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10.2 FATIGUE/FRACTURE ANALYSIS 
OF 
DES MOINES (POLK COUNTY) BRIDG~ 
.-- A Brief Summary --
I.D. No. 58 
Town/City/etc. Four Mile Twp. and Des Moines, Iowa 
Railway/Highway/Avenue: Iowa Route 163 
County Polk County, Iowa 
State/:rovince Iowa 
Owner Iowa-DOT 
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1. DESCRIPTION AND HISTORY OF THE BRIDGE 
Brief.Description of Structure: 
The Des Moines (Polk County) Bridge carries east and westbound traffic 
over th~ Chicago Rock Island and Pacific Railroad (C.R.I. and P.R.R.) 
tracks and the East Four Mile Creek on Route 163. The bridge is located 
near Des Moines, Iowa. Th~ east and westbound bridges are two similar, 
but separate structures. 
Each skew bridge structure is composed of two continuous welded 
girders with transverse stiffeners 590 ft. long supporting a 30 ft. road-
way. The east end span is 91ft. -0 in. long, and the west end span is 
118 ft. - 0 in. long. The two interior spans are. each 127 ft. - 0 in. long. 
The slab is 7-1/4 in. thick reinforced concrete supported by two 18 WF 45 
stringers and the two main girders (see Fig. 1). The floor slab includes 
one-half inch wearing surface. The plan and elevation of the bridge are 
given in Figs. 1 and 2. Typical intermediate and pier cross sections are 
shown in Fig. 3. 
The two main girder webs are 74 in. deep. The floor beams supporting 
the stringers have 48 in. x 5/16 in. web plates with alternating trans-
verse stiffeners. 
The Des Moines Bridge was designed for H20-SK loading. There was 
19 lb./sq. ft. of roadway added for future wearing surface. The design 
is based on the 1961 AASHO Specifications and 1960 Iowa-DOT Standard Speci~ 
fications and current Special Provisions and Supplemental Specifications. 
All members were fabricated from A36 steel. 
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Brief History of the Structure and Cracking: 
The Des Moines Bridge was constructed in 1962 and opened to traffic 
in 1963 (Ref. 1). The volume of truck traffic crossing the bridge in 1979 
was 500 vehicles per day (Ref. 1). 
In 1979, several fatigue cracks were discovered in the webs of main 
girders of the Des Moines Bridge (Ref. 2). These cracks were in the 
negative moment regions along the upper web-to-flange fillet welds above 
the floor beam connecting plate. Several vertical cracks were observed 
in the fillet welds joining the floor beam connecting plates to the girder 
web (Ref. 2) and in the web several inches below the web flange connection. 
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2. FAILURE MODES AND FAILURE ANALYSIS 
Location of Fracture, Failure Modes and Stages: 
Several web cracks were discovered by the Iowa-DOT personnel in 1979 
(Ref. 2) in the negative moment regions of the main girders of the Des 
Moines Bridge. All cracks were detected in the floor beam connection 
plates nearest to the skew~d piers in the negative moment regions. Two 
types of web cracks were observed: (1) Horizontal fatigue cracks in the 
main girder webs along the toe of the web-to-flange fillet welds. These 
cracks were 3 to 6 in. long and are shown schematically in ·Fig. 5. 
3 
Figure 6 shows photographs of the inside and outside web surfaces indicat-
_ing cracking has developed on each side of the web plate. (2) Vertical 
weld cracks were also observed at the top ends of the floor beam connect-
ing plate, as shown in Figs. 5 and 6. At several locations these cracks 
stopped after propagating downward for an i.nch or so and intersected the 
second web crack shown in Fig. 6. 
On-site examination of the web cracks in the main girders of the 
Des Moines Bridge indicated that. all were fatigue cracks (Ref. 1). The 
principal cause of the cracking is the out-of-plane deformation of the 
girder webs in the small gaps at the ends of the floor beam connection 
plates. The fatigue crack development in the girder webs in the negative 
moment regions is a result of the. web being forced out-of-plane by the 
floor beam end rotation in the small gaps between the end of the floor 
beam connec~ion plates and web-to-flange welds (Refs. 1,2). Since the 
slab constrains the girder top flange at these locations, and the con-
nection plate has its strong·axis perpendicular to the web,end rotation of 
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the floor beam forces the web out-of-plane. When the gap is very small, 
the resulting. ~yclic stresses are very high along the upper end of the 
connection plate weld. This causes the welds to crack and separateS the 
connection plate end from the web. As the vertical cracks in the connec-
tion plate welds increase in length, the web deforms, and this results in 
high out-of-plane bending stresses. This also causes web cracks to form 
several inches below the web-to-flange weld from the double curvature 
bending in the gap. In skewed bridges the out-of-plane movement is more 
severe because of the different vertical displacements at the two ends of 
the floor beams (Ref. 1). 
Cyclic Loads and Stresses (Known or Field-Recorded): 
The ADTT is known to be 500 vehicles in 1979 (2.). No stress me.asure-
ments are available. 
Temperature and Environmental Effects (Known or Field-Recorded): 
Temperature and other environmental effects do not appear to have 
contributed to the development of cracks. The cracks were developed from 
stresses as a result of truck traffic. They occur from out-of-plane 
diSplacements in the girder web gaps at floor beam connection plates in 
negative moment regions. 
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Haterial "Fracture, Hechanical, Chemical Properties" 
Analysis in Failure Regions: 
No material tests were carried out other than those reported on the 
mill reports. No Charpy V-Notch tests are available. 
Visual and Fractographic Examination: 
5 
Only visual observations were made on the cracks detected in the welds 
and web. 
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3. CONCLUSIONS AND RECO~lliENDATIONS 
Conclusions Regarding Fracture/Failure: 
The Type 1 and 2 cracks discovered in the main girders of the 
Des Moines Bridges were all fatigue cracks. Each of these skew bridges 
consists of two main girders with floor beams and stringers. The fatigue 
cracks developed where the·floor beams next to the piers are connected tq 
the main girders. The floor beams next to the piers are bolted to 
intermediate stiffeners or connecting plates nine inches away from bearing 
stiffeners. The cracks are caused by the out-of-plane displacements of 
the girder web in the negative moment regions at floor beam connecting 
plates. ~.;relded to the web (see also Fig. 7). The. horizontal cracks at the 
toes of the flange-web fillet weld developed where the web out-of-plane 
displacements were relatively large because of the skewed bridge 
configuration. 
Vertical cracks along the connection plate girder web welds developed 
.. 
from the upper end of these welds. In several cases, further horizontal 
cracks developed in the web. These resulted from double curvature bend-
ing resulting from the out-of-plane displacement of the girder web due to 
rotations of the floor beam connection plates under cyclic traffic 
loads (1,3). 
Both types of cracking are shown schematically in Fig. 7. 
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Recommendations for Repair/Fracture Control: 
There are several ways to retrofit the fatigue cracks that developed 
in the main girder webs of the Des Moines Bridge. These are as follows (1): 
(a) One possibility is to weld the floor beam connection plates 
to the top flange of the girder in the negative moment regions 
as shown in Fig. 8. This provides a fatigue Category C condi-· 
~ion (3). Welding the connection plates to the top flange 
would minimize the relative out-of-plane movement of the 
girder web in the negative moment region. Some difficulties 
may develop in obtaining good welds under field conditions. 
In addition, holes should be drilled in the web at the ends 
of all existing cracks to prevent further crack propagation. 
(b)· An alternate solution j_s to re.move part of the connecting 
plate and opposite web stiffener, so that a significant gap 
exists between the end of the transverse plate and the re-
strained tension flange. This solution is shown schematically 
in Fig. 9. 
Additionally, all web cracks should have holes drilled at 
their ends in order to arrest further fatigue crack growth. 
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4. ACTUAL REPAIR/FRACTURE CONTROL EFFORTS 
The information and data for the retrofit of the Des Moines (Polk 
County) Bridge w~re provided by Iowa-DOT. After visual and dye penetra-
tion i~spection of the fatigue cracks, the following retrofit scheme was 
used (4): 
(a) In the negative moment regions, the top portion of the stiff-
ener (which is also the connecting plate for the floor beam 
or diaphragms) was removed by flame-cutting, and the surfaces 
were ground smooth as shown in Figs. 9 and 10. 
(b) There were 3/4 in. ¢ holes drilled at the ends of the cracks 
in order to arrest further growth. This is.shown in Fig. 11. 
(c) In the negative moment regions at the piers, the pier stiff-
eners were bolted to the girder top flange using ~ clip angle 
on each side of the stiffener. In order to facilitate this 
repair, a rectangular section of the reinforced concrete 
deck above the pier stiffener was cut out in order to drill 
holes in the top flange and install the bolts. After install-
ation of the bolts, the holes were filled with concrete, as 
shown in Fig. 12. 
5. POSSIBLE ADVERSE EFFECTS OF REPAIR 
No adverse behavior is expected from the retrofit. 
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6. ACTUAL OR ESTIMATED REPAIR/REHABILITATION COSTS 
Cost of Investigation: 
This was approximately $3000. 
Cost of Repair/Rehabilitation: 
Cost of retrofitting the Des Moines (Polk County) Bridge in 1980 was 
$35,900. 
Original Cost of the Bridge: 
The construction contract for the bridge was $438,952 in 1964. 
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